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Committed To The Cause?  
Violent and Financial Criminal Behaviors of Domestic Far-Rightists 
By 
Ashmini G. Kerodal. 
Advisor: Professor Joshua D. Freilich 
This study used factor analysis, logistic and multinomial logistic regression analysis to 
evaluate the effects of an individual’s level of commitment to far-right extremism on his / her 
criminal offending behavior. Agnew’s General Strain Theory (2001, 2005), Cloward and Ohlin’s 
Differential Opportunity Theory (1960) and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free / 
movement spaces were used to address the three research questions: (1) What effect did 
individual level stressors, significant others, and negative interactions with government officials 
have on membership in a far-right group, (2) What effect did individual level stressors, 
significant others, membership in an extremist group, and negative interactions with government 
officials have on an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism, (3) What effect did an 
individual’s commitment to far-right extremism, and membership in extremist groups have on 
his / her criminal behavior?   
This study investigated whether strain factors alone influenced radicalization, or if there 
was a combination of strain factors – including negative interactions with law enforcement – and 
interactions with other extremists that influenced levels of commitment to rightwing extremism. 
This study defined radicalization as “the process by which individuals become violent 




further political, social, or religious goals” (NIJ 2012 Research on Domestic Radicalization 
Solicitation, p. 4). 
Commitment to rightwing extremism was conceptualized as commitment to far-rightist 
norms, similar to Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) definition of commitment to delinquent norms or 
the extent of indoctrination into a deviant subculture. This variable drew on themes found in 
previous research on extremism (Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 
2004, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011, 2008). A factor analysis was used to check the 
validity of the commitment to far-right extremism scale.  
Another unique characteristic of this study was that its dependent variable of criminal 
behavior included both violent (i.e., fatal) incidents and financial schemes. Data were obtained 
from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), a Department of Homeland Security/START-
funded project led by Dr. Joshua D. Freilich and Dr. Steven Chermak. Illegal violent incidents 
and financial schemes committed by domestic extremist that resulted in criminal charged were 
included in the ECDB. Violent incidents were defined as homicides, and financial schemes were 
defined as “illicit financial operation[s] involving a set of activities [i.e. techniques] carried out 
by one or more perpetrators to obtain unlawful gain or other economic advantage through the use 
of deliberate deception” (Belli, 2011, p. 64).  
The study found that GST did not predict membership in extremist groups, but was 
associated with a higher risk of committing a homicide. Group membership was predicted by 
access to extremist groups and a possible predisposition or sympathy towards extremist beliefs. 
However, none of the theories explained levels of commitment to extremism. Instead, 
differences were found between two types of DFRs: Conspiracy Theorists and Proud 




while Proud Supremacists were more likely to have been white males who experienced strain 
and had extremist referent others. Finally, the presence of strain and a prior prison record were 
associated with violent criminal behavior of DFRs. High levels of commitment to extremism, 
female gender, and the absence of strain (i.e., held a good job and did not have prior negative 
interactions with government officials) were associated with an increased risk of financial 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
This study examined variables that influenced commitment to rightwing extremist 
ideology, group membership and criminal behavior of Domestic Far-Rightists (DFRs) between 
2006 and 2010. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, research on international, 
transnational (e.g., Enders & Sandler, 2005; Sandler & Enders, 2004; Smilansky, 2004) and 
domestic terrorism, perpetrated by radical Islamic fundamentalists (e.g., Jenkins, 2010; Vidino, 
2009), has flourished, while research on the domestic far-right has been less frequently studied. 
However, domestic extremists also pose a threat. Acts of domestic terrorism have been found to 
outnumber transnational events by as much as 7 to 1 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, 
Fogg & Scott, 2006). Domestic extremists, including DFRs and Al Qaeda-inspired Islamic 
extremists, have committed more than 700 financial schemes since 1990 (Freilich, Chermak, 
Belli, Gruenewald & Parkin, 2014). These financial schemes resulted in financial losses in 
excess of $650,000,000 (Freilich, et al., 2014). DFRs were responsible for close to 80% of these 
financial schemes (Freilich, et al., 2014) and the majority of these financial losses.   
DFRs have been known to engage in a range of political and criminal activities in 
addition to acts of terrorism and terrorism-financing crimes. These activities aim to inspire social 
and political change through both legal channels (e.g., writing petitions and lobbying) and illegal 
means, such as acts of terrorism (Aho, 1990; Hamm, 1993; Simi, 2010; Smith, 1994). DFRs have 
committed more than 370 homicides between 1990 and 2010 (Freilich, et al., 2014). These 
homicide incidents were responsible for the deaths of more than 600 people (Freilich, et al., 
2014). This figure included deaths attributed to hate crimes and acts of terrorism. Approximately 




private security guards (Freilich, et al., 2014). These findings indicated that DFRs posed an 
additional threat to law enforcement (Chermak, Freilich & Simone Jr., 2010; Freilich & 
Chermak, 2009; “Officer Safety and Extremists,” n.d.).  
This study filled a gap in the terrorism literature by using factor analysis, logistic 
regression analysis and multinomial logistic regression analysis to determine: (1) if individual 
level stressors, the presence of extremist friends / family and prior negative interactions with 
government officials influenced membership in formal extremist groups; (2) if individual level 
stressors, the presence of extremist friends / family and prior negative interactions with 
government officials influenced commitment to rightwing extremism; and (3) the impact of 
commitment to rightwing extremist ideology and group membership on criminal behavior. 
Criminal behavior was operationalized as involvement in a homicide incident or in a financial 
scheme. For the purpose of this study, homicide was defined as when a person purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently caused the death of another human being (MPC § 210.1) in 
which at least one perpetrator was affiliated with the far-right (Freilich, et al, 2014; Gruenewald, 
2011), and a financial scheme was defined as an “illicit financial operation involving a set of 
activities [i.e., techniques] carried out by one or more perpetrators to obtain unlawful gain or 
other economic advantage through the use of deliberate deception” (Belli, 2011, p.64).  
Agnew’s (2005) General Strain Theory (GST) of crime, Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) 
Differential Opportunity Theory and Simi, and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free / movement 
spaces provided a theoretical framework for the study (a detailed discussion of these theories and 
related concepts can be found in chapter 2). 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this project’s innovative 




looked at extremism and radicalization typically separate individuals into two categories: 
radicalized or not radicalized. This method does not capture whether criminal behavior was 
influenced by levels of commitment to an extremist ideology. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued 
that fully indoctrinated members of a deviant subculture were more committed to the delinquent 
norms of that sub-culture and less constrained by the beliefs and values of conventional society. 
Although differential opportunity theory has been extensively tested in relation to youth gangs, 
no previous study has attempted to empirically test Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) argument on far-
right (FR) groups. Instead, it was merely assumed that people who were more committed to an 
extremist cause are also more willing to risk death, injury or criminal charges in support of that 
cause. 
Second, this project tested Agnew’s General Strain Theory (GST) on a random sample of 
DFRs and with an individual level (micro) unit measurement. Previous studies on the DFR have 
examined strain conditions by means of observation (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; Simi & Futrell, 2010) 
and interviews (e.g., Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993) in non-random 
samples. This dissertation was the first quantitative examination of GST and terrorism that 
utilized an individual level unit of analysis on a representative sample of DFRs.   
The sample consisted of all known DFRs who were convicted of a violent or financial 
crime that occurred (all or in part) between 2006 and 2010. The sample was obtained from the 
US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which was created from open source documents. It could 
be argued that since the media did not provide equal coverage to all crimes, the possibility of 
missing cases and non-random selection would be a concern. However, Chermak, Freilich, 
Parkin and Lynch (2011) found that when multiple open source documents were used, the 




concluded that a sample drawn from a wide range of open source documents would be 
representative of the population. 
A key variable tested in this study was prior negative interactions with government 
officials, which included law enforcement and court officials. Therefore, evidence-based 
recommendations were formulated to reduce the radicalizing effects of negative interactions with 
government officials. Prior research found that negative interactions with government officials 
could have inspired far-rightists (or borderline far-rightists) to become more radicalized (Aho, 
1990). This is likely to occur if far-rightists interpreted law enforcement behavior as evidence of 
the validity of their rightwing extremist ideology.  
Fourth, this study was the first to simultaneously examine violent and financial crimes 
committed by extremists, in this case far-rightists. Previous studies on the criminal behavior of 
DFRs have examined: (1) far-rightists who commit acts of terrorism (e.g., LaFree & Dugan, 
2007; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006; LaFree, Morris & Dugan, 2010; Smith 1994); (2) 
hate crimes (e.g., Green, Glaser & Rich, 1998; Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald & Pridemore, 
2012; Hamm, 1993); and (3) general terrorism financing and other financial crimes (e.g., Belli, 
2011). Therefore, a more complete picture of the criminal behavior of far-rightists was obtained. 
DFRs have been charged with a range of criminal behavior, such as money laundering, hate 
crimes, homicide, tax evasion and non-ideological or common crimes (Belli, 2011; Freilich, et al, 
2014; Smith, 1994; Smith, Damphousse, Jackson & Sellers, 2002). Knowledge of the range of 
criminal behaviors committed by the far-right was especially important as hard control measures 
(i.e., crack downs) by law enforcement may have unintended consequences or a negligible effect 




This study examined all known far-rightists who were convicted of a homicide or 
financial scheme that occurred during the years 2006 to 2010, as well as their non-extremist co-
offenders. Non-extremist offenders were an important comparison group, since Aho (1990), Blee 
(2002) and Chermak (2002) all mentioned the importance of ‘seekers’ (Aho’s term) as an initial 
step in the radicalization process. (See literature review section for discussion.) Unlike 
homicides, financial schemes could have lasted for prolonged periods. To have been included in 
the study, at least a portion of the crime must have occurred during 2006 to 2010. The cut-off 
point was set at 2010 to allow for sufficient time for the trial to conclude.  Homicides and 
financial schemes perpetrated for ideological or non-ideological motives were included in the 
study, which facilitated comparisons between far-rightists who offend to obtain some 
social/political end and far-rightists who were convicted of routine (non-ideologically motivated) 
crimes. Results from the ECDB found that 40% of both financial schemes and homicide 
incidents perpetrated by far-rightists were not motivated by their extremist ideology (Freilich, et 
al., 2014). These findings suggest that both ideologically and non-ideologically motivated crimes 
by DFRs should be analyzed to obtain an accurate picture of far-rightists’ criminal behavior 
patterns and to create successful crime prevention policies (Chermak, Freilich & Simone, 2010).  
Data on prior offenses were used to determine patterns of far-rightists’ offending 
behavior over the life-course and whether offending behavior was influenced by interactions 
with government officials.  The ECDB found that about 40% of DFRs who committed an 
ideologically based homicide had also committed a prior crime, 90% of which were not 
ideologically motivated (Freilich, et al., 2014). These data had intriguing implications, as they 
suggested that interactions with law enforcement (e.g., arrest, trial and conviction) contributed to 




interactions with law enforcement further radicalized DFRs, then a more strategic approach to 
curtailing their financial and violent crime should be formulated.  
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the American far-right movement. This overview 
formed the basis for operationalizing a key variable for this study: commitment to rightwing 
extremism. The discussion of the far-right is followed by the study’s theoretical framework: 
Agnew’s General Strain Theory (2001, 2005), Cloward and Ohlin’s Differential Opportunity 
Theory (1960) and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free or movement spaces. Chapter 3 
discusses the relevant literature about factors that contribute to membership in far-rightist 
groups, commitment / indoctrination into those groups and the criminal behavior of DFRs. 
Chapter 4 lists the study’s research questions and hypotheses, all firmly grounded in the 
theoretical framework and literature that is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 5 describes the 
methodology used in the study. In this chapter, detailed explanations of the variables, the sources 
of data and sampling techniques, and statistical models used to test the research questions are 
described.  Chapter 6 presents the study’s findings for the three research models. These findings 
are discussed in Chapter 7, along with the relevance of the study to the terrorism literature and its 
limitations. The conclusion, which summarized the study’s findings, contribution to the literature 










CHAPTER 2  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 The Far-right 
Based on a systematic review of scholarly literature on right-wing extremism, Freilich, 
Chermak and Caspi (2009a) defined the ideology the far-right movement as: 
fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of 
centralized federal authority, reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of 
taxes), believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal 
liberty, believe that one’s personal and/or national ‘‘way of life’’ is under attack and is either already lost or 
that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for some the threat is 
from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and believe in the need to be prepared for an attack by 
participating in paramilitary preparations, training and survivalism (p. 499). 
Several researchers have argued that the FR should have been conceptualized as a social 
movement – linked by hate sites, movement and other social events, ‘zines and music –with a 
distinct sub-culture and ideological beliefs (Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & 
Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010).  
Some of the characteristics of the far-right, described as a belief in freedom from undue 
government intervention and the inviolability of constitutional rights, are present to a lesser 
extent among mainstream conservatives. For example, the right to bear arms is conferred by the 
Second Amendment to the US Constitution; taxation without representation in the British 
Parliament was one of the causes of the American Revolution; and the phrase “life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness” was contained in the US Declaration of Independence. For that reason, 
Freilich, et al. (2009a) cautioned that care must be taken to distinguish the far-right from 




One of the key distinguishing factors of the far-right is the belief in conspiracy theories. 
Several authors have noted the importance of conspiracy theories to far-right ideology (Aho, 
1990; Barkun, 1989, 1996; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Dobratz & 
Shanks-Meile, 2006; Durham, 1996, 2003; Ezekiel, 1995; Freilich, et al., 2009; Kaplan, 1995a, 
1997; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000). These conspiracy theories are diverse, complex and not 
subscribed to by mainstream conservative movements, for example the New World Order 
(NWO) and Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG). According to Chermak (2002), the NWO is a 
plan orchestrated by the UN and international bankers, leaders and organizations to create a 
global nation and end the sovereignty of the US. Kaplan (1995a) described the ZOG as the belief 
that both the federal government and predominant culture were controlled by a Jewish 
conspiracy.  Therefore, belief in conspiracy theories was a key indicator used to distinguish 
DFRs from mainstream conservatives.  
In addition to the belief in conspiracy theories, DFRs such as Christian Identity 
adherents, Klan and Neo-Nazi group members also believe in white supremacy, i.e., the God-
given right of the white/Aryan race to rule other races (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 2000; Berlet & 
Vysotsky, 2006; Blee, 2002; Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000), or are 
opposed to race mixing in schools, communities or relationships  (Blee, 2002; Dobratz & 
Shanks-Meile, 2006; Simi, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Ezekiel (1995) and Blee (2002) argued 
that most people subscribe to a certain level of racist beliefs. Blee (2002) used Philomena 
Essed’s concept of everyday racism to describe this phenomena. Blee (2002) argued that racist 
groups transform everyday racism into extraordinary racism, which is an “ideology that 
interprets and gives meaning to a wide variety of phenomena that seem unconnected to race, 




personal issues such as the quality of family life, city services, and medical care" (2002, p. 76). 
Blee’s (2002) description of the actual transformation process of everyday racism into 
extraordinary racism is very similar to Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free spaces (see 
section 2.3 below for discussion). 
However, others have argued that the idea of white supremacy may not have been shared 
by all DFRs (Barkun, 1996; Gruenewald, Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). 
Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (2006) pointed out that while some DFRs subscribe to white 
supremacist beliefs, others may be white separatists. White separatists believe that the Aryan 
race should have separate economic and cultural lives from other racial groups. In addition, 
Barkun (1996) noted that some militia groups claimed to accept non-white members. Some 
DFRs consider racial minorities to be a minor concern and instead are anti-Semitic. However, 
other researchers of rightwing extremism (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993) have argued that 
members of racist groups (i.e., the Klans, skinhead and neo-Nazi groups) are more concerned 
with the threat posed by minorities and are socialized into anti-Semitism and belief in the ZOG 
by movement leaders. Thus, extreme racism and/or anti-Semitism could also be used to 
distinguish DFRs from mainstream conservative movements.  
According to Ezekiel (1995), leaders and lieutenants in the domestic far-right tend to be 
lifelong members of the movement, but may branch off to form new factions / groups.  Members 
also move between groups and may be loosely linked to multiple groups at the same time (Aho, 
1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Ezekiel, 1995; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Vertigans, 2007).  
Membership in the far-right movement could be divided into: (1) ordinary or casual members, 
who are not fanatical, but instead are motivated by the thrill of being a member of the group 




toward violence and is radicalized, but could not see the big picture (Ezekiel, 1995); (3) the 
terrorists; and (4) the senior members, which includes the leaders and lieutenants, who are 
usually more educated than the other members (Ezekiel, 1995; Smith, 1990).  
With the use of negative interactions with government officials and interactions with 
extremist others, this study examined whether casual members evolved into loose cannons 
(committed non-ideologically motivated violent or financial crimes) or terrorists (committed 
ideologically motivated violent or financial crimes). This study also examined whether an 
individual’s level of commitment to extremism was related to his/her criminal offending 
behavior.  
General Strain Theory (Agnew, 2001, 2005), Differential Opportunity Theory (Cloward 
& Ohlin, 1960) and free or movement spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010) are 
discussed in the next section. These theories provided a framework for selecting the research 
questions, operationalizing the variables and selecting the data analysis techniques. Finally, an 
illustration of the theoretical framework is presented.   
 
2.2 General Strain Theory 
In his General Strain theory (GST), Agnew (2005) attempted to explain all types of 
criminal behavior. Agnew (2005) identified three types of strain: failure to achieve positively 
valued goals, removal of positive stimuli / possessions,1 and presence of negatively valued 
stimuli / adverse treatment by others. Merton (1938) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2006) argued 
that there was an expectation that anyone could achieve success in America but that not everyone 
                                                 
1 Researchers (Hamm, 1993; Blazak, 2001; Ezekiel, 1995) have examined the effects of loss of positive stimuli (e.g., 
parental divorce, loss of jobs) among skinheads, but this information could not have been reliably obtained using 




had the opportunities to achieve success. Failure to achieve success (e.g., low status occupation), 
removal or threat of the removal of positively valued stimuli (e.g., loss of employment) and 
negative stimuli (e.g., arrest and conviction) could put strain on an individual (Agnew, 2005). 
Furthermore, strain could result in anger, frustration and depression, which could increase the 
likelihood that the person would commit a crime to reduce such negative affect (Agnew, 2005).  
Agnew (2005) also differentiated between subjective and objective strain. Objective 
stressors are disliked by most people (e.g., loss of employment), while subjective stressors are 
disliked by the individual of interest to the researcher. Agnew (2005) also identified a third 
category of strain: subjective interpretation of objective strain, e.g., someone with a high degree 
of self-confidence may experience less emotional distress from a loss of employment when 
compared to someone with a lower degree of self-confidence.  
Agnew (2005) argued that the experience of strain was not a sufficient cause of criminal 
behavior. In addition to the strain experienced, the individual must also be unable to cope legally, 
believe the cost of crime (or being caught) is low and have a predisposition to criminal behavior. 
Personality traits (such as self-confidence), intelligence, problem solving skills and access to 
financial and social resources could also affect an individual’s ability to cope legally (Agnew, 
2005). For example, an individual with a savings account and a strong social network would be 
able to discover potential employment opportunities and utilize their savings to cover living 
expenses in the interim. An individual who feels little guilt at the thought of committing a crime 
and is unlikely to be penalized by family members or friends for engaging in criminal behavior 
would have a higher propensity to engage in criminal behavior, since the cost of crime to the 




An individual’s propensity to engage in crime after experiencing conditions of strain 
could also be influenced by prior responses to criminal behavior, e.g., parental attention 
subsequent to an arrest or warning could act as reinforcement and increase the propensity for 
future offending behavior. This relationship is depicted in diagram 1. 
Diagram 1: General Strain Theory
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In 2010, Agnew extended GST to account for acts of terrorism and to explain why only a 
few individuals who experienced strain resorted to terrorism. According to Agnew (2010), for 
terrorism to occur strain must be: high in magnitude, perceived as unjust/undeserved2 and caused 
by powerful others with whom the individual has weak ties (such as a government that no longer 
represents one’s interests). Agnew hypothesized that these types of strain result in anger, 
frustration and helplessness, which would lower inhibitions and ability to cope through 
legitimate means. This may create pressure / incentive for criminal coping, which could include 
both common crimes and acts of terrorism. However, the effects of strain, according to Agnew 
(2010), could be mediated by whether the individual has beliefs favorable to terrorism and 
offending behavior (see diagram 2 for a concise description of General Strain of Terrorism).  
However, it is possible that GST and GST of terrorism may not provide a complete 
picture of the causes of criminal and terrorism behavior of DFRs. Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) 
Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) explains how one may become susceptible to joining a 
sub-cultural group. DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) also explains how beliefs favorable to 
terrorism / crime and the skills required to commit such acts are acquired. DOT (Cloward & 







                                                 
2 This was not directly examined in this study, since the data was obtained from secondary sources e.g., news 




Diagram 2: General Strain of Terrorism 
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2.3 Differential Opportunity Theory and Movement Spaces 
In 1960, Cloward and Ohlin proposed Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) to explain 
the development and persistence of delinquent sub-cultures and the effect of such subcultures on 
the delinquent behavior of their members. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) posited that rejection of the 
conventional social order and submersion into a deviant subculture is a four-step process. 
Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that the individual must first experience alienation, which 
commonly occurs through failure or anticipated failure. The individual must then attribute the 
blame for said failure to society. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that alienation is quite 
possible in a society that “espous[es] equality of opportunity and universally high aspirations for 
success…[but has] discrepancies in opportunities” (p. 108). If an individual meets the formal 
criteria for success, but does not achieve success, feelings of injustice could occur. This is 
dependent on the individual attributing blame for his/her failure to achieve success on an external 
force, such as an unfair society. An individual who attributes blame internally would become a 
retreatist (reject both the goals of society and the means of obtaining those goals) or ritualist 
(abide by the socially accepted means of success but give up hope of achieving success). Such 
feelings would diminish the individual’s belief in the legitimacy of the conventional social order 
and reduce his/her commitment to the prevailing norms of society (See also Cloward and Ohlin 
(1961) and Merton (1938) for further discussion). 
In the second step, the alienated individual seeks out like-minded others (Cloward & 
Ohlin, 1960). However, as there exist differential opportunities for success, so too are there 
differential opportunities to deviate, and not all alienated individuals have access to deviant 
subcultures (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Those who have access to deviant subcultures could 




to deviate. The techniques for neutralizing are also acquired at this stage. The reaction of law 
enforcement is crucial at this stage. If the justice system labels the individual as a criminal or 
different from law-abiding people, feelings of alienation are exacerbated and bonds with the 
deviant group are strengthened. Among extremists, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) referred 
to this stage as unfreezing (loss of commitment to conventional ideology) and refreezing 
(replacement of conventional values with extremist ideology).  In the final step, the group 
members must be allowed to interact with each other, to build cohesiveness and a “sense of 
mutual dependence” (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960, p. 142).    
Simi and Futrell’s (2010) account of free space or movement space effectively describes 
Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) fourth step. Movement spaces are physical or virtual spaces, in 
which members of a socially unaccepted group are allowed to meet, interact and build 
cohesiveness (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). The 
interactions with other extremists in isolated movement or free spaces provides extremists with 
the support and freedom required to “nurture oppositional identities that challenge prevailing 
social arrangements and cultural norms” (Simi & Futrell, 2010, p. 3).Thus, movement or free 
spaces facilitate socialization in extremist ideology, reduce commitment to conventional society, 
and increase bonds with other extremists in the group, thereby increasing the individual’s 
commitment to extremism (see also: Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2011; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). 
Thus, goal blockage caused by the structural conditions of strain (Agnew, 2005, 2010) is 
a necessary but not a sufficient cause of crime and deviance: the opportunity to learn the 
prerequisite skills and abilities to engage in non-conforming behavior must also be present 




to form a different belief system (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 
2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). These skills and knowledge, as well as the new belief system, are 
obtained via interactions with a deviant subculture or gang (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Futrell & 
Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). However, as noted by Aho (1990), not everyone who 
experiences conditions of strain would have access to rightwing extremist groups. Thus, they 
would lack the opportunity to learn the skills necessary to commit terrorism or crime. This may 
explain the fact that so few people who experience strain became members of extremist groups.  
Cloward and Ohlin (1960) differentiated between beliefs (descriptions, or how one should 
describe a situation), values (evaluations, or how one should evaluate a situation) and norms 
(prescriptions of how one should behave in a situation). The authors argued that when a person 
became indoctrinated into a deviant sub-culture, their beliefs and values would increasingly 
contradict societal descriptions (i.e., beliefs) and prescriptions (i.e., norms) and their 
commitment to the sub-cultural norms would increase. Thus, a fully indoctrinated member of a 
sub-culture would be more committed to the norms of that sub-culture and less committed / 
constrained by the norms of conventional society. Consistent with Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) 
argument, it was possible that membership in an extremist group would interact with conditions 
of strain to create the motivation, justifications and knowledge required to engage in criminal 
and terrorist behaviors. It was also possible that alienated individuals who join a far-rightist 
group would obtain beliefs and values which would allow them to internally rationalize the 
replacement of societal norms with the norms of the extremist group. If the group norms replace 





This study hypothesizes that rather than posing competing explanations of extremism, 
GST explains how a person becomes susceptible to joining an extremist movement, while DOT 
provides a framework for analyzing behavior after someone joins the movement. The 
radicalization literature provides some justification for this theoretical framework. Radicalization 
is defined as “the process by which individuals become violent extremists... individuals who 
support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political, social, or religious goals” 
(NIJ 2012 Research on Domestic Radicalization Solicitation, p 4). Based on GST (Agnew, 2005, 
2010), DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), and movement spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & 
Futrell, 2010), this study theorizes that the process from personal grievance to commitment to an 
extremist ideology requires that the individual: (1) have virtual, electronic or physical access to 
similarly situated others, (2) have movement or free spaces to interact with each other; and (3) 
learn to identify with others who have similar personal grievances. This relationship is depicted 
in the diagram below.  
The relevant literature on extremist group membership, indoctrination into extremist sub-
cultures and the criminal behavior of far-rightists will be reviewed in the next chapter. Many of 
the studies utilized qualitative research techniques such as in-depth interviews and observation of 
events and are frequently ethnographic in nature, while other studies utilized quantitative 
designs. The information obtained from the quantitative studies provided the justification for the 
variables and research questions posed by this study, while the qualitative studies were used to 
structure the research models and operationalize the study’s variables. As this study’s unit of 
analysis was at the individual or micro level, the literature review focused on research conducted 
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CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1. Membership in Extremist Groups  
3.1.1. Strain & Membership in Extremist Groups. Support was found linking GST to 
membership in the domestic far-right. Smith (1994) examined people and groups designated by 
the FBI’s counterterrorism program as terrorists in the 1980s. Smith (1994) subdivided his 
sample into far-rightists, far-leftists and single-issue terrorists. Many far-rightists, but not far-
leftists, in Smith’s (1994) study experienced a lack of economic opportunities. Only 12% had a 
college degree and 33% had a GED equivalent or lower education (Smith, 1994). Most also had 
earnings below the poverty line or were unemployed (Smith, 1994). This study did not directly 
examine the effects of strain, nor did it establish causation between strain and membership in 
extremist groups. However, while causation was not empirically established, Smith (1994) found 
an association between strain conditions and membership in far-rightist groups. 
Smith’s (1994) findings were supported by subsequent research (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; 
Hamm, 1993; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). Hamm (1993), who interviewed 36 skinheads, found 
that 20 interviewees had parents with low socioeconomic statuses (blue collar background or 
unemployed). Most of the skinheads were unemployed (N=5) or held blue collar jobs (N=20) 
and only 10 were enrolled in college. Thus, not only did the skinheads experience strain, most 
were not in a position to reduce their strain in the foreseeable future. However, Hamm (1993) did 
not examine whether different levels of strain were experienced by skinheads and the general 
population. 
In an ethnographic study, Ezekiel (1995) found that members of a neo-Nazi group in 




underemployed or casually employed. Also using an ethnographic design that spanned from the 
mid-1980s to late 1990s, Wooden and Blazak (2001) found that strain conditions, such as fears 
of downward mobility and status frustration, were major contributing factors to young men’s 
decision to join a skinhead group.  
In contrast, Aho (1990) did not find any evidence of education theory (i.e., people with 
lower levels of education were more likely than those with higher levels of education to join an 
extremist group) in explaining membership in Idaho Christian Patriot groups. According to Aho 
(1990), members in those groups had education rates similar to other Idahoans and Americans. 
However, Aho’s (1990) sample consisted of extremists who did not engage in violent crime, 
while Smith (1994) examined extremists who committed acts of terrorism and Hamm (1993) 
compared far-rightists who did not offend with those who committed hate crimes. The 
differences between the sample designs could have accounted for the different findings. It was 
possible that extremists who engaged in acts of terrorism were different from extremists who 
engage in civil disobedience or non-violent crimes. Thus, one would expect different educational 
and employment backgrounds from both groups, i.e., one would expect to observe evidence of 
strain among DFRs who commit violent crimes (Hamm, 1993; Smith, 1994), but not among 
DFRs who commit financial crimes or did not offend (Aho, 1990).  
Another explanation for the discrepancy between Aho (1990) and Ezekiel’s (1995) 
findings are that neither study used a random sample design. This was because of the difficulty 
in obtaining access to closed groups. Random sampling is one of the pre-requisites for 
generalizability of research findings. Aho (1990) used snowball sampling for his study. He 
argued that the resulting sample was representative of the population of Christian Patriots in 




Furthermore, Aho (1990) interviewed both leaders and followers in the movement. It is possible 
that different variables motivate movement leaders and movement followers to join an extremist 
movement (Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995). For example, leaders of the neo-Nazi movement 
interviewed by Ezekiel (1995) tended to have higher levels of education than the followers in the 
movement. Smith (1990) also noted a marked difference in the education levels of far-rightist 
leaders and members in the movement. For instance, Richard Butler, former leader of the Aryan 
Nation, was an engineer, as was Wilhelm Ernst Schmitt, former leader of one of the Sheriff’s 
Posse Comitatus chapters. Thus, differences in education rates could have been missed by 
including both movement leaders and followers. 
Rather than strained individuals seeking out extremist groups as a means of reducing 
their strain or finding individuals with similar life experiences to interact with, it was possible 
that extremist groups targeted strained individuals for recruitment (Blazak, 2001; McVeigh, 
2004; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). McVeigh (2004) argued that far-right groups use the rhetoric of 
whites’ loss of economic status to Jews and ethnic minorities as a recruitment technique. 
Blazak’s (2001) research supported McVeigh’s (2004) argument. Blazak (2001) interviewed 
recruiters in the skinhead movement. He found that groups deliberately targeted boys who 
experienced conditions of strain and that these recruitment efforts were often successful (Blazak, 
2001).  
In another publication discussing the data from Blazak’s (2001) study, the authors 
concluded, “the recruitment of skinheads employs a systematic process based on identification of 
social strain” (Wooden & Blazak, 2001 p. 144). Interestingly, studies that examined rank and file 
group membership patterns of DFRs who engaged in criminal behavior (Hamm, 1993; Smith, 




groups. However, this relationship was not found for DFRs who led law-abiding lives. Studies of 
non-criminal DFRs by Dobratz & Shanks-Meile (1996) and Aho (1990) did not find an 
association between strain conditions and membership in extremist groups. Since the current 
study was limited to DFRs and collaborators who engaged in a homicide or financial scheme, it 
was hypothesized that individuals who experience individual level stressors would have been 
more likely to join a far-rightist group, as compared to those who did not experience individual 
level stressors. 
3.1.2. Friends / Family & Membership in Extremist Groups.  Individual level 
stressors could make a person susceptible to anger, blaming external forces for the strain 
experienced, and subsequently recruitment by far-rightist groups Blazak, 2001; Hamm, 1993; 
McVeigh, 2004). However, access to the far-right opportunity structure is crucial to actual 
recruitment (Aho, 1990; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). 
Christian Patriots surveyed by Aho (1990) tended to have significant others (e.g., work 
colleagues, friends, family, pastors) in the far-right movement. Furthermore, people surveyed by 
Aho (1990) mentioned that family members (approx. 35% of interviewees) and friends (approx. 
21% of interviewees) were major influences in their decision to join the movement. The social 
movement literature also found evidence of a link between prior relationship with extremists, 
such as friends or family in the movement, and an individual’s decision to join an extremist 
group (Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blee, 2002).  
A strategy used by extremist groups is to focus their recruitment efforts on friends and 
family of existing and trusted members (Aho, 1990; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; 
Wooden & Blazak, 2001) or to utilize existing extremist friends and family as a means of 




(2001) found that relatives of known skinheads were likely to have been targeted for recruitment 
by skinhead leaders. Leaders and recruiters in extremist movements were generally skilled at the 
use of rhetoric. Furthermore, friends and family members of existing extremists were susceptible 
to this rhetoric, especially if this rhetoric fit with their world view (Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; 
Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; McVeigh, 2004). They were also found to be susceptible to this 
rhetoric if they had close relationships with existing extremist group members (Aho, 1990; 
Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990).  
A friend or family member in the group is not always a prerequisite for group 
membership. A group of extremist friends may join an extremist group at the same time. Several 
researchers have found that individuals joined extremist movements along with a group of 
friends, a romantic partner (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2008, 2011) or family members (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990). However, not all people 
with extremist significant others join the movement. It is possible that people with a higher 
degree of tolerance for extremist views could have been more predisposed to joining an extremist 
group (Chermak, 2002). Aho (1990) referred to the person who realized the world conflicted 
with his/her personal standards and became motivated to change the world as a “Seeker.”  
Seekers are people who already hold anti-government beliefs, i.e., are already radicalized to 
some extent, and searching for ways to regain a sense of power over their lives (Aho, 1990; 
Chermak, 2002). For Aho (1990), having loved ones or family in the movement, i.e., access to an 
extremist opportunity structure, was not a sufficient motivator for an individual to join an 
extremist group. The individual must have first undergone the internal shift to become a seeker. 




supremacists’ accounts of their decision to join the movement as “a personal quest for racial and 
political truth” (p. 53).  
In addition to the internal shift to becoming a seeker, another common finding in the 
literature was a strong social bond between recruitees and the existing group member. Several 
researchers found that recruitees tended to join an extremist group when they felt admiration and 
wanted to emulate significant others who belonged to the movement (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; 
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) referred to this 
phenomenon as the “power of love” and noted that love of fellow group members could also 
prevent an individual from leaving an extremist group. Therefore, the second hypothesis was: 
individuals with extremist family / friends would have been more likely to join a far-rightist 
group, when compared to those without extremist family / friends. DFRs who have extremist 
family and friends would also have more access to far-right extremist opportunity structures, 
compared to those without extremist referent others. Extremist family and friends need not be 
current group members, as individuals tend to join extremist groups along with their extremist 
referent others (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; 
Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990). 
According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), both strain and access to extremist opportunity 
structures are required for membership in subcultural gangs. Ezekiel (1995) and Hamm (1993) 
both found evidence of strain and extremist referent others among the far-rightists interviewed in 
their studies. Other studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) found evidence that 
having extremist referent others was associated with membership in extremist groups. However, 
these studies did not find evidence of higher levels of strain among group members, in 




the latter studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) involved non-criminal group 
members and the current study examined criminal DFRs, a tentative corollary of hypothesis two 
was: there was an interaction effect between the experience of strain and having extremist 
referent others on the likelihood of membership in extremist groups.  
3.1.3. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Membership in Extremist 
Groups.  Prior negative interactions with government officials, such as the police, court officials 
or IRS officials (e.g., being audited by the IRS, denial of tax refund claim, lien placed on 
property by IRS) could increase the likelihood that one could become a member of a far-rightist 
group, especially if the behavior of the official is perceived as unwarranted (Aho; 1990; 
Chermak, 2002). As mentioned previously, one of the defining features of the far-right is their 
suspicion and rejection of the legitimacy of state and federal government (Aho, 1990; Blee, 
2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, Chermak & Simone, 2009b; 
Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Simi, 2010). Such a belief system could influence how 
far-rightists (or seekers) interpret interactions with government officials, which could contribute 
to the individual’s decision to join a far-rightist group.  
Wooden and Blazak (2001) found that hard core racist skinheads were more likely than 
nonracist skinheads (i.e., members of youth gangs not affiliated with the far-right) to have “been 
in trouble with the police” (p. 139). This indicated that negative interactions with law 
enforcement officials could have contributed to an individual’s decision to join a far-right group.  
However, it was possible that the relationship between interactions with law enforcement 
and membership in a far-right extremist group is more complex and thus more difficult to 
measure. Several researchers have highlighted the radicalization effects of the standoffs at Ruby 




Kaplan, 1997; Vertigans, 2007). Chermak (2002) described these incidents as “last straw” 
events, which provided the impetus required for borderline DFRs to join the movement. Less 
sensational interactions with law enforcement could have also convinced other far-rightists to 
join the movement or create a more radical group. Thus, stories about other individuals with 
whom the person identified could have encouraged him/her to join the movement. Further, there 
was evidence to suggest that DFRs were aware of the radicalization effects of negative 
interactions with government officials. Militia members interviewed by Chermak (2002) utilized 
negative interactions with government officials in their recruitment rhetoric. 
The route from interactions with law enforcement to membership in extremist groups 
may also be indirect. Blazak (2009) estimated that about 220,000 prisoners are involved in racist 
white prison gangs (e.g., Public Enemy Number 1, Nazi low Riders, Aryan Brotherhood, et 
cetera) for protection and the support network they provide. Some members of racist prison 
gangs eventually transition to membership in a racist group or return to the movement after 
prison (“Dangerous Convictions,” 2002; Blazak, 2009). Blazak (2009) suggested that perhaps 
prison gangs provide access to the movement opportunity structure, which Cloward and Ohlin 
(1960) and Aho (1990) argued is required for recruitment into sub-cultural groups. This suggests 
that the ideological motivation of the initial offense could be less important than the presence of 
an extremist opportunity structure at the prison in which the individual is incarcerated. 
Therefore, hypothesis three was that negative interactions with government officials,3 such as 
civil action by the government, arrests and convictions, increase the likelihood that an individual 
                                                 
3 The literature suggests that police stops (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; “Deadly Domains,” 2003) and IRS audits 
(Aho, 1990) could have also contributed to an individual’s decision to join a far-rightist group. However, this 
information could have not have been reliably and systematically obtained from open source documents. Instead, 
this study used civil action by government, specifically liens and injunctions, prior arrests and prior convictions as a 




would become a member of a far-rightist group. One would expect DFRs without such prior 
negative interactions with government officials to be lone wolves. Chermak, et al. (2010, p.1022) 
defined a “lone wolf” as someone not affiliated with an extremist group, although s/he could 
have visited on-line extremist websites and blogs. 
Aho (1990) found that some members of Christian Patriot groups in Idaho joined because 
of what they termed “unprovoked persecution” (p. 188) by local officials and tax officials, such 
as tax audits and foreclosures. Aho (1990) noted that these experiences of persecution were then 
described to friends or relatives in the far-right movement, who then invited the individual to a 
movement activity or event. Some of these individuals in Aho’s (1990) study eventually joined 
the movement, provided there was a strong relationship between the recruiter and recruitee. In 
contrast, Aho (1990) noted that only 3% of interviewees attributed their membership in the 
movement to legal persecution. Aho’s (1990) findings suggested that the combined effect of 
having extremist friends / family and negative interactions with government officials could have 
a greater impact on an individual’s decision to join an extremist group, than would negative 
interactions with law enforcement in the absence of extremist friends / family members. 
Therefore, based on Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) work and Aho’s (1990) findings on the 
importance of access to the movement, a corollary of hypothesis three was: there was an 
interaction effect between negative interactions with government officials and friends/relatives in 
the movement on an individual’s decision to join an extremist group. 
 
3.2. Commitment to Rightwing Extremist Ideology 
3.2.1. Strain & Commitment to Extremist Rightwing Ideology. McCauley and 




without psychological issues towards political violence, i.e., could radicalize an individual. 
Similar to strain, personal grievance is defined as when someone wrongs/harms the individual or 
a loved one, resulting in anger and frustration and, in rare cases, political violence (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2011). Basing their analysis on  on the infrequency of lone wolf terrorists, 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that personal grievance by itself is unlikely to result in 
radicalization or political violence. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), anger is a 
fleeting emotion, while radicalization requires a more permanent shift in beliefs. However, if the 
individual interprets the grievance as committed by a particular group (e.g., Jews or the ZOG) 
against another group (e.g., the Aryan race) with which the individual positively identifies, 
personal grievance could blend with group grievance to create a more abiding emotion than 
anger: group identification. Group identification occurs when an individual who has a positive 
identification with a group, begins to care about the group, feels joy when group members are 
doing well and sadness when group members are persecuted (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). 
It is not required that the individual be a member of a far-rightist group, but that s/he identify 
positively with other far-rightists, (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). In other words, high levels 
of commitment to extremism would be sufficient to ensure group identification, even in the 
absence of membership in a formal extremist group. 
Positive identification could be coupled with negative identification, i.e., when one feels 
good when another person or group suffers. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that the 
combination of these two phenomena, positive and negative group identification, could 
radicalize an individual who experiences personal grievance, and in some cases, move the 




and political grievance could motivate an individual to engage in political violence is discussed 
in the upcoming section on criminal behavior. 
 Hamm (1993) found evidence of feelings of personal grievance, i.e., strain and 
marginalization, transitioning into political grievance, and thereafter increased commitment to 
extremist ideology among racist skinheads. Based on the above discussion, hypothesis four was 
that people who experience individual level stressors would have higher levels of commitment to 
extremist ideology when compared to people who did not experience individual level stressors. 
3.2.2. Friends/Family in Movement & Commitment to Rightwing Extremist 
Ideology. Several ethnographic accounts (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 
2010) paint a vivid picture of parents that socially isolate and immerse children in racist sub-
cultures. According to Simi and Futrell (2010) primary socialization into the white power 
movement occurs at the family level in free spaces. Socialization into the KKK and neo-Nazi 
movement involves deliberate choices and behavior by parents: parents give children Aryan 
names and movement-related clothing; they organize family activities and engage in rituals to 
transmit the “ideals and practices of militant Aryan nationalism” (Simi & Futrell, 2004, p. 26). 
Parents also utilize homeschooling to socialize children about far-rightist ideals in a setting that 
is unchallenged by mainstream society, which further entrenches children into the movement’s 
ideology (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Vertigans, 2007).  Therefore, 
not only are these children surrounded by racist imagery (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi 
& Futrell, 2010), hate cartoons and comic books (Blee, 2002) and modified school books (Simi 
& Futrell, 2010), they are not allowed access to contradictory worldviews. In other words, DFRs’ 




they obtain definitions favorable to extremist ideology in excess of conventional beliefs, which 
are then reinforced by their parents (Simi & Futrell, 2010).  
Support for the Blee (2002) and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) work was found by Wooden 
and Blazak (2001), who interviewed both racist and nonracist skinheads. The authors found that 
racist skinheads were more likely than nonracist skinheads to have family members who were 
racist. This suggests that racist skinheads are socialized towards racist beliefs. However, Wooden 
and Blazak (2001, p. 137) cautioned that their “findings should be viewed with some 
reservations” since the results were based on a questionnaire administered to a sample of 32 
respondents. 
Similar to effects of extremist family members, having extremist friends may also 
increase solidarity and commitment to the cause (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 2007). Friends share experiences and viewpoints, which 
could gradually radicalize an individual if a close social bond, such as comradely or romantic 
love, is present (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 
2007). Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with significant others who were far-
rightists would have higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to those 
without extremist friends or family members. 
3.2.3. Membership in Extremist Groups & Commitment to Rightwing Extremist 
Ideology. Similar to interactions with extremist friends and family, membership in an extremist 
group could be a strong socialization tool. As noted previously, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) 
theorized that boys who experienced strain or did not achieve their anticipated degree of success 
may join a subcultural group if (1) they attributed the cause of their lack of success to an external 




become fully committed or indoctrinated into a subcultural group, the individual must: (1) lose 
his/her commitment to conventional society, or become alienated; (2) the group must provide the 
individual with techniques to deal with their guilt and fear (e.g., an alternate system of norms, 
values and beliefs); and (3) s/he must have the freedom to interact with the group to design 
collective solutions to his/her problems. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) defined norms as 
prescriptions of how one should behave in a certain situation, beliefs as how one should describe 
a situation and values as evaluations of a situation. Taken together, one’s norms, beliefs and 
values could provide an indication of one’s commitment to society or a group. 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) used the term unfreezing to describe the process 
whereby individuals lose their commitment to conventional norms, beliefs and values; and 
refreezing to describe their replacement with new norms, beliefs and values. According to 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), unfreezing could free an individual to create various new 
identities: development of an extremist identity and bonding with other extremist is one of the 
possible options. Unfreezing could be caused by fear and pain (i.e., strain), or by a lack of ties to 
conventional members of society (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011) and could free the individual 
to form bonds with members of the extremist group.4 The unfreezing and refreezing process 
could be exacerbated by the degree of isolation experienced by members of extremist groups. 
According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), “isolated groups – terrorists groups, youth 
gangs, religious cults, soldiers in combat – have unchecked power to determine value and 
                                                 
4McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) identified 12 pathways to radicalization. In their analysis of case studies of 
extremists, they found that individual level factors, group dynamic and nation/macro level factors could influence an 
individual’s level or radicalization of commitment to an extremist cause. They argue that these factors often work 
together, as rarely were individuals radicalized by only one factor. While many of these pathways involved 
socialization into an extremist group, i.e., unfreezing and refreezing, the authors also recognized the importance of 





meaning…the unchecked value-setting power of an isolated group is a multiplier…in whatever 
direction the group is likeminded” (pp. 138-139). Thus, isolation from conventional society and 
solely interacting with the extremist group may result in powerful bonds with fellow extremist 
group members.  Such bonds build both group cohesion and group consensus, i.e., socialize 
individuals into the norms, values and beliefs of the extremist group (Aho, 1960; Ezekiel, 1995; 
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). According to Cloward and Ohlin 
(1960), the more a new member internalizes the values and beliefs of the group, the greater 
would be his/her commitment to the norms of the group.  
Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) theory referred to subcultural gangs. However, Aho (1990) 
and McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008, 2011) research indicated that this socialization and 
indoctrination process is also applicable to extremists. Aho (1990) found that new members first 
emulate their significant others from the Christian Patriot movement, experience an increase in 
self-esteem from emulating those significant others and eventually internalize their significant 
other’s expressions, values and beliefs. In other words, indoctrination occurred after the 
individual imitated the behavior of loved ones in movement and this behavior was reinforced by 
others. McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2008, 2011) also noted that commitment by members of 
extremist groups is positively influenced by comradely and romantic love, as individuals tend to 
internalize the loved one’s radical beliefs. Love and identification with group members could 
also increase an individual’s commitment to the group if they all face a common threat / enemy 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). Loss of fellow members caused by retaliatory action by 
law enforcement may also increase commitment to extremism, especially if the group is isolated 




Interactions with other extremists could increase commitment to extremist ideology in 
other ways: interactions with extremist group members could alter individuals’ perceptions of 
situations or experiences, e.g., (re)attribute loss of job or earnings to a Jewish conspiracy or 
affirmative action. Such current or retroactive interpretations could also increase group cohesion 
and a sense of shared identity. It was therefore hypothesized that members of extremist groups 
would have higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to non-members.  
3.2.4. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Commitment to Extremist 
Rightwing Ideology. As noted in the earlier discussion of the far-right, intense anti-government 
beliefs and beliefs in conspiracy theories are defining features of the far right (Aho, 1990; 
Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Gruenewald, 2011; Pitcavage, 2001). Such intense negative beliefs 
could influence how individuals interpret interactions with government officials (Freilich & 
Chermak, 2009). Sovereign Citizens’ belief in common law, their tendency to misinterpret the 
law and to read obscure pseudo-legal writings by other far rightists could encourage them to be 
confrontational in dealings with law enforcement (Chermak, Freilich & Shemtob, 2009b) and 
government officials, such as the IRS (Aho, 1990; Potok, 2012). Confrontational attitudes could 
lead to negative consequences, such as an arrest or citation (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Potok, 
2012). This could be perceived as confirmation that the government is corrupt or no longer 
working in the interest of the American people and thereby increasing far-rightists’ commitment 
to extremism (Sprinzak, 1995). Sprinzak (1995) termed this a ‘conflict of legitimacy,’ one of the 
stages in the delegitimization process, which he argued groups must have experienced before 
they engaged in acts of terrorism. Sprinzak’s (1995) theory is discussed in more detail in the 




Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that an individual’s interactions with law enforcement 
could increase feelings of alienation and commitment to a delinquent subculture (see 
“Theoretical Framework” above for detailed discussion). Therefore, it is possible that negative 
interactions with law enforcement, e.g., prior arrests or convictions, could further entrench an 
individual in the extremist group of which s/he was a member. Freilich and Chermak (2009) used 
a case study approach to illustrate how a routine police stop to issue a speeding ticket escalated 
into a chase and shootout at the DFR’s residence, which exacerbated the individual’s anti-
government beliefs. Freilich and Chermak (2009) argued that DFRs’ anti-government ideology 
and paranoia about government infringement of personal liberties could interact with police 
behavior (e.g., surrounding a far rightist’s home with weapons drawn) and act as confirmation of 
their extremist beliefs, essentially radicalizing DFRs.  
Similarly, Kaplan (1995b) found that interactions with law enforcement increased 
individuals’ commitment to extremism. Kaplan (1995b) noted that the use of force and physical 
violence against rescuers (e.g., persons who belong to the anti-abortion movement) increased 
their commitment to the cause. Kaplan (1995b) theorized that police violence could have been a 
product of jail overcrowding, police cynicism from having dealt with violent criminals, and the 
rescuers’ refusal to cooperate e.g., to give their names, refusal to leave the station without other 
members, or pay fines. Thus, it was not the actions of the police per se that increased rescuers 
commitment to the norms and values of the rescue movement, but an interaction between 
rescuers’ behavior, the situation and the police reactions to both (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; 
Kaplan, 1995b). In other words, extremist beliefs impact on a person’s perception and increase 




confrontational behaviors could increase the likelihood of an arrest or conviction and act as a 
confirmation of extremist beliefs (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Kaplan, 1995b).  
It is also possible that a non-extremist could become radicalized by interactions with law 
enforcement (Chermak, 2002) and government officials (Aho, 1990). Civil action by the 
government against an individual could increase the individual’s commitment to rightwing 
extremist ideology. Aho (1990) noted that several members of the Idahoan Christian Patriots 
cited negative interactions with the IRS – such having funds withdrawn from personal or 
business accounts to cover their outstanding taxes – as confirmation of a government that was no 
longer concerned with the interests of true patriots/Americans. Aho (1990) argued that policies 
or actions by government officials to enforce obedience to laws (e.g., personal property 
auctioned to cover tax liability) that borderline far-rightists consider invalid or unfair (e.g., the 
federal taxation system) could radicalize the individual. The radicalization effect of government 
actions that are perceived as unjust could also be applicable to people who are merely suspicious 
of the government (Aho, 1990). Therefore, based on this escalation effect, it was hypothesized 
that individuals who experience negative interactions with government officials would have 
higher levels of commitment to rightwing extremist ideology, compared to those without such 
negative interactions. This study defined prior negative interactions by government officials as 
civil actions by the government, prior arrests, prior charges and prior convictions from the date 
of the offense included in the study. 
Kaplan (1995b) also used excerpts of interviews describing police officers’ sexual and 
physical abuse of arrested female rescue members to argue that such actions are important to the 
formation of rescuers’ apocalyptic worldview.  Such physical and sexual abuse of female 




commitment to their cause (Kaplan, 1995b). Thus, it is possible that there is an interaction effect 
between having extremist friends / family and prior negative contact with law enforcement on 
commitment to extremism. Thus, a corollary of the above hypothesis was that there was an 
interaction effect between having extremist others and negative interactions with law 
enforcement on an individual’s level of commitment to extremism. 
  
3.3. Criminal behavior 
3.3.1. Levels of Commitment to Rightwing Extremism & Criminal Behavior. Many 
individuals with extreme beliefs are law-abiding citizens, as possession of extremist beliefs does 
not necessarily lead to criminal behavior (Freilich, et al., 2009a; Michael & Minkenberg, 2007). 
However, it was possible for someone with extremist beliefs to engage in criminal acts as: (1) an 
expression of those beliefs; (2) a way to finance activities to inspire social / political change; or 
(3) an attempt to inspire social and/or political change (Chermak, Freilich & Simone, 2010; 
Smith, 1994). A person’s extremist beliefs could influence his/her commitment to the extremist 
cause and subsequent behavior, but not all people with extremist beliefs are motivated to act on 
those beliefs (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) sub-divided 
radicals into activists and terrorists. They describe “activists” as people who engaged in political 
activities to inspire social and/or political change and “terrorists” as radicals willing to use 
terrorism as a tactic to achieve social and/or political change (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). 
They noted that while some activists move towards violence because of friendship, romantic or 
group loyalty or government persecution of self or loved ones, other activists do not transition to 




Although some academics claim that extremists tend to specialize in extremist offending 
(e.g., Gottfredson & Hirshi, 1990), research suggests that extremists engage in a variety of 
criminal behavior (Belli, 2011; Chermak et al., 2009b; Chermak, et al., 2010; Gruenewald, et al., 
2009; Smith, 1994; Smith, et al., 2002).  DFRs engage in routine crimes, preparatory crimes or 
acts of terrorism (Chermak, et al., 2010; Smith, 1994). Routine crimes are non-ideological in 
nature, e.g., bank robbery for profit. Crimes committed for the purpose of funding or acquiring 
materials for future terrorist attacks are referred to as “preparatory crimes” (Belli, 2011; 
Chermak, et al., 2010; Smith, 1994) and can be conceptualized as a hybrid of ideological and 
non-ideological motives, while the preparatory crime itself is motivated by profit, the ultimate 
aim is to use the materials/funds to obtain some ideological end. Acts of terrorism are usually 
conceptualized as violent crimes committed to attain some ideological purpose, i.e., a social, 
political or religious change, e.g., bombing the IRS to protest federal taxes. However, 
preparatory crimes and acts of terrorism can both be classified as ideological crimes.  
Smith (1994) noted that federal charges against domestic terrorists from 1982 to 1989 
were quite diverse and included both financial and violent crimes, e.g., racketeering, possession 
of weapons, racketeering-influenced and corrupt organization (i.e., RICO conspiracy), stolen 
property, robbery and burglary, treason, mail fraud and homicide. A more recent study by Smith, 
et al. (2002), which utilized data from the American Terrorism Study, confirmed these findings. 
Smith, et al. (2002) found that federal charges against domestic terrorists from 1980 to 1998 
followed a similar pattern to Smith’s (1994) study. Although prosecutors have discretion to 
select which charges to file against suspects, charges must be supported by evidence. Thus, the 
range of federal charges against DFRs indicated that extremists who offend commit a variety of 




3.3.1.a. Scheme/incident ideology. Far-rightists commit crimes for non-ideological as 
well as ideological reasons (Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009; Chermak, et al., 2010; 
Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald, et al., 2009). According to Gruenewald (2011), homicides 
committed by DFRs can be acts of terrorism (i.e., committed to inspire social, political or 
religious change), hate crimes (i.e., motivated by the victim’s race, religion, ethnicity, or 
nationality) or routine in nature. Both terrorist incidents and hate crimes are ideologically 
motivated (Hamm, 1993, 2004), while routine homicides are non-ideologically motivated. Using 
data from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) for the years 1990 to 2006, Gruenewald 
(2011) found that about a quarter of homicides committed by far-rightists were motivated by 
profit and some were motivated by a combination of profit and ideology. In other words, far-
rightists’ violent offending behavior are motivated by a variety of reasons (Gruenewald, 2011).  
Far-rightists also commit financial crimes for a variety of reasons. According to Smith 
(1994), far-rightists engaged in petty theft and robbery for the purpose of funding their terrorist 
activities and operations. Far-rightists also engaged in financial crimes purely for profit or purely 
for ideological purposes. Using data from the ECDB for the year 2004, Belli (2011) found that 
tax evasion was the most prevalent financial crime committed by far-rightists in 2004. 
Furthermore, 77% of the sampled far-rightists were motivated by extremist ideology and 23% 
were motivated by a combination of profit and extremist ideology. Thus, an individual far-
rightist may commit a financial crime for multiple reasons. There is also a risk that ideologically 
motivated financial crimes could escalate into violent crimes e.g., a standoff with law 
enforcement (Belli & Freilich, 2009; Freilich, et al., 2009).  
3.3.1.b. Suspect ideology. Several authors have noted that DFRs who call themselves 




government to be been unconstitutional, such as the Internal Revenue Code (Aho, 1990; Belli & 
Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007). This latter belief could foster legal fundamentalism (i.e., plain 
text interpretation of law), the tendency to create/rely on common law courts, acts of civil 
disobedience and criminal behavior (Aho, 1990). Highly committed far-rightists engage in 
crimes such as tax evasion, filing fraudulent tax returns and filing fraudulent liens as an 
expression of their anti-government beliefs (Aho, 1990; Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009; 
Vertigans, 2007) or because they believe federal tax laws are invalid/unconstitutional (Aho, 
1990). Belli (2011) suggested that financial crimes could be the “ultimate form of [non-violent] 
anti-government protest” (p.107), in which case one would expect that more committed far-
rightists would be more likely to engage in ideologically motivated financial crimes and would 
do so more frequently when compared to less committed far-rightists. Based on the above 
discussion, it was hypothesized that people with strong extremist beliefs are more likely to 
commit an ideological crime, i.e., a crime that would further their extremist goals. Such behavior 
includes crimes committed for a purely ideological purpose, as well as preparatory crimes 
committed to acquire funds and/or materials to commit an ideological crime(s). A corollary of 
this hypothesis was that people with lower levels of extremist belief are more likely to engage in 
routine crimes (i.e., a homicide or financial scheme that was not intended to further any 
ideological goal).  
3.3.2. Strain & Criminal Behavior. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), 
personal grievance is one of the mechanisms by which an individual could be persuaded to 
engage in political violence. Personal grievance extends the concept of strain to any kind of 
discomfort, in addition to goal blockage. Similar to Agnew’s (2005, 2010) assertion that the 




Moskalenko (2011) argued that personal grievances may trigger feelings of anger, which could 
led to aggression. According McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), for political violence to occur, 
the personal grievance (e.g., being audited by an IRS agent) must become political.5 In other 
words, the anger must be focused against a group that is perceived as the perpetrators of injustice 
(e.g., the federal government), rather than the individual who initially triggered the personal 
grievance (e.g., the IRS agent). 
According to Agnew (2001, 2005, 2010), people who do not have legal avenues to reduce 
the anger caused by strain and hold definitions favorable to deviant behavior in excess of those 
favorable to conforming behavior may turn to crime and/or terrorism to reduce their feelings of 
anger and frustration.  Hamm (1993) found that skinheads who engaged in violence against non-
whites, whom  he termed ‘terrorists,’ were more likely to have parents who had low socio-
economic status, as compared to non-terrorist skinheads, which supported Agnew’s (2005) 
theory. DFRs labeled by the FBI as terrorists and prosecuted in the 1980s for terrorism and other 
crimes experienced greater degrees of economic strain in terms of lower education and 
occupational success when compared to left-wing and single-issue terrorists (Smith, 1994). 
However, several researchers and academics have argued that the far-rightist movement draws 
membership from various socio-economic status (SES) classes (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-
Meile, 2006; Schlatter, 2006; Vertigans, 2007). When these findings were juxtaposed, they 
suggest that while the far-rightist movement cuts across class boundaries, the members who had 
experienced conditions of strain were more likely to engage in crime and terrorism, as compared 
to members with a higher SES. A possible explanation for this is that strained members of the 
                                                 
5 McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that political grievance could have become personal i.e. one could have 
become radicalized by observing persecution of a group one identifies with, rather than personally experiencing 




far-right could have fewer legal avenues for coping and/or a lower potential cost associated with 
criminal offending, e.g., loss of status or occupation (Agnew, 2005). Based on the above 
discussion, it was hypothesized that DFRs who experienced strain were more likely to commit an 
ideologically motivated crime when compared to DFRs that have not experienced individual 
level stressors.  
 3.3.3. Extremist Friends/Family & Criminal Behavior. Extremist friends and family 
can contribute to a fellow extremist’s criminal behavior in several ways. As mentioned by 
Cloward and Ohlin (1960), most people accept conventional norms and values as legitimate, and 
an internal change in norms and values is necessary before their conscience allows them to 
contravene conventional norms, e.g., norms against using extreme violence for a purpose other 
than self-defense.  This internal change can be accomplished via socialization by friends and 
family (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that 
individuals acquire both the skills and the internal justifications necessary to deviate through 
interactions with their peers. This is the third step in the indoctrination process, according to 
Cloward and Ohlin (1960). For a more detailed explanation on the indoctrination process, see the 
Theoretical Framework section.  
Although Cloward and Ohlin (1960) referred to socialization by a subcultural group into 
deviance and crime, their analysis is applicable to less formal friendship groups. Therefore, it is 
possible that an individual can be socialized through interactions with extremist friends and/or 
family into believing that acts of crime and terrorism are morally permissible (Futrell & Simi, 
2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). In other words, an individual can 
be radicalized as a result of interactions with extremist friends. Such a shift in norms and values 




Moskalenko (2011), such a process occurs when personal grievance (i.e., one’s own experiences 
of loss, suffering or strain) merges with group grievance (i.e., similar experiences by friends or 
referent others). 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that individuals who are not themselves 
radicalized can commit acts of terrorism or crimes as a result of their devotion or love for 
extremist friends and significant others. The authors cited accounts of extremists who recognized 
the illogic or hopelessness of continuing in the movement but continued to participate in criminal 
and non-criminal movement activities. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that 
extremists’ criminal behaviors are motivated by their feelings for loved ones who are 
incarcerated or killed as a result of their extremist activities. Thus, the intermediate step of 
radicalization is not necessary; love or devotion to extremist friends and significant others could 
also influence an individual to offend (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).  
In addition to motives of love or devotion, non-extremists also offend with extremist co-
offenders because of a desire for profit or financial gain. Belli (2011) reported that about 32% of 
people involved in ideological or a combination of ideological and profit motivated financial 
schemes in 2004 were motivated by profit / greed, and were non-extremists. In addition, 
Gruenewald (2011) found that 56% of homicides committed by far-rightists from 1990 to 2006 
involved multiple perpetrators (compared to 16% of typical homicide incidents that occurred in 
the same time period). Many of the homicide incidents that involved at least one far-rightist were 
motivated by profit (40%) or were not directly related to the extremist movement (20%). While 
care must be taken to not conflate the ideological motivation for a crime with the ideological 




or informal group dynamics, as well as personal considerations such as greed, could motivate a 
non-extremist to offend with extremist colleagues.  
As mentioned previously, individuals tend to join extremist groups with friends and 
subsequently became indoctrinated into the extremist culture (Aho, 1990; Cloward & Ohlin, 
1960; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). This finding suggests that 
at least one member of the social group is initially more extreme and/or convinces the others to 
join. It is also likely that these individuals continue to interact with and be influenced by their 
more extreme friends in the movement. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that devotion 
to friends influences devotion to the extremist group, which would in turn strengthen love and 
friendship bonds with friends, especially if the group faces threats from external forces. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, it was hypothesized that people with extremist family 
or friends are more likely to commit an ideologically motivated crimwhen compared to people 
that did not have extremist family members or friends.  
3.3.4. Group Membership & Criminal Behavior. Neutralization of guilt associated 
with criminal and terrorist behaviors could also be accomplished via socialization by a group 
(Futrell & Simi, 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Cloward and 
Ohlin (1960) argued that people who attributed their lack of success to an external force would 
experience alienation. However, such feelings of alienation may decline if those people receive 
collective support from like-minded individuals, i.e., a gang or sub-cultural group (Cloward & 
Ohlin, 1960). As feelings of alienation increase, the alienated individuals would become more 
dependent on the reassurance and validation provided by fellow group members and increasingly 
committed to the norms, values and beliefs of the subcultural group (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).  




and co-exist with belief in the legitimacy and moral validity of conventional norms until an 
individual is fully indoctrinated into the group. When this indoctrination process is complete, the 
individual would no longer be bound by the norms and values of conventional society. 
Furthermore, if the group’s norms, values and beliefs justify criminal behavior, then the 
individual’s guilt from contravening the laws of society would be neutralized (Cloward & Ohlin, 
1960). Therefore, the individual would be free to engage in criminal or terrorist behaviors.  
As a result of this troublesome ‘guilt’ issue, lone wolves, far-rightists who belonged to 
informal groups and far-rightists who belonged to formal extremist groups would engage in 
different types of offending behavior. Extremists who belong to formal groups would receive 
both the socialization and the isolation from conventional society (i.e., free space) necessary to 
create and nurture oppositional identities and to build group cohesion (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; 
Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Thus, it is possible that far-rightists who belong to 
extremist groups are less likely to experience guilt from committing an act that conventional 
society labels as terrorist (i.e., considered beyond the pale). Aho (1990) noted that in a specific 
chapter of the Golden Mean Society, a Christian Patriot group in Idaho, almost all members 
committed tax crimes, such as filing frivolous tax returns or failing to file federal tax returns. 
Admittedly, tax crimes were not quite beyond the pale. However, the prevalence of tax crimes 
committed by the Golden Mean Society suggests that the group socializes its members to engage 
in tax crimes, recruits people who are predisposed to committing tax crimes, or a combination of 
the guilt reducing effects of group socialization and predisposition exists.  
Research on violent crimes committed by DFRs also supports Simi and Futrell’s (2010) 
ideas on the utilization of free/movement space by extremist groups to build oppositional 




study of 36 skinheads, found that only seven had not been involved in a violent incident in the 
last two years, and the remaining 29 skinheads had committed about 120 acts of violence within 
the past two years. However, Hamm’s (1993) research did not establish whether the degree of 
violence demonstrated by skinheads was different from that of ordinary criminals. Using ECDB 
data from 1990 to 2008, Gruenewald and Pridemore (2012) found that ideologically motivated 
homicides by far-rightists were more likely to involve multiple perpetrators and to have been 
more brutal and use intimate weapons (e.g., fists, boots, knives) when compared to ordinary 
homicides committed by non-extremists in that same period. Although no mention was made of 
membership in extremist groups, these differences between ideologically motivated homicides 
committed by far-rightists and routine homicides suggest the presence of (formal or informal) 
group dynamics.  
Hamm (1993) and Gruenewald and Pridemore’s (2012) research supports Blee’s (2002) 
argument that the “core of the white supremacist culture is violence” (p. 174). When this culture 
of violence is combined with the degree of social isolation experienced by DFRs (Blee, 2002; 
Kaplan, 1995a; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010), the likely result is the breakdown of 
conventional values and norms, i.e., reduced internal barriers to engage in acts of violence.   
In contrast, lone wolves do not experience the socialization into an oppositional identity 
and the subsequent guilt neutralizing effect described by Simi and Futrell (2010). Thus, they may 
be more likely to engage in non-violent extremist behavior or non-terroristic violent behavior, 
both of which are considered less morally repugnant than terrorism (i.e., ideologically motivated 
violent crimes). It is also possible that the issue is not a matter of guilt, but of resources: it is 




wolves and extremists who are not members of formal far-rightist groups may be forced to 
confine their ideological protests to less costly endeavors (Chermak et al., 2010).  
Several authors (Belli, 2011; Chermak et al., 2009b) have suggested that lone wolves, 
far-rightists who belonged to informal groups and far-rightists who are members of an 
established extremist group have different patterns of offending behavior. These include 
spontaneous and planned attacks carried out by a single extremist. Chermak, et al. (2009b) 
argued that far-rightists who belong to established extremist groups are more likely to engage in 
acts of terrorism, while lone wolves or far-rightists that belong to informal groups are more 
likely to engage in non-terrorist crimes or financial crimes.  
Several studies lend support for Chermak and colleagues’ (2009b) thesis. Gruenewald 
(2011) examined far-rightists who committed a homicide classified as violent and non-terrorist 
and found that most perpetrators did not belonged to a formal extremist group. In fact, slightly 
less than 40% of homicides committed by far-rightists were committed by people who belonged 
to an extremist group (Gruenewald, 2011). However, most of the far-rightists who were not 
members of an extremist group acted with other offenders, i.e., as part of an informal group. In 
contrast, all the perpetrators of acts of terrorism studied in Smith (1994) and Smith, et al. (2002) 
were affiliated with formal extremist groups. The absence of lone wolf attacks in these studies 
was probably due to definitional issues, since the FBI definition of terrorism was used, which 
excludes lone wolf attacks (See Chermak, et al., 2009b).  
Additional support for Chermak and colleagues’ (2009b) argument was provided by Belli 
(2011), who found that most far-rightists (57.9%) who engaged in financial crimes such as tax 
avoidance, money laundering and pyramid schemes did not self-identify with any specific far-




lone wolves also engage in acts of terrorism. Spaaij (2010) used the RAND-MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base to support his argument that acts of lone wolf terrorism in the US increased in 
the last three decades. Spaaij (2010) hypothesized that this increase was due to the popularity of 
Tommasi6 and Louis Beam’s7 ideas of “leaderless resistance” among the domestic far-right. 
According to Spaaij (2010), almost 42% of all the acts of terrorism that occurred in the US from 
1968 to May 2007 were committed by lone wolves. Thus, despite the fact that lone wolf attacks 
are increasing, most acts of domestic terrorism in the US were committed by people affiliated 
with an extremist group and with access to financial and other support by the group.  
One must note, however, that Spaaij’s (2010) data included attacks committed by the far-
left and radical Islamic adherents, who are fundamentally different from DFRs. Rather than the 
guilt reducing effects of group socialization or diffusion of responsibility from acting as part of a 
group, Spaaij (2010) found that there was a greater degree of mental illness8 among the lone 
wolves, as compared to terrorists who belonged to an extremist group (far-right, far-left or 
radical Islamic). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) also argued that there tends to be a greater 
prevalence of psychopathology among lone wolves, as compared to terrorists who belong to an 
extremist group. This was supported by a subsequent study by Gruenewald, Chermak and 
Freilich (2013a). Using ECDb data, Gruenewald, et al. (2013a) found a higher incidence of 
reported mental illness among FR lone wolves (40% of lone wolves sampled), compared to other 
DFRs (8% of other DFR sampled). Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich (2013b) also found 
                                                 
6 Tommasi was the cofounder of the National Socialist Liberation Front, an American have far rightist group, which 
ended with his death.  Tommasi believed anyone could have been a government or watch group informant, and as 
such, revolutionary action would have to come from the sole individual, acting on his own (Kaplan, 1997). 
7 Louis Beam published an essay titled “Leaderless Resistance,” (Kaplan, 1997; Spaaij, 2010). Kaplan (1997) also 
argued that William Pierce’s Hunter, Richard Kelly Hoskins’ Vigilantes of Christendom and David Lane’s Wotan 
was Coming also contributed to the idea of leaderless resistance and lone wolf terrorism among the DFRs. 
8 Due to the use of open source information, this study was unable to measure mental illness with any degree of 




significantly higher levels of mental illness among FR loners (people who offend alone and did 
not have any ties to formal or informal extremist groups) compared to members of formal and 
informal extremist groups who offend with others or offend alone. 
While lone wolves tend to be motivated by a combination of psychopathology caused by 
personal grievance and political grievance (Freilich & Chermak, 2012; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2011; Spaaij, 2010), DFRs who belonged to extremist groups tend to be motivated 
by a combination of ideology and greed (Belli, 2011; Gruenewald, 2011; Smith, 1994). 
Gruenewald’s (2011) study of homicides committed by DFRs found that 42% were ideologically 
motivated, while 24% were motivated by a desire for profit. Likewise, Belli (2011) found that 
23% of DFRs who committed a financial scheme in 2004 were motivated by a combination of 
profit and ideology and 77% were motivated purely by ideology, i.e., a desire to express their 
ideological dissatisfaction with the government and its policies. Therefore, based on Gruenewald 
(2011), Belli (2011) and Spaaij’s (2010) findings, it was hypothesized that more financial crimes 
have been committed by lone wolf DFRs, and more violent crimes have been committed by DFRs 
who were members of an extremist group.  
3.3.5. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Criminal Behavior. 
According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), alienated individuals’ initial acts of defiance are usually 
minor, but the response of the justice system could further worsen feelings of alienation. This 
could create a “vicious cycle of norm-violation, repression, resentment and new and more 
serious acts of violation” (p. 127).  
3.3.5.a. Prior arrests and criminal behavior. According to the Anti-defamation League 
(ADL), many militia members and sovereign citizens drive vehicles without a license, drive 




constitutional or God-given right to do so (Pitcavage, n.d.). Since DFRs tend to fear government 
encroachment on civil liberties (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 
1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Pitcavage, 2001; Simi, 
2010), it is possible that police stops for such non-violent protest actions could escalate into a 
dangerous incident (Chermak, et al., 2010; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Pitcavage, n.d.). Using 
ECDB data for 1990 to June 2009, Chermak and Freilich (n.d.) found that 49 law enforcement 
officers were killed by far-right extremists, and 22% of those incidents resulted from a traffic 
stop.  
3.3.5.b. Prior arrests, commitment to rightwing extremism and criminal behavior. 
Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) distinguished between people with extreme views who 
engaged in non-violent political action (i.e., activism) and illegal/violent action (i.e., radicalism).  
The authors found that although many activists never engaged in radicalism, one of the factors 
that could cause this transition is repression of non-violent political action by government actors. 
Thus, a routine stop for a minor violation (e.g., driving without a valid license plate) that results 
in an arrest could act as confirmation of one’s anti-government extremist beliefs and further 
radicalize a far-rightist. Although McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that extreme 
beliefs did not necessarily result in criminal or terrorist behaviors, they conceded that people 
who engaged in ideologically motivated criminal acts tended to have higher levels of extremist 
beliefs (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Based on Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Moskalenko 
and McCauley’s (2009) claims, it seems possible that actions by law enforcement officials in 
such situations that are perceived as unjust by a DFR could propel the individual from mere 
activism to criminal or terrorist behavior. Sprinzak (1995) also argued that DFRs with strong 




terrorism if pushed by society or (perceived) aggressive action by law enforcement or other 
government agencies. 
3.3.5.c. Prior convictions, commitment and criminal behavior. Radicalization could also 
occur in prison, via interactions and socialization into an extremist prison gang (“Dangerous 
Convictions,” 2002; Blazak, 2009). Research on far-rightists involved in ideologically based 
homicides found that 40% had committed a previous crime, most of which (90%) were not 
ideologically motivated (Freilich, et al., 2014). These findings support Cloward and Ohlin’s 
(1960) argument and Blazak’s (2009) prison radicalization thesis, i.e., prior arrests and 
convictions could radicalize an individual and increase that likelihood that the individual would 
commit a subsequent ideological crime.  
3.3.5.d. Criminal behavior, interactions with government officials and terrorism. Strict 
adherence to the original Constitution without appreciation for the social and political context 
within which it was created also contribute to DFRs’ intense protectiveness of their rights to bear 
arms (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, et al. 2009). In addition, intense 
suspicion of State and Federal government actors, such as State/federal law enforcement officers, 
judges, and IRS agents (Belli, 2011; Chermak, 2002) also contribute to DFRs’ protectiveness of 
their right to bear arms. According to Sprinzak (1995), such beliefs could lead DFRs to commit 
criminal acts, as well as acts of terrorism, in certain situations.  
In his theory of split delegitimization, Sprinzak (1995) argued that the radicalization 
process of American far-rightists starts with a Conflict of Legitimacy. At this stage, DFRs believe 
that their opposition (ZOG, minorities, or Jews, depending on the far-right group to which the 
person belonged) is illegitimate and should be eliminated or segregated. Most crimes, Sprinzak 




reestablish the status quo by reinforcing discriminatory practices and mechanisms in society 
(e.g., hate crimes). Spontaneous acts of violence could erupt during conflicts with government 
authority, such as the cases mentioned by Chermak and Freilich (n.d.) but critiques of 
government policies and civil protests are more likely to occur (Sprinzak, 1995).  
If the government does not intervene to protect the “legitimate” citizenry, DFRs could 
begin to perceive government policies as soft, unfair or an infringement of their civil rights and 
liberties. This could trigger a Crisis of Confidence in the prevailing authority, i.e., the federal 
government, and DFRs could lose faith in the government, its policies and agents. At this stage, 
DFRs would no longer feel bound the government’s laws and rules (Sprinzak, 1995). However, 
most violent actions would be perpetrated against the hated ‘other.’ Sprinzak (1995) termed this 
phenomenon “split delegitimization,” since both the hated other and government would be 
targets of violence.  
However, Sprinzak (1995) argued that this split could end if DFRs begin to believe that 
the government is overtaken by the original hated other (i.e., ZOG). According to Sprinzak 
(1995), if this occurred, violence will be perpetrated primarily against the government. Sprinzak 
(1995) referred to this phenomenon as the ‘disappearance of the split,’which  can be triggered by 
excessive compliance measures by government agents (e.g., the IRS, police, as in the Randy 
Weaver incident) and subsequently result in acts of terrorism. Therefore, based on Sprinzak 
(1995), Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Moskalenko and McCauley’s (2009) arguments, it was 
hypothesized that negative interactions with government officials (i.e., civil action by the 
government, prior arrests, prior charges and prior convictions) would increase commitment to 




commit an ideological crime. DFRs who have not had such interactions should have lower levels 
of commitment to extremism and would be less likely to commit an ideological crime.  
The research models and questions will be presented in the following chapter. First, the 
full research model is depicted and described. This will be followed by detailed explanations of 






















CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH MODEL, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1. Research model 
The study tested the model in stages. The first research question examined predictors of 
membership in rightwing extremist groups. The second research question evaluated explanatory 
variables of commitment to rightwing extremism. The third research question assessed predictors 
of criminal behavior. In the last model, which examined the criminal behavior of DFRs, 
membership in an extremist group and commitment to extremism were used as independent 
variables.  
















Individual level stressors, extremist friends/ family members and negative interactions 
with government officials were conceptualized as possible predictors of membership in a 
rightwing extremist group. The reviewed literature indicated that individual level stressors, 
extremist friends/ family members, negative interactions with government officials and 
Membership in 




















membership in a rightwing extremist group could have influenced commitment to rightwing 
extremism. It was also hypothesized that individual level stressors, negative interactions with 
government officials, membership in a rightwing extremist group and commitment to rightwing 
extremism would have influenced the criminal behavior of DFRs. Finally, it could have also 
been possible that people with low (or no) commitment to rightwing extremism could have 
engaged in criminal behavior due to the influence of extremist friends/ family members. These 
direct and mediator effects were depicted in diagram 4.  
As stated previously, many DFRs do not engage in criminal behavior. Since the sample 
consisted of DFRs convicted of a violent or financial crime and their co-offenders, the results are 
generalizable only to these two groups. Furthermore, as little research on non-extremists who 
offended with DFRs exists, few hypotheses specified a directional (or any) relationship with the 
dependent variables. Thus, much of the analysis concerning the non-extremists was of an 
exploratory nature. This section discusses the study’s conceptual framework. The research 
questions and related hypotheses will be outlined next.  
 
4.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research question 1: Among DFRs, what effect, if any, did individual level stressors, the 
presence of significant others, and prior negative interactions with government officials have on 
membership in a rightwing extremist group? 
H1: Based on GST, DFRs who experience individual level stressors were more likely than DFRs 
who did not experience individual level stressors to join a far-rightist group. 
H2a: According to DOT, extremist friends would provide access to extremist groups. Also, 




Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990), individuals tended to join 
extremist groups with their extremist friends / family. Therefore, DFRs who had far-rightist 
significant others were more likely than those without extremist friends / family to join a far-
rightist group. 
H2b: According to DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), both strain and access to extremist 
opportunity structures are prerequisites for membership in subcultural gangs. Findings have been 
inconsistent as Ezekiel (1995) and Hamm (1993) both found evidence of strain and extremist 
referent others among the far-rightists who joined groups in their studies, but no such interaction 
effects were found in other studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996). Since the latter 
studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) involved non-criminal group members and 
the current study examines criminal DFRs, an interaction effect between the experience of strain 
and having extremist referent others was hypothesized on membership in extremist groups. 
H3a: Based on the postulates of GST and DOT, negative interactions with government officials 
(e.g., court officials and the police) should increase the likelihood that a DFR would experience 
feelings of strain and alienation, which they may try to alleviate by becoming a member of far-
rightist group. Therefore, DFRs that experienced negative interactions with government officials 
were more likely than DFRs who had not had such negative interactions with government 
officials to join a rightwing extremist group.  
H3b: However, it was possible that membership in extremist groups was contingent on access. 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that there was an interaction effect between negative interactions 





Research question 2: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, group 
membership and negative interactions with government officials have on an individual’s 
commitment to rightwing extremism? 
H4: According on GST, people who experienced individual level stressors had higher levels of 
commitment to extremist ideology when compared to people who had not experienced individual 
level stressors. 
H5: Based on the postulates of DOT and free spaces, people with significant others who were 
far-rightists had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to people 
without extremist friends or family members. 
H6: According to DOT and free spaces, interactions with other extremists should have an 
indoctrination effect. Therefore, members of extremist groups had higher levels of commitment to 
extremist ideology when compared to non-members.  
H7a: According to DOT, the behavior of law enforcement and courts could increase a strained 
person’s feelings of alienation and reduce his/her commitment to conventional norms. These 
feelings of alienation could provide an opportunity for conventional norms to be replaced with 
extremist values and beliefs. Therefore, individuals who experienced negative interactions with 
government officials had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to 
those who have not had such experiences.  
H7b: Based on Kaplan’s (1995b) findings and DOT, there was an interaction effect between 
having extremist others and negative interactions with law enforcement on levels of commitment 
to extremism. 
Research question 3: What effects, if any, did an individual’s commitment to far-right 




of these two IVs moderated or exacerbated by individual level stressors, significant others, group 
membership and interactions with law enforcement? 
H8a: People with strong extremist beliefs were more likely than people with lower levels of 
extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically motivated crime.  
H8b: People with lower levels of extremist belief were more likely than people with strong 
extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non-ideological) crimes.  
H9: Based on GST and GST of Terrorism, individuals who experienced individual level stressors 
were more likely than those who have not experienced individual level stressors to commit an 
ideologically motivated crime.  
H10: Based on the socialization effect of family and friends, it was hypothesized that individuals 
who had extremist family/friends were more likely than individuals who did not have extremist 
family/friends to commit an ideologically motivated crime. This relationship should be valid, 
irrespective of the individual’s own level of commitment to extremism.   
H11a: Based on the socialization effects of deviant groups and free spaces, it was hypothesized 
that DFRs who belonged to an extremist group were more likely than lone wolves to commit 
violent crimes.  
H11b: Based on Chermak, et al. (2009b) and Belli’s (2011) arguments, it was hypothesized that 
lone wolves were more likely than extremist group members to commit non-violent/financial 
crimes.  
H12: Since far-rightists did not recognize any authority above the local level, it was 
hypothesized that individuals who had negative interactions with government officials were more 
committed to rightwing extremism and consequently more likely to commit an ideological crim 




Table 1: Summary table of hypotheses and their justifications 
 HYPOTHESIS JUSTIFICATION 
1 Individuals that experience individual level 
stressors were more likely to join a far-
rightist group, compared to those who did 
not experience these stressors. 
GST, DOT 
2a Individuals that had significant others who 
were far-rightists were more likely to join a 
far-rightist group, when compared to those 
who lack such access to extremist 
opportunity structures. 
DOT: extremist friends could have provided 
access to extremist groups / extremist 
opportunity structures.  
2b There was an interaction effect between 
strain and extremist friends / family on 
membership in extremist groups.  
GST: negative interactions with government 
officials (e.g. court officials and the police) 
increased feelings of strain and alienation.  
Aho (1990).  
3a Individuals that experienced negative 
interactions with government officials were 
more likely to join a rightwing extremist 
group, when compared to those who did not 
have these interactions. 
Aho (1990): negative interactions with 
government officials could have created 
‘Seekers’  
3b Individuals who had both negative 
interactions with government officials and 
extremist friends/family were more likely 
than those that did not to join an extremist 
group.  
DOT: extremist friends/family provided 
access to extremist opportunity structures. 
4 Individuals who experienced individual 
level stressors had higher levels of 
commitment to extremist ideology, when 
compared to people who did not experience 
such stressors. 
GST: strain resulted in feelings of anger, 
frustration and depression. 
McCauley and Moskalenko: If the person 
attributed the cause of the strain to a group, 
rather than an individual, this could have 
increased a person’s commitment levels. 
5 Individuals with significant others who 
were far-rightists had higher levels of 
commitment to extremist ideology, when 
compared to people without extremist 
friends or family members. 
DOT and free spaces: interactions with 
other extremists in informal settings should 
have had an indoctrination effect. 
6 Members of formal extremist groups had 
higher levels of commitment to extremist 
ideology, when compared to non-members.  
DOT and free spaces: interactions with 
other extremists in a group setting should 










Table 1: Summary table of hypotheses and their justifications continued… 
 HYPOTHESIS JUSTIFICATION 
7a Individuals who experienced negative 
interactions with government officials had 
higher levels of commitment to extremist 
ideology, when compared to those who did 
not have such experiences. 
DOT: the behavior of law enforcement and 
courts could have increased a strained 
person’s feelings of alienation and reduced 
his/her commitment to conventional norms. 
Consequently, there would be an 
opportunity for conventional norms to be 
replaced with extremist values and beliefs. 
7b There was an interaction effect between 
extremist friends / family and negative 
interactions with government officials on 
commitment to extremism.  
DOT 
8a People with strong extremist beliefs were 
more likely than people with lower levels of 
extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically 
motivated crime. 
Consistent with ideological & anti-
government beliefs (Belli, 2011; Belli & 
Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007). 
8b People with lower levels of extremist belief 
were more likely than people with strong 
extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non-
ideological) crimes. 
Consistent with ideological & anti-
government beliefs (Belli, 2011; Belli & 
Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007). 
9 Individuals that experienced individual 
level stressors were more likely than those 
who did not experienced individual level 
stressors to commit an ideologically 
motivated crime.  
GST; GST of Terrorism: strain increased 
feelings of anger and commitment to the 
cause, which may have increased the 
likelihood of committing an ideologically 
motivated crime 
10 Individuals who have extremist 
family/friends were more likely to commit 
an ideologically motivated crime.  
The socialization effects of sub-cultural 
groups and free spaces 
11a Individuals who belonged to an extremist 
group were more likely than lone wolves to 
commit violent crimes.  
The socialization effects of deviant groups 
and free spaces would have increased the 
likelihood that group members would 
commit a homicide 
11b Lone wolves were more likely than 
extremist group members to commit non-
violent/financial crimes. 
Chermak, et al. (2009) and Belli’s (2011) 
research findings 
12 Individuals who have negative interactions 
with government officials were more 
committed to rightwing extremism and 
consequently were more likely than those 
who had not had such interactions to 
commit an ideological crime 
DFRs would not recognize any authority 
above the local level and have anti-
government beliefs. Such beliefs extend to 
officers of the court, law enforcement 
officers and tax officials. DOT: negative 
interactions with government officials could 
have solidified a person’s deviant self-
concept; thereby increasing likelihood s/he 




This chapter presented the three research models examined in the study. A summary of the 
study’s hypotheses and their justifications were also provided in Table 1 above. The sample 
























CHAPTER 5  
DATA AND METHODS 
5.1. Data source 
This study used individual level data from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) 
(see: Freilich, et al. 2014). The ECDB was created in several stages, which will be outlined 
below.  
5.1.1. Identification of incidents: Incidents were first identified from existing terrorism 
databases (such as the RAND-MIPT, American Terrorism Study and Global Terrorism 
Database), official sources, personal informants, scholarly and journalistic articles, and watch-
group reports (Chermak, Freilich, Parkin & Lynch, 2012; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; 
Gruenewald, 2011). These incidents were then searched using 30 open-source search engines: 
Lexis-Nexis; Proquest; Yahoo; Google; Copernic; News Library; Westlaw;  Google Scholar 
(both articles & legal opinions); Amazon; Google U.S. Government; Federation of American 
Scientists; Google Video; Center for the Study of Intelligence; Surf Wax; Dogpile;  Mamma; 
Librarians’ Internet Index; Scirus; All the Web; Google News; Google Blog; Homeland Security 
Digital Library; Vinelink; The Bureau of Prison’s inmate locator; Individual State Department of 
Corrections (DOCs); Blackbookonline.info. The searched cases were then assigned to trained 
coders. Training involved a combination of instructions by a trained coder and practice coding a 
previously coded case. The second training step also provided a measure of inter-rater reliability, 
in addition to its role as a training mechanism. The coder then conducted follow-up targeted 
searches to locate missing data. Next, the data from the search file were entered into an ACCESS 
database. Cases were also periodically re-searched and updated in the database. For a more 




The ECDB has several advantages compared to other terrorism databases. Unlike other 
databases (e.g., ATS), the ECDB’s inclusion criteria is not limited to the federal government’s 
definition of terrorism. The ECDB also includes both state and federal crimes, which provides a 
more complete picture of far-rightists’ criminal behavior (Chermak, et al., 2010; Chermak, et al., 
2012; Gruenewald, 2011). Triangulation of measures (i.e., multiple sources) is used both to 
identify incidents and code incidents. Although Andrew Silke (2001) argued for a movement 
away from open source information when conducting research on terrorism, this study 
compensated for the limitations of open source materials (e.g., publicity effects, i.e., 
inconsistencies in coverage of different incidents, and source effects, i.e., inconsistencies within 
a source) by triangulation of measures (for a discussion on using multiple sources to uncover 
publicity and source effects, see: Chermak, et al., 2012). Sources of information were ranked 
according to Sageman’s (2005) decreasing order of reliability (See also: Freilich, et al. (2014) for 
details). This ranking of sources of information increased the reliability of the data, while 
triangulation of measures facilitated convergent validation, which strengthened confidence in the 
study’s results.    
Possible limitations of the database include a risk of under-inclusion or missing cases, 
especially for financial schemes. Homicides committed by members of the far-right tend to 
attract a high degree of media attention and are less likely than financial crimes to be omitted 
from the ECDB (for a more detailed discussion on selectivity bias see: Chermak, et al., 2012). 
Despite these factors, the ECDB is the most appropriate data source for this study because its 
universe is wider than that found in other terrorism databases. State and federal level offenses are 
included in the database, as well as violent and financial crimes perpetrated by the far-right and 




database, which reduced the time needed to create the study’s dataset. For example, the ECDB 
uses various sources to infer subjects’ commitment to far-rightist ideology, and the reliability of 
these sources is ranked to maximize validity and accuracy of this variable. Furthermore, 
protocols exist to ensure inter-rater reliability between coders, to minimize selectivity bias and 
reduce missing cases. The unique strengths of the ECDB far outweighed the limitations 
associated with secondary data analysis. These data were cleaned and verified prior to 
conducting analysis for this study, which involved a 3-stage plan (see next section). 
 
5.2. Sample, Data Coding & Verification Process 
The sample was first extracted from the ECDB. People in the database must have been 
formally charged with a homicide or financial crime at the state or federal level, and at least 
some portion of the offense must have occurred in one of the 50 states. Unlike homicides, which 
tend to occur at a certain point in time, financial schemes generally occur over a period of time 
(Belli, 2011). To have been included in this study, at least a portion of the financial scheme must 
have occurred during 2006 to 2010. This period was selected (1) to allow for a sufficiently large 
sample size to ensure a reasonable degree of statistical power, (2) to minimize the effects of 
social factors excluded from the study, (3) and to exclude pending trails/cases.  
The sample consisted of DFRs charged with a homicide (N= 142) or financial scheme 
(N=103), and non-far-rightist co-offenders charged with a homicide (N= 27) or financial scheme 
(N=33).  The original intent was to include convicted people only. However, because of the 
limited sample size and number of IVs in the study, omitting the acquitted suspects would have 
resulted in loss of statistical power and unreliable parameter estimates. Conviction status was 




research questions 1 and 2. Thus, the effect of the IVs on the DV is interpreted as conditional on 
conviction.  
Table 2: Sample of crimes and suspects charged with a homicide or financial crime 
during the period 2006 to 2010  




Total number of 
suspects 
Financial 103 33 136 
Homicide 142 27 169 
Total 245 60 305 
 
Non-extremists who offended with an extremist co-offender were coded as “zero” on the 
extremist commitment scale (see next section for details). This was used as a comparison group 
of criminals who could have also been Seekers (Aho, 1990). Non-extremists were compared to 
(1) far-rightists who committed an ideological crime and (2) far-rightists who committed a non-
ideological crime.  
Next, the 30 free open source web engines identified in the previous section were 
(re)searched to identify new information. In addition, criminal history records of individuals in 
the sample were obtained from a pay-per-view website, BeenVerified.com. The information 
obtained from the updated searches and criminal history records was then entered into an Excel 
file and transferred to SPSS and Stata for analysis.  
 
5.3. Variables  
This study used a cross-sectional design to examine the criminal behavior of DFRs and 
their non-extremist co-offenders. This study had three dependent variables: membership in an 




were created to explain each of the three dependent variables. However, since the research 
literature indicated that membership in an extremist group and commitment to extremism may 
influence criminal behavior of DFRs (see literature review section), the variables membership in 
an extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were then used as independent 
variables in the final model, which explained the criminal behavior of far-rightists.   
The variable, membership in an extremist group, was defined as whether the individual 
was part of a formal extremist group at the time of the offense. Formal groups typically have a 
clear hierarchal structure and goals, while informal groups have no clear leadership structure. 
This variable was coded: 0=no evidence that the suspect belonged to formal extremist group; 
1=at least one source that indicated the individual was a member of an extremist group. Since a 
group of friends who are extremists could have been coded as both an (informal) group and the 
presence of extremist friends / family, there was a risk of autocorrelation between the variables. 
To mitigate this risk, membership in informal group was excluded from the group membership 
variable and coded as the presence of extremist friends. The Southern Poverty Law Center’s 
(SPLC) website was primarily used to ascertain whether a group was classified as extremist or 
merely right wing. Members of right wing groups were not coded as belonging to an extremist 
group. Consensus in the media or by law enforcement was also used to determine whether a 
group was coded as extremist. This variable was also included as an independent variable in the 
final research model. 
The second dependent variable, commitment to rightwing extremism, was 
operationalized similarly to Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) concept of indoctrination into a deviant 
subculture but drew upon: (a) the unique ideology common to the far-right (conspiratorial, 




in far-rightist sub-cultural activities, e.g., attended movement activities, wrote or disseminated 
movement materials, wrote letters to the editor, etc.; and (c) self-identification as a far-rightist.  
According to Cloward & Ohlin (1960; also see: Freilich, et al., 2009b), an individual who 
subscribes to numerous rightwing extremist beliefs could be considered as more indoctrinated 
into the far-right culture compared to someone who subscribes to fewer rightwing extremist 
beliefs. Therefore, this individual would be more committed to rightwing extremist ideology, 
when compared to someone who held fewer rightwing extremist beliefs. Likewise, continuous 
participation in many movement activities suggests integration and indoctrination into far-right 
extremist culture (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; 
Simi & Futrell, 2010).  
Rather than summing up an individual’s score to determine his/her commitment to 
extremism, a factor analysis was used to identify the relevant factors that contribute to 
commitment to far-right extremism (also see Field, 2013, pp. 665-719). Individual’s scores were 
then tallied for each factor identified. Finally, each individual’s scores were summed up for the 
factors to determine his/her overall commitment to extremism score. The results of the factor 
analysis are discussed in Chapter 6. Similar to membership in extremist groups, the commitment 
to extremism score was also used as an independent variable in the third research question. A 












Table 3: Indicators of Commitment to FR Ideology 
Value Indicator Explanation of indicator 
0 No evidence of 
conspiratorial 
beliefs 
“Believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to 
national sovereignty and/or personal liberty and a belief that one’s 
personal and/or national ‘way of life’ is under attack and is either 
already lost or that the threat is imminent” (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 
372) e.g. Belief in New World Order or ZOG; demonizing the UN; 
SSN & IDs used to track people; foreign troops in US; the economy 
was controlled by America’s enemies; end times was near; two 
seedlines - Jews were offspring of Satan; Creativitiy: Catholicism 
denounced as a ‘cult-religion’ and it was the holy responsibility of 
each generation to fight for the white race (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 
1989, 1996; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 
2006; Durham, 1996, 2003; Kaplan, 1995a, 1997; Kimmel & 
Ferber, 2000) 




0 No evidence of 
xenophobic 
beliefs 
“but for some the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious 
group”  (Freilich et alet al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. believe children 
should have been home schooled to avoid race mixing; violently 
opposed to mixed marriages/relations; racial segregation; US was a 
white nation; refer to imprisoned white supremacists as ‘prisoners of 
war;’ restriction of immigration to white Europeans; hate/bias 
comments or statements by perpetrator on or before crime; hate/bias 
material left at crime scene; presence of racist clothing, zines, music 
and tattoos* (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 2000; Perry & Blazak, 2010; 
Blee, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 
1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Krouse, 2010; Simi, 2010; Simi & 
Futrell, 2010). 
1 Evidence of 
xenophobic 
beliefs 
0 No evidence of 
anti-government 
beliefs  
“Suspicious of centralized federal authority” (Freilich, et al., 2009b, 
p. 372) e.g. Excessive erosion of civil liberties; government violates 
the Constitution & excessively legislates citizens lives; plain text 
interpretation of law & belief in common law courts (Aho, 1990; 
Blee, 2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Ezekiel, 
1995; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Simi, 2010). 
1 Evidence of anti-
government 
beliefs 
0 No evidence of 
anti-tax beliefs 
“reverent of individual liberty…be free of taxes” (Freilich, et al., 
2009b, p. 372) e.g. 16th Amendment not ratified; federal tax was 
voluntary; wages & tips were not income; only foreign source of 
income was taxable; an individual was not a person according to the 
IRC; only federal employees were subject to federal tax; the IRS 
was a private corporation (Aho, 1990; Belli & Freilich, 2011; 
Chermak, et al., 2010; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006;  Durham, 
1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Kaplan, 1995; 
“The Truth about Frivolous Tax Arguments”, 2012; “The Tax 
Protest Movement”, n.d.). 







Table 3: Indicators of Commitment to FR Ideology continued 
Value Indicator Explanation of indicator  
0 No evidence of 
survivalist beliefs 
“A belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by 
participating in paramilitary preparations, training and 
survivalism” (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. stockpiling 
weapons, medical supplies and food and weapons training 
necessary (Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Kaplan, 1995a, 1995b; 
Kimmel & Ferber, 2000).  
1 Evidence of 
survivalist belief  
0 No evidence of 
anti-gun control 
beliefs 
“reverent of individual liberty… especially their right to own 
guns” (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) Right to bear arms not 
limited by legislation (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 
1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b). 
 
 
1 Evidence of anti-
gun control beliefs 




e.g. operated hate site, wrote or disseminated extremist 
books/essays/letters to the editor, organized or attended movement 
activities, recruited others (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 
2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010) 
1 Evidence of 
participation in at 
least 1 movement 
activity 
1 Self claim  e.g. I am a far-rightist/tax-protester/Patriot  
-1 Self denial e.g. I am not an extremist 
 
The third dependent variable, crime committed, was measured as a violent incident or 
financial scheme, which was further subdivided into ideologically motivated homicide, non-
ideologically motivated homicide, ideologically motivated financial scheme and non-
ideologically motivated financial scheme. Crimes committed to advance the goals of the 
extremist group / movement or motivated by extremist ideology were classified as ideological. 
When there was no evidence that the crime that had any link to the movement, the crime was 
coded as non-ideological.  
This study utilized the classical Weberian approach to action, which conceptualized 
action as a reflection of the subjective meaning attached to the behavior by the actor (Campbell, 




actor’s internal state (i.e., beliefs) and his/her action, even if the actor was unaware of this 
connection, i.e., included both rational and affective actions (Weber, 1998). Therefore, this study 
assumed that an individual’s motive to commit an act (i.e., ideological or non-ideological crime) 
would have been consistent with his/her subjective meaning of the situation (i.e., commitment to 
rightwing extremism). However, the reverse would not have been true, as this study did not 
assume that action implied a specific subjective meaning to the actor. Thus, while motive (for an 
action) was ascertained from an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism, to assume that 
someone who committed a hate crime was a white supremacist would have been circular 
reasoning.  
Since this study conceptualized motive to engage in an action as emanating from the 
permanent internal state of the individual, i.e., his/her commitment to far-right extremism, there 
was some overlap between the variables. According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), indoctrination 
into a subculture tends to fluctuate until the norms, values and beliefs of the subculture replaced 
conventional norms, values and beliefs. After an individual is indoctrinated into the subculture, 
their commitment to the subculture could be conceptualized as a permanent internal state, i.e., a 
permanent change in the individual’s belief systems (Cloward & Ohlin, 1990). However, the 
behavior or crime committed is an event that occurred in time, i.e., not permanent, albeit a 
product of an individual’s commitment to far-right extremism (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998). 
Thus, ideological motive for committing a crime and commitment to far-right extremism are 
separated by a time dimension, i.e., commitment to extremism occurs first and is relatively 
permanent; the behavior is motivated by commitment and is a temporary event. However, motive 
and ideology could also be interconnected constructs: leaving white supremacist symbols and 




hate crime on a website were used as evidence of the individual’s commitment to far-right 
extremism and ideological motive for the crime (see Table 4).   
Table 4: Operational Definition of Crime Committed 
 
Indictments and court documents are the most reliable source to establish an individual’s 
motive for committing a crime. However, searches of open sourced documents unearthed few 
indictments. Further, court documents were obtained for some suspects. Personal statements and 
statements by co-offenders were also used to establish motive for a crime (e.g., if a co-offender 
Classification 
of Crime 




Convicted of causing the death of 
another human for an ideological or 
movement related purpose 
hate/bias/anti-government comments 
or statements made by perpetrator on 
or before crime; hate/bias/anti-
government material or graffiti left at 
crime scene; perpetrator was a 
member of an extremist group and 
extremist group was involved in the 
crime; perpetrator wrote bias-related 
emails; perpetrator created websites; 
hate/bias/anti-government materials 
representative of an organized hate 
group left at crime scene;   extremist 
group claimed responsibility for the 
crime (Campbell, 1998; Flanagan & 
O’Brien, 2003; Kaplan & Moss, 2003; 
Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009; 






Convicted of carrying out an illicit 
financial operation for an ideological 





Convicted of causing the death of 
another human for no  an ideological 
or movement related purpose 
 
 
Evidence of economic motive for 
incident and no evidence of the pro-







Convicted of carrying out an illicit 
financial operation for no  an 





stated the suspect hated sexual orientation minorities and shouted anti-gay slurs during the crime, 
this offense was coded as ideologically motivated).  
In situations where there were no statements made by the sampled DFRs about their 
motivation for committing a crime, this study attributed motivation for a crime based on 
circumstantial evidence prior to the commission of the offense. Similar to the system used by the 
courts and FBI to determine bias in hate crime cases, evidence of the suspect’s prior ideology or 
belief was used to determine whether a crime was ideologically or non-ideologically motivated, 
e.g., hate/bias/anti-government comments or statements by perpetrator on or before crime, 
hate/bias/anti-government material left at crime scene, whether perpetrator was a member of an 
extremist group and involvement of the hate group in the crime (Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009; 
Krouse, 2010). The FBI’s method for determining if an offense was a hate crime was also 
consistent with Weber’s conceptualization of motive and action (Cambell, 1998; Weber, 1998). 
Also in keeping with hate crime legislation (Flanagan & O’Brien, 2003; Kercher, Nolasco & 
Wu, 2009) crimes in which there was mixed motive (i.e., a combination of ideological and non-
ideological motives) were classified as ideologically motivated crimes.  
In situations where conflicting reports were given about the motivation of sampled 
individuals, Sageman’s (2005) decreasing order of reliability was used to classify the crime as 
ideological or non-ideological. Sageman (2005) ranked information in decreasing order of 
reliability according to the source: appellate court decisions; government documents; trial 
transcripts; corroborated information by key informants; uncorroborated information by key 
informants; and statements from people without direct access to the event/information (e.g., 
other media reports, watch-group reports, personal views expressed in blogs, websites, editorials 




Independent variables included individual level stressors, friend or family member in the 
movement, and prior negative interactions with government officials. Individual level stressors 
included low education, low income, low status job and abuse. Initially this variable was 
conceptualized as a 6-point scale, however, because if the high proportion of missing values, this 
variable was recoded as a binary variable. A degree of resiliency was assumed on the part of 
suspects. People 18 years old and older without a high school education were coded as having 
low education. Similarly, financial debt, homelessness and incarceration (prisoners rarely earned 
income and those who worked in prison earned a negligible income) were used as evidence of 
low income. Finally, abuse by a parent and bullying at school were used as evidence of abuse. 
For persons with college degrees and / or full-time occupation, this variable was coded as “0.” If 
no mention was made of the suspect’s education, financial status, occupation or abuse, this 
variable was coded as “missing.” High school and college students were only coded as “1” for 
this measure if abuse or bullying was mentioned.  
The variable, friend or family in movement, was coded as “1” = any evidence of friend or 
family involvement in the far-right movement and “0” = no evidence of friend or family 
involvement in the far-right movement found. Engaging in social activities with other far-
rightists, such as socializing in a DFR’s home, was used as evidence of having friendship ties. 
Statements by the police, media or court about extremist friends / family members, were also 
used as evidence of having friendship ties in the movement. Committing an unplanned crime 
with non-group members who were extremists was also taken as evidence of having friendship 
ties to extremists, since this suggests the crime occurred in the midst of social activities. 
However, being with a fellow group member at the behest of the group leader to commit a 




Table 5: Description of variables 
Variable Description of variable 
Dependent variables      
1. Membership in 
extremist group 
 
2. Commitment to 
extremism 
3. Crime committed 
On or before the time of the offence, was the individual a member of an 
extremist group, i.e., an organization, with a name and command 
structure and at least 2 extremist members? (0=no; 1=yes) 
Level of commitment to extremist cause on or before the time of the 
offence, measured as a scale comprising 6 factors. 
What type of crime did the suspect commit?  
 1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically 
motivated homicide; 3 = ideologically motivated financial 
scheme; 4 = non-ideologically motivated financial scheme.  




















6. Prior negative 
Interactions with 
government officials 
 Civil action by 
government 
 Prior arrests  
 Prior charges 




What was the individual’s gender? (0=male; 1=female) 
What was the individual’s race? (0=non-white; 1=white) 
Was the individual a Domestic Far-Rightist? (0=non far-rightist; 
1=DFR i.e. any one pro indicator listed in Table 3) 
(Proxy variable) Binary variable consisting of any one the following 
elements 
Was the individual older than 18 and had less than a high school 
education?   
Was the individual homeless, incarcerated or in financial debt at the 
time of the offense? 
Was the individual unemployed or casually employed at the time of the 
offense?  
Was abuse mentioned as a mitigating factor in court? 
Did the individual have a family member, friend or acquaintance that 
was involved in the movement, on or before the time of the offence? 
(0=no; 1=one or more friend/family member/acquaintance in 
movement) 
(Proxy variable) Binary variable consisting of any one the following 
elements. 
 
Was civil action (e.g. lien, preliminary or permanent injunction) taken 
against the suspects by a government agency or department prior to the 
act?   
Was the individual arrested prior to committing this offense?  
Was the individual charged with a crime prior to committing this 
offense? Was the individual convicted of a criminal offense prior to 
committing this offense? 
The independent variable, prior negative interactions with government officials, was 




or lien filed by a government department or agency against the individual and protection orders 
filed by a spouse); (2) prior arrests; (3) prior criminal charges; and (4) prior convictions. The 
date of the offense coded in the dataset was used to distinguish between prior and subsequent 
criminal / civil offending behavior. This variable was coded as: “1” = at least one prior civil 
order, crime, arrest, or conviction before the start date of the current offense; and “0” = no 
evidence of prior negative interactions with government officials. Statements by the media or 
judge about a criminal record or civil injunction, a record on the state / federal prison website or 
a criminal history record on the pay per view website was coded as “1.” When the media or 
judge said the person did not have a criminal / civil record, no record was found on the state / 
federal website or the pay per view website uncovered no record, this variable was coded as “0.” 
If the suspect was not found on the pay per view website and no mention was made in the open 
source about priors, this variable was coded as missing.  
To describe the sample, individual level variables – gender, race and DFR status – were 
also included. Gender was coded as a binary variable: “0” = male and “1” female. Race was also 
coded as binary: “0” = non-white and “1” = white. DFR status was coded as: “0” = non-extremist 
collaborators and “1” = member of an extremist group or evidence of commitment to DFR 
ideology. Categories coded as “0” were used as the reference category in the statistical models. 
A detailed description of the study’s independent and dependent variables can be found in Table 
5. 
 
5.4. Data Analysis  
Each research question required a different statistical analysis technique. The first 




regression models. According to Agresti (2007) and Field (2013) these types of models should 
be used to determine the effects of continuous and /or categorical independent variables on a 
binary dependent variable (DV) e.g., membership in a formal or informal extremist group.   
Multiple independent variables (IVs) and interaction effects (i.e., moderation) between IVs 
(Field, 2013; Hamilton, 2009) were included in the logistic regression models for research 
questions 1 and 2.  
Logistic regression models were used to predict the probability of a dependent variable, 
y, occurring, given observed values of 1 (or more) IV. The logistic regression equation used to 
predict the probability of y when there was one predictor variable was: 
P(Y) = 
1
1+𝑒  −(𝑏0+ 𝑏1𝑋1+𝜀𝑖)
 
where е was the base of natural logarithms; b0 was the constant; b1 was the weight of the 
predictor variable (X1); and ε was a residual term (Field, 2005). When the model included more 
than one predictor variable, the logistic regression equation was: 
P(Y) = 
1
1+𝑒  −(𝑏0+ 𝑏1𝑋1+𝑏2𝑋2+…+𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛 +𝜀𝑖)
 
where weights or coefficients were added for each additional predictor variable (Field, 2005).  
Logistic regression was used to find a model that best fit the observations in the data, 
with the use of maximum-likelihood estimation. First, a baseline was determined, which 
estimated the parameter for the constant and assessed the fit of the model, i.e., how well the 
model predicted the observed outcomes (Field, 2005). The measure of the fit of the model was 
the log-likelihood; a large log-likelihood indicated that the model did a poor job predicting the 




IVs were entered into the model, and compared against the baseline model. If the log 
likelihood (LL) for the research model was lower than the baseline model, this was taken as 
evidence in support of the research model. The log likelihood for the model was used as a 
badness-of-fit measure, in that the higher the LL, the worse the model fitted the data. The chi2 
result and its associated probability were used to determine if the entire logistic model was 
significant. If the probability of obtaining the chi2 result by chance was small, i.e., less than or 
equal to 0.05, this indicated that the model was a significant predictor of the dependent variable. 
Further, logistic models provided an estimate of the model’s strength in the prediction of the 
dependent variable or Pseudo R2 e.g., Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic, Cox and Snell measure or 
Nagelkerke, termed goodness-of-fit measures (Field, 2005). Larger values indicated a stronger or 
better model specification (Hamilton, 2009). 
Logistic models also allow the researcher to determine if individual IVs were significant 
predictors of the DV through interpretation of the Wald statistic. The Wald statistic was used to 
test the null hypothesis that the b-coefficient of the predictor variable = 0 (Field, 2005, p. 224). If 
the probability of obtaining a specific Wald statistic was small, i.e., less than or equal to 0.05, 
this indicated that the independent variable was a significant predictor of the dependent variable. 
However, since the Wald statistic was calculated by the regression coefficient divided by its 
standard error (i.e., Wald statistic = 
𝑏
𝑆𝐸
), standard errors tended to be inflated when the Wald 
statistic is large, and there was a risk of making a type II error (i.e., falsely rejecting a significant 
predictor). Another issue with the Wald statistic was, since referred to the natural log of the IV 
associated with a one unit change in the DV, it was more difficult to understand (Agresti, 2007; 
Field, 2005). Odds ratios are more easily understood. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicated that as 




odds ratio less than 1 indicated that as the predictor variable increases, the odds of the dependent 
variable decreases (Field, 2005). Therefore, odds ratios were reported when available (see 
findings section). Significant p-values were denoted by asterisks, with a key directly below the 
table. Goodness of fit measures were placed below the table.  A summary of the procedure for 
interpreting these statistics can be found in Appendix A. 
The model with lowest log likelihood was considered to have been the best-fitted model. 
The classification table or plot and several diagnostic tests were used to confirm the best fitted 
model. The classification table, a contingency table which provided the count and percentage of 
correct predictions based on the model, was used to identify the observations that were correctly 
(and incorrectly) predicted by the model (Field, 2005). Similar to the classification table, 
classification plots were used to identify the correctly and incorrectly predicted cases, but in a 
graphical form (Field, 2005). Models with the most correctly identified/predicted cases were 
considered to have been better fitted. However, diagnostic tests, such as Cook’s Distance,9 
Leverage,10 DFBeta,11 Studentized Residual, Standardized Residual and Deviance,12 were 
created and reviewed to ensure than no observation or case has undue influence on the 
coefficients i.e., the coefficients were accurate (Field, 2005). These residuals were also graphed 
against predicted probabilities, since diagrams were easier to interpret than columns of figures 
(Menard, 2002).  
                                                 
9 Cook’s D gave the change in the coefficient when an observation/case was dropped from the analysis. Similar to 
other residuals, Cook’s D was calculated for each case (Field, 2005; Menard, 2002). Individual Cook’s D values 
were reviewed in the data window of SPSS and graphed against predicted probabilities to easily identify cases that 
exceed 1. There were no issues with Cook’s D values. 
10 Leverage values for cases were compared to 
𝑘+1
𝑁
, where k was the number of predictors and N was the sample size. 
No case had excessive influence on the models, i.e., leverage values were ≤  3 times the calculated value (Field, 
2005).  
11 DFBetas (i.e., the standardized Cook’s statistics) were < 1. This indicated that there were no outliers (Field, 2005; 
Menard, 2002).  




Variables were then tested for multicollinearity, by analyzing tolerance, VIF, eigenvalues 
and variance proportions. Collinearity between independent variables was identified by a 
tolerance value less than .1 and VIF value greater than 10 (Field, 2005). Eigenvalues and 
condition indexes for dimensions in the model, found in the collinearity diagnostics table, also 
needed to be close in value. Large eigenvalues and condition indexes were taken as evidence that 
the model coefficients were greatly affected by small changes in the IVs, which would mean that 
the model specifications were not stable (Field, 2005). There were no issues with eigenvalues 
and condition indexes in this study. Finally, the variance proportions in the collinearity 
diagnostics table were interpreted. Variance proportions on small eigenvalue were small, which 
indicated that the study did not have problems with collinearity. A summary table of the 
assumptions of logistic regression can be found in Appendix B. 
The second research question assessed the effects of several categorical IVs on 
commitment to rightwing extremism. Since commitment to rightwing extremism was 
operationalized using indicators to create a factor scale and the scale was skewed, a regression 
analysis was the appropriate technique for examining the effects of IVs on commitment to 
rightwing extremism. A regression analysis was used to determine whether the research model 
was significant, the strength of the model, the strength of IVs, and interaction effects (Field, 
2013). Interaction effects were then estimated and compared to determine the best fitted model. 
Appendix C contains a summary table of the statistics and parameters estimated in regression 
models.  
However, these parameters would have been biased if the assumptions for the test were 
violated. The DV needed to have a linear relationship with the IVs or the model would have been 




and 3. If this assumption was violated, a robust regression would have been used instead (Field, 
2013). Residuals were consistent at each level of the IV, which indicated that there was no 
problem with homoscedasticity. Although continuous IVs did not need to be normally 
distributed, if the errors were skewed, the confidence intervals and significance levels would be 
affected in small samples only (Field, 2013). The current sample size was 305, so this did not 
cause a problem. Finally, there were no outliers of influential cases (Field, 2013). These 
assumptions are summarized in Appendix D.  
The third research question required several multinomial logistic regression models and 
logistic regression models, previously described, to be fully tested. For this model, membership 
in an extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were independent variables, and 
criminal behavior was the dependent variable. As criminal behavior was measured as four 
distinct and unordered categories (1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically 
motivated homicide; 3 = ideologically motivated financial scheme; 4 = non-ideologically 
motivated financial scheme), a multinomial logistic regression model was the appropriate 
statistical test (Agresti, 2007; Hamilton, 2009; Long & Freese, 2005).  
Multinomial logistic regression treated the DV as a nominal variable and calculated 
parameter estimates, i.e., B, SE, Wald and Exp(B), in comparison to a specified baseline 
category of the DV (Field, 2009). The baseline was the first category. Multinomial logistic 
regression determined statistical significance of categorical IVs, continuous IVs, interaction 
effects between IVs, the strength of the entire model, and if this effect was different for people 
with different levels of commitment to extremism (Agresti, 2007; Hamilton, 2009). This type of 
model was very similar to logistic regression models. IVs were entered in a block (at the same 




created in SPSS by specifying a custom model: the IVs were entered, along with the interaction 
terms to determine if the observed effects were due to the IVs (i.e., main effects) or the 
interaction terms (Field, 2009; Garson, 2012).  
Multinomial logistic regression models were interpreted similarly to logistic regression: 
(1) significant Chi2 statistics identify which models, IVs and interactions effects were 
statistically significant; (2) pseudo R2 measures, such as Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke, specified 
the effect size of the model; (3) goodness-of-fit measures (e.g., Pearson Chi2 statistic,13 AIC and 
BIC)14 and classification tables15 were used to determine which models were the best fit of the 
data; (4) and the log likelihood ratio indicated how much variability in the data was not 
explained by the model (Field, 2009).  
However, for these statistics to be accurate, certain assumptions must have been satisfied. 
Cells with low counts, or over dispersion, could have resulted in contradictory results in the 
Pearson Chi2 statistic, in comparison to the AIC and BIC values (Field, 2009). Over dispersion 
was not a problem. Over dispersion was identified by a dispersion parameter, ϕ Pearson = 
𝜒2 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛
𝑑𝑓
 , that was close to 2 (Field, 2009). A summary of the statistics estimated by 
multinomial regression models can be found in Appendix E. 
The full model included individual level stressors, extremist significant others and 
interactions with government officials as explanatory/independent variables. Membership in an 
extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were hypothesized as mediator 
                                                 
13 Pearson Chi2 was used to test whether the predicted values of the model were significantly different from the 
observed values (Field, 2009). Non-significant results indicate a better-fitted model.  
14 AIC was an acronym for Akaike’s information criterion and BIC was an acronym for Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criterion. The model with the lower AIC and BIC values was deemed the better-fitted model (Field, 
2009). 
15 Classification tables were interpreted similarly to those found in logistic regression analysis, except predicted 
probabilities was termed ‘estimated response probabilities’ and predicted group membership was termed ‘predicted 




(indirect) variables in the full model. Several statistical techniques could have been used to test 
for mediator effects on a categorical DV. The Sobel test could have been used when there is only 
one significant mediator variable (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). A large sample size (greater than 
50) was required for the Sobel test to be accurate. The Sobel test can be calculated as follows:  
a *b / √ (b2*sa2 + a2*sb2)  
where a was the unstandardized regression coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator, b 
was the unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between the mediator, the DV, 
sa was the standard error of a, and sb was the standard error of b (Preacher & Leonardelli, 2012). 
However, if both hypothesized mediator variables are found to be significant predictors of 
criminal behavior of DFRs, Preacher and Hayes (2008) recommended the bootstrap method be 
used instead of the Sobel test. The authors argued that the bootstrap method produce less biased 
estimates when there were multiple mediators in a model, and is suitable for dichotomous DVs. 
Unfortunately, since multiple imputation was used to fill in missing values; neither the Sobel test 
not the bootstrap method could have been used. It is likely that future versions of Stata would 
allow for the calculation of mediation effects on multiple imputed data. 
More complex iterations with interaction terms / moderators were computed and 
compared to test whether Differential Opportunity Theory modified the effect of strain.  To 
determine if different predictors or IVs explained violent as compared to financial crimes and 
ideological as compared to non-ideological crimes, the variable criminal behavior was re-coded 
as a dichotomous variable and logistic regression models (described in the analysis plan for the 
first research question) were utilized to fit the data. Depictions of the hypothesized relationships 
for the study’s three research questions, as well as a summary of the statistical methods used to 




5.5. Missing Data and Multiple Imputation 
Missing data was problematic, since this study utilized secondary data analysis. Six 
variables in the study contained missing values. Race, strain and negative interactions with law 
enforcement all contained missing values. Several interaction effects – strain X extreme others; 
extreme others X negative interactions with law enforcement; and strain X negative interactions 
with government officials – also contained missing values. Table 6, below, summarizes the 
percentage in missing values.  
Allison (2002) recommended using multivariate normal models to impute missing values. 
The multivariate normal model assumes the variables in the model are normally distributed, has 
a linear relationship with other variables, and has error terms that were normally distributed 
(Allison, 2002).16 Many of the variables in this study were categorical, which violated the 
normality assumptions for multiple imputations (MI). However, Allison (2002) argued that MI is 
also valid for categorical variables.  
Table 6: Summary of Missing Data 




Prior negative interactions with government officials  
Strain X Extreme others  
Extreme Others X Prior negative interactions with 
government officials 


























                                                 
16 Continuous variables that were not normally distributed may have been normalized via a log transformation and 
the antilog taken after the missing values have been imputed (Allison, 2002). Skewed distributions could have been 
normalized by applying a square root transformation. After missing values were imputed, the values must have been 
squared to reverse the transformation and return the values to their original scale. Rounding (values > 0.5, round up; 
values < 0.5, round down; if there were no negative values in the original measurement scales, negative values round 
to 0) may also have been necessary, especially for continuous variables that were discrete, i.e., could have only take 




Several assumptions must have been met for MI to produce unbiased estimators: the data 
needed to have been missing at random (MAR), the regression models must have been correctly 
specified, the correct imputation method must have been selected and an adequate number of 
datasets must have been imputed (Carlin, Galati, & Royston, 2008; Marchenko & Eddings, n.d.; 
White, Royston & Wood, 2011). MAR is defined as when the probability that value was missing 
depended on another variable. However, within each category of the variable with missing 
values the probability of missingness is not related to another variable (Allison, 2002; White, 
Royston & Wood, 2011). This assumption would have been fulfilled if, for example, the 
probability of missing values for race was related to membership in extremist group, but the 
probability of missing for non-whites (and whites) was unrelated to membership in extremist 
group. It was impossible to test whether this condition was satisfied because the values of the 
missing data were unknown (Allison, 2002).  
Correct specification of the MI model meant that the IVs provided a reasonable 
explanation of the DV. The correct regression model (logistic, regression, multinomial logistic, 
etc.) was then selected. Correct specification of the model was assessed by conducting the 
regression analysis on the original dataset with the missing values (Marchenko & Eddings, n.d.). 
In addition, all the variables – independent, dependent and interaction effects – was included in 
the MI impute command. According to White, Royston and Wood (2011), interactions effects 
must have been treated as “just another variable” and included in the imputation or one would 
obtain biased parameter estimates. 
The imputation method selected was based on number of variables with missing values 
(univariate / single variable or multivariate / multiple variables), the pattern of missingness 




parameter estimates if an infinite number of datasets are created. Standard errors tend to be 
biased upwards if few datasets are estimated and there is a high percentage of missing values. 
Allison (2002) suggested researchers use Rubin’s (1987) formula to calculate the number of 




 where F was the fraction of the missing values and M was the number of datasets to have been 
computed. In other words, according to Rubin’s (1987) formula, 10 imputed datasets should 
result in 95% accurate standard errors and parameter estimates.  However, Allison (2012) later 
revised his recommendation based on the tradeoff between efficiency and accuracy. Allison 
(2012) cautioned that while 10 datasets may have been most efficient when faced with limited 
computer processing speed, accurate standard errors would require the number of imputed 
datasets to have been equivalent or similar to the variable with the largest percent of missing 
values. Thus, based on Table 6 and Allison’s (2012) recommendation, 41 datasets would have 
been adequate. Since there was no issue with processing speed, 50 datasets were imputed.  
Version 13 of Stata, a statistical program, allows users to impute missing values for 
continuous, binary, unordered categorical and ordered categorical variables using the mi impute 
command (“Multiple Imputation in Stata” n.d.; White, Royston & Wood, 2011). First, the 
regression models were calculated using the original datasets to verify the model specification 
(this was described in the data analysis section). The logistic model that predicted membership in 
extremist groups was correctly specified: the model Chi-square was significant, Nagelkerke R2 = 




accurate, there was no evidence of complete separation, and the residuals were normal (for 
details on interpreting logistic models, see Appendix A and Appendix B).  
The regression model assessing commitment to extremism was non-significant but 
correctly specified: the Durbin-Watson Statistic was close to 2, which indicated that the errors 
were independent; the VIF was close to 1 and Tolerance was higher than 0.2, which indicated 
that there was no problem with multicollinearity; Cook’s distance did not exceed 1, Mahalanobis 
distance averaged close to 6 and the standardized residuals were normally distributed, which 
indicated that the normality assumption was fulfilled; and the correlation matrix indicated that 
there the IVs were not correlated (for details on interpreting regression models, see: Appendix D 
and Field, 2013).   
The multinomial logistic model comparing the four types of crimes was also a good fit: 
the likelihood ratio test was significant, which indicated that the model with the IVs was 
significantly better than the null model; the Goodness of fit statistics gave inconsistent results, 
probably due to the missing data problem; the Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 were 
greater than 0.5, which indicated that the model was strong; and the classification table listed that 
the model correctly predicted 63% of the observations (for details on interpreting multinomial 
logistic models, see: Appendix E).  
MI was then attempted using chained equations (since 6 variables contain missing values) 
with the logit method (because the variables were binary). However, the models did not 
converge, and predictive mean matching (PMM) was used instead of the logit method. 
According to Harrell (n.d.) PMM can be used to impute missing values for continuous variables, 




similar to the observed data (i.e., rates of 0 and 1 were relatively consistent across the 50 
datasets).      
Stata 13 was used to calculate the Monte Carlo error (MCE) for MI regression analyses, 
which assessed the adequacy of the imputed data. MCE are listed for the regression models, 
discussed in the next chapter. According to White, Royston and Wood (2011), the following 
criteria should be used to determine if sufficient datasets were imputed:  
1. the MCE of a coefficient should have been approximately 10% of its standard error 
2. the MCE of a coefficient’s T-statistic should have been approximately 0.1 
3. if the p-value was 0.05, the MCE of a coefficient’s p-value  should have been 
approximately 0.01; if the p-value was 0.01, the MCE of a coefficient’s p-value  should 
have been approximately 0.02 
 Stata 13 was used to fit regression models with the mi estimate: command. Regression 
models could have been fitted for binary, count, ordered categorical, unordered categorical, 
continuous, panel data and time series data (Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual: 
Release 13, n.d.). However, the mi estimate: logit command does not run a logistic regression 
and the mi estimate: reg command does not run a regression. Instead, the mi estimate: command 
was used to compute the specified regression on each imputed dataset and to combine the results 
according to Rubin’s (1987) rules. Therefore, the output of mi estimate: commands are different 
from regression analyses conducted on complete datasets (i.e., datasets with no missing values) 
and have their own rules of interpretation.  
The average relative variance (RVI) is the variance in the estimates across the 
coefficients due to missing data. Thus, the closer the RVI is to zero, the lower the effect of the 




number of imputations is sufficient to provide unbiased parameter estimates. The number of 
imputations should be at least 100 * FMI. The model F statistic tested whether all the 
coefficients for the IVs are significantly different from zero; if the p-value of the F statistic was 
≤ 0.05, the model is said to be a significant predictor of the DV. P-values are also provided for 
individual IVs: if the p-value of the t statistic is ≤ 0.05, the IV is said to be a significant predictor 
of the DV (Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual: Release 13, n.d.). Finally, the mi test: 
command is used to assess whether specific coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
This command is interpreted similarly to log-likelihood statistics when comparing different 
blocks when predicting a specific DV: significant mi test results means the IVs significantly 
improved the model. The mi test: command is used to assess the block model and interaction 
effects; non-significant mi test results indicate that the IV or interaction effect did not improve 
the model. These rules for interpreting MI models are summarized in Appendix G. 
Unfortunately, Stata 13 did not provide a means to assess mediation effects on imputed data.  
The next chapter will present the study’s results. First, the descriptive statistics for the 
sample will be presented. Next, the factor analysis used to create the commitment to extremism 
variable and the results of the factor analysis will be described. Finally, the results of the models 












6.1. Descriptive analysis 
 The study consisted of 305 DFR (N = 245; 80.33%) and their co-offenders (N = 60; 
19.67%) who committed a financial scheme or homicide during the 5 year period, 2006 to 2010. 
More than fifty percent (N = 170; 55.74%) were members of formal extremist groups. Most of 
the sample was male (N = 261; 85.57%) and white (N = 223, 73.11%). Less than a quarter of the 
sample experienced at least one form of strain (N = 64; 20.98%), while no evidence of strain was 
found for close to forty-five percent of the sample (N = 135; 44.26%).  
Many subjects had at least one friend or family with extremist beliefs (N = 268; 87.87%) 
and prior negative interactions with government officials (N = 175; 57.38%). Close to eighty-
five percent (N = 259; 84.92%) were convicted. Indicted suspects who were not convicted (N = 
40; 13.11%) were included in the sample to ensure adequate sample size for accurate statistical 
analysis. Of those people who were not convicted, 13 were killed by the police during a crime 
spree or committed suicide immediately after the homicide incident. About half of the non-
convicted suspects (N = 21) were acquitted or the prosecutor dropped the charges, usually in 
exchange for testimony against a codefendant. Six suspects absconded or were awaiting trial at 
the time of the data analysis. The analyses presented in this chapter retained the non-convicted 
persons to maximize statistical power but controlled for non-convicted subjects when possible. 
Open source documents were unable to definitively verify the experience of strain 
indicators for several subjects. There were high percentages of missing values for education (N = 




strain measure was coded as any one indicator = “1,” the percentage of missing values dropped 
to acceptable levels (N = 106; 34.75%) and resulted in a more reliable measure.  
Table 7: Summary of variables 
Variables N Percentage 
Group member 
    Yes 
    No 
Crime committed 
    Ideological homicide 
    Non-ideological homicide 
    Ideological financial scheme 
    Non-ideological financial scheme 
Convicted 
    Yes 
    No 
    Missing (imputed) 
Gender 
   Male 
   Female 
Race 
   White 
   Non-white 
   Missing (imputed) 
Strain 
   Yes 
    No 
   Missing (imputed) 
Extreme others 
   Yes 
    No 
Negative interactions with government officials 
    Yes 
    No 
   Missing (imputed) 
Domestic Far Right 
    Yes 




































































A similar problem occurred with the indicators for prior negative interactions with 




282, 92.16%), prior arrest (N = 157; 51.31%), prior criminal charges (N = 186; 60.78%) and 
prior criminal conviction (N = 140; 45.75%). However, when the multiple indicators were 
merged to create prior negative interactions with government officials, the rate of missing values 
fell to acceptable levels (N = 26, 8.52%). Multiple imputations were then used to fill in these 
missing values for conviction status (N = 6; 1.97%), race (N = 26; 8.52%), strain (N = 106; 
34.75%) and prior negative interactions with government officials (N = 26, 8.52%). Missing 
values for interaction terms were also imputed. (See Chapter 5 for detailed explanation of the 
multiple imputation procedure used in this study).  
The study’s descriptive statistics were presented in Table 7 above. The factor analysis 
used to create the commitment to extremism variable will be presented in the next section. The 
inferential tests used to assess the study’s dependent variables will then presented. 
 
6.2. Commitment to ideology factor  
6.2.1. Creating the Commitment to ideology scale 
One of the key variables used in this study was commitment to extremism. This variable 
was used as the dependent variable in the second research question and an independent variable 
in the third research question. Commitment to extremism was conceptualized as a latent variable, 
i.e., multiple indicators were used to capture this construct. When there are many facets to a 
construct or latent variable, Field (2013) suggested using a factor analysis to (1) understand the 
structure of the latent variable, (2) create a more reliable instrument / questionnaire to measure 
the latent variable and (3) reduce the data to a more manageable level. In other words, factor 
analysis was used to determine which indicators were valid measures of the commitment to 




cited by Field, 2013) or eigenvalue > 0.7 (Jolliffe’s recommendation, as cited by Field, 2013). 
Indicators that combine to form a factor with an eigenvalue < .07 were deemed invalid and 
dropped from the construct measurement. Factor analysis was used to establish which indicators 
(previously described in chapter 5 and summarized in Table 3) contributed the most to the scale 
(Field, 2013). Jolliffe’s recommendation (eigenvalue > 0.7) was used to identify the number of 
factors that contributed to the commitment to extremism construct. The raw scores were tallied 
to create each factor. The factors were then tallied to create a commitment to extremism scale. 
Although the factor analysis empirically creates a valid scale, it is considered to be the first step 
in designing a valid and reliable scale (Field, 2013). Since the study’s commitment to extremism 
scale has not been previously tested, factor analysis is the appropriate technique to create a valid 
scale. The steps used to create the commitment to extremism scale will be described below. 
A principal axis factor analysis was conducted on the 9 items with equamax rotation. 
This process involved estimating the communalities between the indicators listed in Table 3, and 
replacing the diagonals of the correlation matrix with the estimated communalities (Field, 2013). 
The eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the correlation matrix were then computed to determine the 
substantive importance of the factors and how many factors to retain (Field, 2013). An equamax 
rotation was then conducted to make the factors easier to interpret.  
  The correlation matrix revealed no problems with multicollinearity (i.e., none of the 
Pearson’s r were greater than 0.9). According to Field (2013), a sample size of 300 or larger 
should have provided a stable factor solution. The result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 






Table 8: Commitment to ideology scale  
 

















.832 .209 -.105 .209 -.072 -.091 
Evidence of 
anti-tax-beliefs 




.064 .891 -.020 .099 .146 -.035 
Evidence that 
the suspect was 
anti-gun 
control 
.098 .883 .067 -.042 -.014 -.001 
Movement 
related tattoo 
-.058 -.067 .841 -.238 .192 .064 
Evidence of 
racist / general 
hate beliefs 





.159 .007 .015 .936 .116 .042 
Claim to have 
been a far-
rightist  
.028 .108 .096 .098 .948 .007 
Denial of far-
rightist beliefs 
-.038 -.012 .067 .037 .005 .995 
Eigenvalues 2.709 1.797 1.364 .964 .839 .770 
% of variance 27.089 17.969 13.639 9.636 8.387 7.703 
Cronbach’s α .81 .74 .57    
 
The six factors fulfilled Jolliffe’s criteria, i.e., had eigenvalues > 0.7 – Conspiracy 
Theorist, Survivalist, Proud Supremacist, Socializer, Proud far-rightist and Denier. Together 




showed six points of inflection (where the slope changed drastically), which also suggested that 
six factors should be extracted. Rather than using the factor scores, individuals’ raw scores were 
tallied for each indicator of the variable. These were then summed to create individuals’ overall 
score for commitment to extremism (M = 1.57; SD = 1.54).  The items that clustered into the 6 
factors are depicted in Table 8 above, along with their factor loadings (Eigenvalues). 
 Two factors, Conspiracy Theorist and Survivalist, had high reliability (Cronbach’s α > 
0.7). However, Proud Supremacists had a low reliability (Cronbach’s α > 0.57). Reliability 
measures could not be calculated for Socializers, Proud far-rightists and Deniers as only one item 
was used to create each of those factors. However, when four or five factors were extracted, too 
many residuals had absolute values greater than 0.05; with the six-factor scale, only 28% of 
residuals had absolute values greater than 0.05. Thus, the six-factor scale was retained.  
 The percentage of variance for each factor provided a measure to assess the relative 
importance of the indicators to overall commitment to extremism. As expected, general 
conspiratorial beliefs, anti-government beliefs and anti-tax beliefs carried the most weight, and 
measured one overarching aspect of the commitment to extremism construct. When combined, 
these indicators formed the Conspiracy Theorist factor and explained 27% of the variance in 
individuals’ commitment to extremism levels. Survivalist beliefs and anti-gun control beliefs 
also measured one aspect of commitment to extremism, i.e., formed a cohesive factor, 
Survivalist. This factor explained close to 18% of the variance in commitment to extremism. 
People who subscribed to general hate (anti-minority, anti-LBGT, anti-Semitic) beliefs also 
tended to have tattoos. These two indicators were used to create the Proud Supremacist factor, 




in movement activities (approx. 10%), claiming to have been a DFR (8%) and denying affiliation 
with the movement (approx. 8%) were also valid measures of commitment to extremism.  
6.2.2. Interpreting the Commitment to ideology factors: subtypes in the American FR  
Factors in the commitment to extremism scale can also be conceptualized as sub-types 
among the DFR movement. One model of DFR subtypes was described by Kaplan (1995a). 
According to Kaplan (1995a), the domestic far-right movement can be divided into the following 
sub-types: Klan, Christian Identity, neo-Nazi, reconstructed traditions/Odinism, idiosyncratic 
sectarians, single issue constituencies (e.g., tax protestors) and knuckle draggers 
galore/skinheads. Klan members traditionally engage in racist violence. However, racist violence 
by Klan groups has been declining largely due to the result of infiltration by government 
informants (Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Kaplan, 1995a; Simi & Futrell, 2010) or perhaps due to 
the need to reframe their ideology to reduce the stigma associated with Klan groups (Dobratz & 
Shanks-Meile, 2006). Membership in Klan groups has been found to cut across class boundaries 
(Ezekiel, 1995; Simi & Futrell, 2010).  
Christian Identity or the belief in two seedlines, which evolved from British Israelism, 
asserts that whites were descendants of Adam and Eve and were the true Lost Tribes of Israel 
and Jews are the children of Eve and Satan (Dobratz, 2001; Durham, 2008; Ezekiel, 1995; 
Kaplan, 1995a; Sharp, 2000). Similar to Christian Identity groups, neo-Nazi groups are 
xenophobic. According to Kaplan (1995a), some neo-Nazi groups dream of overthrowing the 
ZOG and creating a new order, while others hope to create white utopian communities.  
Kaplan (1995a) classified reconstructed traditions/Odinism as the fourth sub-type of the 
American FR. He described Odinism as “an imaginative blend of ritual magic, ceremonial forms 




syncretism in adopting elements of other white supremacist appeals - Nazism and, remarkably, 
Christian Identity” (p. 60).  
According to Kaplan (1995a), the fifth sub-type among the American FR is idiosyncratic 
sectarians, e.g. the Church of the Creator and Survivalists (Kaplan, 1995a). Survivalists and 
Militia members are associated with complex conspiracy theories, anti-government beliefs and 
an intense need to be prepared to defend their rights (especially to own guns or be free from 
unconstitutional federal taxes) and liberty (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; 
Kimmel & Ferber, 2000).  
Finally, the seventh FR sub-type identified by Kaplan (1995a) is knuckle draggers galore 
/ skinheads. Skinheads or ‘knuckle draggers galore’ are extremely racist, generally engage in 
opportunistic violence against racial minorities and commit crimes with other group members 
(Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 1995a; Sprinzak, 1995). Hamm (1993) described skinheads as 
“remarkably violent” and motivated to “fight for the survival of [the white] race” (p. 109). 
  Limited empirical support was found for Kaplan’s (1995a) classification of the DFR. 
Rather than being distinct sub-types, idiosyncratic sectarians and single-issue constituencies 
formed factor 1, Conspiracy Theorist. Idiosyncratic sectarians also described factor 2, 
Survivalist. In other words, rather than being one distinct group, some idiosyncratic sectarians 
(i.e., believers of conspiracy theories) scored highly on the Conspiracy Theorist factor, while 
others scored highly on the Survivalist factor.  
According to the factor analysis, Klan, neo-Nazis and skinheads formed factor 3, Proud 
Supremacist. Characteristics of the Christian Identity movement and reconstructed traditions / 




(Proud far-Rightist) were not described by Kaplan (1995a) as a distinct sub-type of the American 
FR movement. 
This section described the process used to create the commitment to extremism scale and 
used Kaplan’s (1995a) typology as a framework to interpret the six factors extracted from the 
factor analysis. Some empirical support was found for Kaplan’s (1995a) typology. Next, 
differences between DFRs and their non-extremist collaborators will be explored. This will be 
followed by the inferential models used to assess covariates of membership in extremist groups, 
commitment to extremism and crimes committed by far-rightists and non-extremist 
collaborators.  
 
6.3. Covariates of Membership in Far-Right Extremist Group 
The results for the first research question of the study – among DFRs and non-extremist 
collaborators, what effect did individual level stressors, significant others and negative 
interactions with government officials have on membership in far-right groups – are presented in 
this section. As this study was specifically concerned about the criminal behavior of DFR, the 
models presented in this section offset the conviction variable, that is, conviction status was set 
to “1” or yes. This technique allows the study to retain the individuals who were not convicted 
(i.e., retain the entire sample) but all the coefficients reported are based on the additional 
constraint of conviction = 1.  That is, the odds ratios should be interpreted as the effect of the IV 
on the DV, if the suspect was convicted.  
Members of extremist groups were significantly less likely to have been non-white. 
Specifically, non-whites were approximately 0.31 times less likely than whites to join a far-right 




found in previous studies to attract mostly white members (Gruenewald, et al., 2013a; 2013b). 
Members of extremist groups were close to 8 times (exp(B) = 7.95, p < 0.001) more likely to 
have at least one extremist friend or relative, which supported DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) 
and previous research findings (e.g., Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993). However, because 
open source documents were used in this study, it was unknown if these friendships developed 
prior or subsequent to joining the group.  
Group members were significantly more likely to have had prior negative interactions 
with government officials (exp(B) = 3.33, p < 0.01). This supported GST (Agnew, 2005) and 
DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), which argued that negative stimuli, such as a criminal record or 
civil charges, would increase feelings or strain and alienation. Furthermore, to alleviate these 
feelings, strained individuals may join a deviant sub-cultural group. However, these conclusions 
are tentative. Due to the limitations of open source documents, it is unknown whether these 
interactions occurred prior or subsequent to joining the group.  
However, it was possible to determine whether these negative interactions with 
government officials occurred prior to the individual committing a homicide or financial scheme. 
Prison and arrest records typically contain an arrest or conviction date. This was then compared 
to the start date of the analyzed offense to determine whether the negative interactions with 
government officials occurred prior to the offense. Occasionally the precise date of the prior 
civil/criminal charge could not have been ascertained. However, in such events the news 
documents or court documents normally mentioned a criminal history record. When no statement 
was made about the civil or criminal record of the suspect and no actual record was found, the 
data was assumed to have been missing. The imputation process was described in Chapter 5 and 




 Table 9: Models assessing covariates of membership in far-right extremist group, 
offset conviction 
Independent Variables 
(when convicted = yes) 
Model 1 
Odds Ratio (SE) 
Model 2 
Odds Ratio (SE) 
Model 3 
Odds Ratio (SE) 
Gender ᵞ  
Race š  
Strain ψ  
Extreme others ψ 
Negative interactions with 
government officials ψ 
Domestic Far Right ψ 
Commitment to extremism 
Strain X Extreme Others 
Strain X Negative interactions with 
government officials  
Constant 
 0.99 (0.46) 
 0.31 (0.18)* 
 0.98 (0.36) 
 7.95 (3.82)*** 
 3.33 (1.25)**  
 
91.61 (62.39)*** 




 0.00 (0.00)*** 
 1.02 (0.47) 
 0.31 (0.17)* 
 2.01 (1.96) 
 12.56 (9.62)** 
 3.57 (1.37)**  
 
94.72 (64.64)*** 
 0.55 (0.06)*** 





 0.31 (0.17)* 
 0.50 (0.56) 
 7.65 (3.72)*** 
 2.95 (1.25)*  
 
88.21 (60.22)*** 

























Note 1: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  
Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable for all models, which indicated that 50 imputed datasets were 
adequate. This was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 35 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been 
adequate to ensure accurate parameter estimates. 
Note 4: The results of the mi test indicated that the interaction effects did not significantly improve the model. All 
the IVs in model 1 significantly improved the null model. Model 1 was the better model. 
Note 5: The RVI was close to zero, which indicated that the missing data had little effect on the variance of the 
estimates. 
 
Members of far-right groups were significantly more likely to have been a far-rightist 
(exp(B) = 91.61, p < 0.001). However, group members had significantly lower commitment to 
extremism scores (exp(B) = 0.56, p < 0.001) than non-members, that is, lone wolves and people 
with informal links to the movement had higher commitment to extremism scores. This 
suggested that membership could have been motivated by factors other than strong commitment 
to extremism (e.g., the need to join a hate gang in prison for protection, or the influence of 




commitment to extremism, in comparison to group members. This supported McCauley and 
Moskalenko’s (2011) claim that group members were more loyal to other members, than they 
were to the actual cause. 
Strain was not significantly associated with membership in far-right extremist groups 
(exp(B) = 0.98, p > 0.05). In other words, similar rates of strain were found among group 
members and non-members. This was consistent with previous findings by Gruenewald, et al. 
(2013a), in which similar rates of unemployment were found among lone wolves and other 
DFRs. However, this finding contradicted GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 
1960). It was possible that since the sample consisted of people charged with a homicide or 
financial scheme, different rates of strain would have been found among DFRs who lead law 
abiding lives and it was not group membership per se that was influenced by strain. 
Next, two interactions effects – strain X extreme others and strain X prior negative 
interactions with government officials – were individually added, which are presented in models 
2 and 3 above. The effect of race on membership in extremist groups remained unchanged: non-
whites were significantly less likely than whites to join a far-right extremist group (exp(B) = 
0.31, p < 0.05). The effect of commitment to extremism on group membership also was 
unchanged: group members had significantly lower commitment to extremism scores than non-
members. When strain was absent, friend / family ties increased the odds of group membership 
12.56 times. Individuals appeared to have joined the group because of their ties to other 
extremists, rather than to the experience of strain. Furthermore, there was no interaction effect 
between extreme others and strain. These findings contradicted GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT 
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) but supported studies on the far-right (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-




people with extremist referent others joining FR groups but no evidence of strain among group 
members.  
In addition, the interaction effect of prior negative interactions with government officials 
X strain was not significant. However, when strain was absent prior negative interactions with 
government officials increased the odds of membership in extremist groups by 2.95 times 
(exp(B) = 2.95, p < 0.05). Based on Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) DOT, a significant interaction 
between strain and negative interactions with government officials was expected. Thus, the 
former finding contradicted DOT. However, this latter finding, a reduction in the effect of 
negative interactions with government officials when strain was absent, supported DOT 
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), a deviant or criminal label by 
law enforcement becomes crucial after the initial strain experience triggers an incentive to join a 
deviant subcultural group.  
All the models presented in Table 9 were significant and did not unduly suffer from the 
imputation procedure (the RVI for both models were close to 0). Adequate datasets were 
imputed (M = 50) to ensure accurate coefficients and standard errors (the Monte Carlo errors 
were all acceptable and the largest FMI indicated that 35 imputed datasets would have resulted in 
unbiased coefficients). However, Model 1 was the best-fitted model, since the results of mi test 
indicated that the interaction effects did not significantly improve the model. 
 
6.4. Differences between DFRs and non-extremist collaborators  
 DFRs (N = 245; 80.33%) and non-extremist collaborators (N = 60; 19.67%) are 
compared in this section. DFR was defined as someone coded as “1” for at least one far-right 




classified as non-extremist collaborators. A logistic model was used to compare DFRs and non-
extremist collaborators. These results were described below and depicted in Table 9.  
As noted previously, for logistic models, odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that as the 
predictor increases, the odds of the dependent variable occurring also increased; while an odds 
ratio less than 1 indicate that as the predictor variable increased, the odds of the dependent 
variable decreased (Field, 2005). The results presented used fifty (50) multiple imputed datasets. 
Results for each dataset were calculated and combined according to Rubin’s (1987) rules in Stata 
13, to ensure unbiased standard errors and coefficients. However, since the imputed data 
contained a degree of randomness, odds ratios changed slightly depending on the seed number 
used in the imputation procedure. Significant effects were consistent, irrespective of the seed 
number. Therefore, the results presented focused primarily on statistical significance, as odds 
ratios should be interpreted as approximations.  
Females were 0.30 times less likely to have been a Domestic Far-Rightist, i.e., females 
were more likely to have been non-extremist collaborators (exp(B) = 0.30, p < 0.01). Sample 
members with at least one extremist friend or family member were significantly less likely to 
have been DFR (exp(B) = 0.08, p < 0.05). In other words, non-extremist collaborators were more 
likely to have extremist friends / family members, when compared to DFRs. This was 
unexpected, since extremist friends / family members were associated with membership in 
extremist groups. However, group members were 23.35 times more likely than non-members to 
have been DFR (exp(B) = 23.35, p < 0.001). This finding indicated that although social 
connections were important in individuals’ decision to join an extremist group, their belief 




effect of referent others among subcultural groups hypothesized by DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 
1960) and free spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). 
Table 10: logistic model comparing DFR and non-extremists 
Independent Variables Model 1 




Extreme others ψ  
Group ψ  



















Note 1: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  
Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable, which indicate that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This was 
verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 20 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been adequate. 
Note 4: The results of the mi test indicate that all the IVs significantly improved the fit of the model. 
  
Interestingly, there was no difference in strain between DFRs and non-extremists (exp(B) 
= 1.58, p > 0.05).  Therefore, not only did strain not predict group membership, it also did not 
predict DFR beliefs. This contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin (1960), which argued that the 
experience of strain would initially incentivize individuals to join deviant subcultural groups 
(provided they had access to deviant opportunity structures, such as friends in the group) and 
contribute to the subsequent socialization process (i.e., increase commitment to extremist 
values). 
These results are depicted in Table 10, above. The model was significant and the IVs 




Monte Carlo errors verified that adequate datasets were imputed (M = 50). This was supported 
by the largest FMI, which suggested that .20 x 100 or 20 datasets would result in unbiased 
estimates.  There were no issues due to the imputed data, as evidenced by the average RVI being 
close to 0.   
 
6.5. Covariates of Commitment to Extremism 
The results for the second research question – what effect did individual level stressors, 
extremist friends / family, membership in an extremist group and prior negative interactions with 
government officials have on an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism – are 
presented in this section. None of the IVs had a significant effect on commitment to extremism. 
The non-significant results from the commitment to extremism scale could have been due to the 
fact that the variable was not normally distributed. Another possibility could have been that 
levels of extremism may have been less relevant than which extremist belief one is committed to, 
i.e., the factor an individual scored highly on was more important than his / her overall score on 
the commitment to extremism scale. To test this hypothesis, logistic models were fitted for the 
six factors – Conspiracy Theorists, Survivalists, Proud Supremacists, Socializers, Proud far-
rightists and Deniers. Significant results were obtained for two factors, Conspiracy Theorists and 
Proud Supremacists, which were presented in the next section. Models assessing the covariates 
of the commitment to extremism scale and the other four factors – Survivalists, Socializers, 







6.5.1. Covariates of “Conspiracy Theorists” 
The factor, Conspiracy Theorists, had high factor loadings for belief in conspiracy 
theories, anti-government belief and anti-tax belief. Logistic models were fitted to assess 
covariates of Conspiracy Theorists, with conviction set to “1” or yes and without conviction 
offset. The results were consistent with and without the offset variable. For simplicity sake, only 
the results of the conviction offset models are presented in Table 11, below.  

























Prior negative interactions with 
government officials (GO) ψ 
Strain X Extreme Others 
 
Strain X Prior negative 
interactions with GO 
Extreme Others X Prior negative 











































































































Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  





In the basic model without interaction effects, non-whites were significantly more likely 
to have been Conspiracy Theorists, when compared to whites (exp(B) = 3.33, p < 0.01). This 
supported Barkun’s (1996) argument that some conspiracy groups accepted non-white members. 
This relationship was relatively consistent when the interaction effects were added to the basic 
model. Interestingly, Conspiracy Theorists were 0.04 times less likely to experience strain, when 
compared to non-Conspiracy Theorists (exp(B) = 0.40, p < 0.01).  
Next, the interaction effects – strain X extreme others, strain X prior negative interactions 
with government officials, and extreme others X prior negative interactions with government 
officials – were individually added into the model. According to Model 2, strain became non-
significant when extreme others were absent (exp(B) = 0.49, p > 0.05). As depicted in Model 3, 
strain also became non-significant when negative interactions with law enforcement were absent 
(exp(B) = 0.53, p > 0.05). Thus, the experience of strain significantly reduced the likelihood that 
an individual would become a Conspiracy Theorist only when the effects of other variables were 
controlled (exp(B) = 0.4, p < 0.001). 
According to Model 3, the interaction effect of strain X prior negative interactions with 
government officials did not have a significant effect on Conspiracy Theorists (exp(b) = 0.72, p 
> 0.05). Prior negative interactions with law enforcement was not significant when strain was 
absent (exp(b) = 0.62, p > 0.05). However, prior negative interactions with government officials 
became significant when the interaction effect extreme others X negative interactions with law 
enforcement was added to the model. Specifically, people who did not have extreme referent 
others but had prior negative interactions with government officials were 0.09 times less likely to 
have been Conspiracy Theorists (exp(b) = 0.09, p < 0.05). This contradicted Kaplan’s (1995b) 




No evidence of a socialization / radicalization effect of extremist groups (exp(b) = 0.99, p 
> 0.05)  or extreme referent others (exp(b) = 0.68, p > 0.05)  was found for Conspiracy Theorists. 
Furthermore, Conspiracy Theorists were not radicalized by the experience of strain (exp(B) = 
0.40, p < 0.01). Therefore, neither GST (Agnew (2005), nor DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) 
predicted Conspiracy Theorists. Tentative support was found for the socialization / radicalization 
effect of free spaces and friendship ties among people who experienced alienation from negative 
interactions with government officials. The interactions effects of negative interactions with 
government officials X extremist referent others was not quite significant (exp(B) = 7.63, p < 
0.1).  
This section discussed the covariates of Conspiracy Theorists, one of the factors used to 
create the commitment to extremism scale. None of the interactions effects were significant at 
the 0.05 level. Model 1 was the best fitted model, since the mi test revealed that the interaction 
effects did not significantly improve Model 1. The covariates of Proud Supremacists are 
presented in the next section.  The factor, Proud Supremacists, was also used to create the 
commitment to extremism scale. The differences between Proud Supremacists and Conspiracy 
Theorists are also highlighted in the next section.  
6.5.2. Covariates of “Proud Supremacists” 
The factor, Proud Supremacists, had high factor loadings for two commitment indicators: 
movement related tattoos and general hate / bias beliefs (i.e., bias based on race, gender, 
nationality or sexual orientation). Logistic models were fitted with the entire sample; then 
conviction was set to “1” or yes. The results were consistent for both models. Therefore, only the 




comparing Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists will be discussed. Next, the effects of 
interaction effects on Proud Supremacists will be discussed in more detail.  
In the basic model without interactions effects, females were significantly less likely to 
be Proud Supremacists, when compared to males (exp(B) = 0.16, p < 0.01). However, there were 
no significant gender differences between Conspiracy Theorists and non-Conspiracy Theorists 
(exp(b) = 1.00, p > 0.05). Interestingly, non-whites were 0.24 times less likely to have been 
Proud Supremacists (exp(B) = 0.24, p < 0.05), while  non-whites were 3.33 times more likely to 
have been Conspiracy Theorists (exp(B) = 3.33, p < 0.01).  




Odds Ratio (SE) 
Proud Supremacists 




Extreme others ψ 
Group ψ 


































Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  
Note 3: The largest FMI indicated that 44 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been adequate to ensure unbiased 
estimates. 
Note 4: The basic model in Tables 10 and 12, without interaction effects, were presented here to illustrate the 
differences between the two types of extremist ideologies.  
 
People who experienced strain were significantly more likely to have been Proud 
Supremacists (exp(B) = 2.88, p < 0.01), which was consistent with GST (Agnew, 2005) and 




< 0.01): strain reduced the likelihood that a DFR would have been a Conspiracy Theorists (see 
Table 12). 

























Prior negative interactions with 
government officials (GO) ψ 
Strain X Extreme Others 
 
Strain X Prior negative 
interactions with GO 
Extreme Others X prior 









































































































Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  
Note 3: The Monte Carlo T-test error for Strain exceeded .1 for Model 1. However, since the Monte Carlo error for 
the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This 
assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 45 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been 
adequate. 
 
Next, the interaction effects – strain X extreme others; strain X prior negative interactions 




officials – were added individually into the model assessing Proud Supremacists. These results 
are summarized in Table 13. When the interaction effect of strain X extreme others was added, 
strain became non-significant (exp(B) = 5.54, p > 0.05), i.e., strain was non-significant when 
extreme others were absent. However, people who did not have any prior negative interactions 
with government officials but experienced strain were 9.52 times more likely to have been Proud 
Supremacists (exp(B) = 9.52, p < 0.01).  
According to Model 1, prior negative interactions with government officials had a non-
significant influence on Proud Supremacists when all other IVs were controlled (exp(B) = 1.74, p 
> 0.05), which contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). In other words, there was no 
evidence of an alienation effect from having a criminal record or civil charges among Proud 
Supremacists.  
According to Model 3, prior negative interactions with government officials also had no 
significant influence on Proud Supremacists when strain was present (exp(B) = 0.23, p > 0.05), 
i.e., there was no interaction effect between prior negative interactions with government officials 
and strain on Proud Supremacists. However, individuals who had prior negative interactions with 
government officials and did not experience strain were 2.7 times more likely to have been Proud 
Supremacists, compared to those who did not have any prior negative contact with government 
officials (see Model 3). This contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Furthermore, 
according to Model 4, the effect of prior negative interactions with government officials was 
non-significant for people with extremist referent others (exp(B) = 0.44, p > 0.05), which also 
contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).  Therefore, GST (Agnew, 2005) did a better job 




The models were all correctly specified. The average RVI for the models were close to 0, 
which indicated that the imputation process did not unduly influence the estimates. The largest 
FMI indicted that the 50 imputed datasets were sufficient to ensure unbiased standard errors. 
Model 1 was the best fitted model, since the mi test revealed that the interaction effects did not 
significantly improve Model 1 and none of the interaction effects were significant at the 0.05 
level. 
 
6.6. Covariates of Crime Committed 
6.6.1. Covariates of Crime Committed: any crime type 
The results for the third research question of the study – what effect did individual level 
stressors, significant others, membership in an extremist group, negative interactions with 
government officials and an individual’s commitment to far-right extremism have on his/her 
criminal behavior – are presented in this section. First, the covariates of the four categories of 
crime (ideological homicide, non-ideological homicide, ideology financial scheme and non-
ideological financial scheme) will be presented. Next, the covariates of homicide and financial 
schemes will be compared. Finally, the influence of the commitment to extremism factors on 
homicide and financial perpetrators will be explored. 
 Since crime category was measured as four nominal categories, a multinomial logistic 
model was used to evaluate the differences between the four crime categories (see Table 14). 
Conviction status could not have been set to “1” or yes with the mi estimate: mlogit command. 
Ideological homicide was used as the base comparison group. Therefore, the coefficients 
provided in Table 14 should be interpreted in comparison to ideological homicide perpetrators. A 




than the likelihood of it occurring for ideological homicide. A positive coefficient means the 
likelihood of IV occurring for the current crime category was greater than the likelihood of it 
occurring for ideological homicide.  
Table 14: Multinomial Logic Regression model comparing the 4 crime types  
Variables 
(coefficients relative to ideological 













Extreme others ψ 
Group ψ 
Prior negative interactions with 
government officials ψ 
Domestic Far-right ψ 
Commitment to far-right extremism 
Constant 
-0.47 (0.70)  
-0.65 (0.65)  
-0.44 (0.49)  
-0.34 (0.48)  
-0.67 (0.46)  
2.00 (0.59)** 
 
-0.65 (0.68)   
-0.26 (0.15)  
0.59 (1.07)  
1.81 (0.72)*  
1.04 (0.64)  
-3.36 (0.63)***  
0.15 ( 0.69) 
0.23 (0.48)  
-1.06 (0.47)*  
 
-1.23 (0.74)  
0.82 (0.18)***  
-0.50 (1.14)  
1.30 (0.76)  
-1.24 (1.13)  
-3.05 (0.74)***  
-0.23 (0.75)  
-0.56 (0.58)  
-0.49 (0.52) 
  
-1.61 (0.77)*  
0.21 (0.22)  











Note 1: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  
Note 3: ideological homicide was the base comparison group. 
Note 4: The Monte Carlo T-test error for Strain exceeded .1 for ideological financial crime. However, since the 
Monte Carlo error for the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were 
adequate. This assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 39 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would 
have been adequate. 
Note 5: according to the mi test results, the interactions effects did not improve the model. They were not reported 
 
There were few significant differences between people charged with ideological and non-
ideological homicides, i.e., individuals charged with homicides had similar levels of strain (B = -
0.44, p > 0.05), extremist referent others (B = -0.34, p > 0.05), membership in extremist groups 
(B = -0.67, p > 0.05) and levels of commitment to extremism (B = -0.26, p > 0.05).  However, 




interactions with government officials, compared to those charged with an ideological homicide 
(B = 2.00, p < 0.05). Thus, rather than prior negative interactions with government officials 
having a radicalization effect that subsequently resulted in the commission of an ideologically 
motivated homicide, these negative interactions increased the risk of having a violent criminal 
career. In other words, negative interactions with government officials did not alienate 
individuals and further entrench them in an extremist sub-culture. This contradicted DOT 
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1996). Instead, evidence was found supporting GST (Agnew, 2005). Prior 
negative interactions with government officials reduced individuals’ ability to engage in legal 
coping measures, possibly due to difficulties in finding employment subsequent to incarceration, 
which increased the risk of future violent offending behavior.  
There were several significant differences between individuals charged with ideological 
financial crime, as compared to those charged with an ideological homicide. Overall, there were 
more males involved in the four crime categories (261 males vs. 44 females). However, 
individuals charged with an ideological financial crime were significantly more likely to have 
been female, as compared to those charged with an ideological homicide (B = 1.81, p < 0.05). In 
other words, females who offended were mostly likely to commit an ideological financial crime.   
Individuals charged with an ideological financial crime were significantly less likely to 
experience strain, when compared to those charged with an ideological homicide (B = -3.36, p < 
0.001). In other words, strain increased the risk that an individual would commit an ideological 
homicide only, rather than any ideological crime. Individuals charged with an ideological 
financial crime were significantly less likely to have prior negative interactions with government 
officials, when compared to those charged with an ideological homicide (B = -1.06, p < 0.05). 




homicide but decreased the risk that they would commit an ideological motivated financial 
scheme.  
Instead, individuals who committed an ideological financial crime appeared to have been 
motivated primarily by their commitment to extremism. Ideological financial perpetrators had 
significantly higher committed to extremism scores, when compared to ideological homicide 
perpetrators (B = 0.82, p < 0.001). Neither GST, nor DOT explained ideological financial 
criminal behavior: strain, extremist friends/ family and negative interactions with government 
officials were not associated with ideological financial crimes. Rather, ideological financial 
crimes appeared to have been committed as an expression of individual’s extremist beliefs. It 
was possible that greed also contributed to ideological financial offending behavior, since many 
individuals who committed ideologically motivated financial crimes were non-extremist 
collaborators. 
DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a non-ideological financial crime 
were significantly less likely to experience strain, when compared to those charged with an 
ideological homicide (B = -3.05, p < 0.001). Non-extremist collaborators were more likely to 
commit a non-ideological financial crime, while DFRs were more likely to commit an 
ideological homicide (B = -1.61, p < 0.05). Therefore, perpetrators of non-ideological financial 
schemes were not motivated by the experience of strain, prior negative interactions with law 
enforcement or their extremist beliefs; instead, the likely motivator was greed. 
 
6.6.2. Covariates of Crime Committed: homicide vs. financial crime 
This section compares DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a homicide, to 




be executed. Instead, the mi estimate: mlogit command was used to compared homicide and 
financial perpetrators. Homicide was used as the base category. Therefore, the coefficients 
should be interpreted in reference to the base category (homicide).  
The basic model without interaction effects was first fitted (see Table 15 – Model 1, 
below). Females were significantly more likely to commit financial crimes, compared to males 
(B = 1.87, p < 0.01). This was not surprising, based on previous findings by Gruenewald (2011) 
and Belli (2011). In Gruenewald’s (2011) study, which examined far-rightists who committed a 
homicide between 1990 and 2006, close to 98% were male. In contrast, among the FR 
perpetrators of financial schemes analyzed by Belli (2011), only 70% were male. Therefore, one 
would expect to have found significantly more females engaging in financial crimes. 
Financial perpetrators were significantly less likely to have experienced strain than the 
homicide perpetrators (B = -3.13, p < 0.001), which indicated that strain was not a motivator for 
committing financial schemes. Financial perpetrators were also significantly less likely to have 
had some form of prior negative interactions with government officials (B = -1.63, p < 0.001). 
Therefore, strain and negative interactions with government officials did not increase the risk of 
a DFR committing a financial scheme.  However, commitment to the cause increased the risk of 
committing a financial scheme. People charged with financial crimes were more committed to 
extremism, when compared to those who were charged with a homicide (B = 0.76, p < 0.001). 
Greed also increased the risk of non-extremists committing financial schemes. Non-extremist 
offenders were more likely to have been involved in financial crimes, i.e., DFRs less likely to 
have been involved in financial crimes (B = -1.28, p < 0.05). Thus, financial perpetrators did not 




with government officials. Instead, financial perpetrators were motivated by commitment to 
extremism, and possibly also by greed. 
Table 15: Multinomial logit Regression model comparing homicide and financial crime 











Extreme others ψ 
Group ψ 
Negative interactions 
with GO ψ 
Domestic Far-right ψ 
Commitment to far-
right extremism 
Strain X extreme 
others 
Extreme others X GO 
Strain X GO 
Constant 
 1.87 (0.67)** 
 0.59  (0.58) 
-3.13 (0.55)*** 
 0.23 (0.58) 










 0.41 (0.94) 
 1.75 (0.67)** 
 0.64 (0.59) 
-4.43 (1.43)** 
-0.19 (0.75) 




 0.78 (0.17)*** 
 




 0.81 (1.03) 
 1.88 (0.68)**  
 0.58 (0.58) 
-3.14 (0.56)*** 
 0.04 (1.09) 








 0.24 (1.28) 
- 
 0.59 (1.31) 
 1.89 (0.67)** 
 0.58 (0.58) 
-3.20 (0.82)*** 
 0.21 (0.59) 









 0.10 (0.94) 


























Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  
Note 3: Homicide was the base outcome  
Note 4: The Monte Carlo error for T Test exceeded .1 for Strain. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the 
Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This 
assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 33 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been 
adequate. 
Note 5: according to the mi test results, the interaction effects did not improve the model 
 
Next, each interaction term – strain X extreme others; strain X prior negative interactions 
with government officials and; extreme others X prior negative interactions with government 
officials – was added individually into the model (see Table 15 – Model 2-4, below). Normally, 




However, when an interaction effect is added a model, the coefficient provides the effect of the 
IV when the other element of the interactions effect is absent or “0.”  
According to Model 2, people charged with financial crimes were less likely to 
experience strain when extreme others were absent (i.e., strain = 1 and extreme others = 0), 
compared to those charged with a violent crime (B = -4.43, p < 0.01). Furthermore, people 
charged with financial crimes were less likely to experience strain when prior negative 
interactions with government officials were absent (i.e., strain = 1 and prior negative interactions 
with government officials = 0), compared to those charged with a violent crime (B = -3.20, p < 
0.001). Therefore, people who experienced strain had a higher risk of subsequent violent 
criminal behavior, without the radicalization / socialization effect of extremist friends or the 
alienating effect of prior civil or criminal charges.   
DFRs that experienced the alienating effect of prior negative interactions with 
government officials had a higher risk of being charged with a subsequent homicide, but a lower 
risk of being charged with a subsequent financial crime. The significant effect of prior negative 
interactions with government officials was present when all other IVs were controlled (B = -1.63, 
p < 0.001). Furthermore, the alienating and radicalizing effect of prior negative interactions with 
government officials occurred even when strain was absent (B = -1.66, p < 0.001). Thus, even 
without any conditions of strain, prior negative interactions with government officials increased 
the risk of a DFR committing a subsequent homicide, but decreased the risk of committing a 
subsequent financial crime. However, this effect became non-significant for people who did not 
have any friends / family in the movement (B = -1.84, p > 0.05).  
Interestingly, while the effects of gender, strain and commitment to extremism remained 




disappeared when the strain X prior negative interactions with government officials effect was 
included (-1.30, p > 0.05). This was likely caused by the loss of predictive power due to the 
increase in degrees of freedom in Model 4. 
Table 16: Multinomial logit Regression model exploring differences in extremism between 
homicide and financial crime offenders 








Strain [problematic mcerr for ttest only] 
Extreme others ψ 
Group ψ 
Negative interactions with law enforcement ψ 
Domestic Far-right ψ 
Commitment to extremism 
Proud Supremacists ψ 
Conspiracy Theorists ψ 
Survivalists ψ 
Socializers ψ  
Proud far-rightists ψ 
Deniers ψ 
Constant 
 1.87 (0.67)** 
 0.59  (0.58) 
-3.13 (0.55)*** 
 0.23 (0.58) 
 0.16 (0.43) 
-1.63 0.37)*** 
-1.28 (0.60)* 







 0.41 (0.94) 
 1.61 (0.94)† 
-1.26 (0.82) 
-3.50 (0.97)*** 
 1.09 (1.13) 
-1.05 (0.89) 
-2.10 (0.65)** 
 0.35 (1.19) 
- 
-6.20 (1.47)*** 
 3.51 (1.02)** 
-6.23 (1.55)***  
 2.33 (1.18)* 
 1.55 (1.03) 
 0.62 (1.52) 
















Note 1: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note 2: ᵞ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0  
Note 3: Homicide was the base outcome  
Note 4: The Monte Carlo error for T Test exceeded .1 for Strain. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the 
Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This 
assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 34 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been 
adequate. 
 
To deconstruct the effects of the commitment to extremism factors on criminal behavior, 




interpretation, models with commitment to extremism (previously presented in Table 15 – Model 
1) and the six factors were presented in Table 16.  
The effects of strain (B = -3.50, p <0.001) and prior negative interactions with 
government officials remain significant (B = -2.10, p < 0.01), when the commitment factors were 
entered in the model. However, the significant effects of gender (B = 1.61, p > 0.05) and DFR 
status (B = 0.35, p > 0.05) appear to have been eroded. This was likely caused by the loss of 
predictive power due to the increase in degrees of freedom due to the increased number of IVs in 
the model. 
Further analysis of the commitment factor revealed that the financial perpetrators were 
more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that challenged government authority and 
participate in movement activities. In other words, Conspiracy Theorists (B = 3.51, p < 0.01) and 
Socializers (B = 2.33, p < 0.05) were more likely to have been charged with a financial crime, 
rather than a homicide. However, financial perpetrators were significantly less likely to have 
been concerned about race (i.e. scored low in the Proud Supremacist dimension of the 
commitment to far-right extremism factor) or to have survivalist beliefs. Specifically, Proud 
Supremacists (B = -6.20, p < 0.001) and Survivalists (B = -6.23, p < 0.001) were significantly 
less likely to have been charged with a financial crime and more likely to have been charged 
with a homicide. There were no significant differences in crimes committed by Proud Far-
Rightists and Deniers. This was expected, since these two factors had lower factor loadings (less 







Table 17: Summary of Findings 
 HYPOTHESIS RESULTS 
1 DFRs who experienced individual level 
stressors were more likely to join a far-
rightist group, compared to those who did 
not experience these stressors. 
Non-Significant, see: Table 9 
Strain had no effect on group membership. 
 
2a DFRs who had significant others who were 
far-rightists were more likely to join a far-
rightist group, when compared to those who 
lacked such access to extremist opportunity 
structures. 
Significant, see: Table 9. 
Extremist friends/ family members were 
significantly associated with membership in 
an extremist group. 
 
2b There was an interaction effect between 
strain and extremist friends / family on 
membership in extremist groups.  
Non-Significant, see: Table 9 
The interaction effect was not significant.  
3a DFRs that experienced negative 
interactions with government officials (GO) 
were more likely to join a rightwing 
extremist group, when compared to those 
who did not have these interactions. 
Significant, see: Table 9.  
Negative interactions with GO were 
significantly associated with membership in 
an extremist group. 
 
3b DFRs who had both negative interactions 
with government officials and extremist 
friends/family were more likely than those 
that did not to join an extremist group.  
Could not calculate confidence intervals or 
SE for this interaction effect. 
 
4 DFRs who experienced individual level 
stressors had higher levels of commitment 
to extremist ideology, when compared to 
people who did not experience such 
stressors. 
The commitment model was non-
significant. No significant differences were 
found between non-extremist collaborators 
and DFRs. However, Conspiracy Theorists 
were less likely than Proud Supremacists to 
experience strain. See Table 12. 
5 DFRs with significant others who were far-
rightists had higher levels of commitment 
to extremist ideology, when compared to 
people without extremist friends or family 
members. 
The commitment model was non-
significant. However, DFRs were more 
likely to have extremist others, when 
compared to non-extremist collaborators. 
See Table 10  
6 Members of formal extremist groups had 
higher levels of commitment to extremist 
ideology, when compared to non-members.  
The commitment model was non-
significant. However, DFRs were more 
likely to have been a member of an 
extremist group, when compared to non-







Table 17: Summary of Findings continued… 
 HYPOTHESIS RESULTS 
7a DFRs who experienced negative 
interactions with GO had higher levels of 
commitment to extremist ideology, when 
compared to those who have not had such 
experiences. 
The commitment model was non-
significant. No significant differences were 
found between non-extremist collaborators 
and DFRs in terms of negative interactions 
with GO. See Table 10 
7b There was an interaction effect between 
extremist friends / family and negative 
interactions with GO on commitment to 
extremism.  
The commitment model was non-
significant. No significant differences were 
found between non-extremist collaborators 
and DFRs for this interaction effect. See 
Table 10 
8a People with strong extremist beliefs were 
more likely than people with lower levels of 
extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically 
motivated crime. 
Partially supported: more committed 
individuals were more likely to commit 
ideological financial crimes, compared to 
ideological violent crimes. See Table 14. 
8b People with lower levels of extremist belief 
were more likely than people with strong 
extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non-
ideological) crimes. 
Partially supported: DFRs were 
significantly less likely to commit a non-
ideological financial crime, when compared 
to an ideological homicide. See Table 14.  
9 DFRs that experienced individual level 
stressors were more likely than those who 
had not experienced individual level 
stressors to commit an ideologically 
motivated crime.  
Partially supported: DFRs and non-
extremist collaborators who experienced 
strain were more likely to commit a 
homicide. See Table 15.  
10 DFRs who had extremist family/friends 
were more likely to commit an 
ideologically motivated crime, compared to 
those who did not.  
Non-Significant, see: Table 14. 
Extremist friends / family had no effect on 
crime committed. 
11a DFRs who belonged to an extremist group 
were more likely than lone wolves to 
commit violent crimes.  
Non-Significant, see: Table 14. 
Group membership had no effect on crime 
committed. 
11b Lone wolves were more likely than 
extremist group members to commit non-
violent/financial crimes. 
Non-Significant, see: Table 14. 
Group membership had no effect on crime 
committed. 
12 DFRs who had negative interactions with 
GO became more commitment to rightwing 
extremism and consequently were more 
likely than DFRs who had not had such 
interactions to commit an ideological crime 
Negative interactions with GO had no 
effect on commitment to extremism. See 
Table 10. People who had negative 
interactions with GO were more likely to 
commit a non-ideological homicide, 
compared to an ideological homicide. They 
were also less likely to commit an 
ideological financial scheme, compared to 




The current chapter described the creation of the commitment to extremism factor and 
presented the results for the study’s three research questions: (1) what effect did individual level 
stressors, significant others and prior negative interactions with government officials have on 
membership in far-right group; (2) what effect did individual level stressors, significant others, 
membership in an extremist group and prior negative interactions with government officials have 
on an individual’s commitment to rightwing extremism; and (3) what effect did an individual’s 
commitment to far-right extremism and membership in extremist groups have on his / her 
criminal behavior?  These results are summarized in Table 17 and will be discussed in the next 
chapter, within the context of the study’s theoretical framework – General Strain Theory (GST), 


















DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS  
7.1. Discussion  
This study used General Strain Theory (GST), Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) 
and free / movement space as a theoretical framework to examine covariates of membership in 
extremist groups, commitment to extremism and type of crime committed among DFRs and non-
extremist collaborators. The sample was drawn from the five year period, 2006 to 2010. The 
ensuing discussion is generalizable to current DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged or 
convicted of a homicide or financial scheme (e.g., money laundering, tax evasion, pyramid 
scheme). The results are not applicable to DFRs that have been charged with other types of crime 
or lead law abiding lives.  
 
7.1.1. Discussion of factors associated with membership in DFR groups  
Members of FR extremist groups tended to have been white persons with extremist 
friends / family. This was consistent with previous studies, which found that people tended to 
join extremist groups with loved ones or friends (Aho, 1990; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 
2011). Another possibility was that the friendships developed subsequent to joining the group. 
Group members were more likely to have negative interactions with government officials than 
non-members. This was consistent with previous research by Aho (1990). However, it 
contradicted the Gruenewald, et al. (2013b) study, which found that non-group members (loners) 
had higher rates of prior arrests (64.1%) than group members who offended alone (57.7%) or 




priors used in the current study (civil charge, criminal charge, arrest, or conviction), compared to 
the Gruenewald, et al. (2013b) study (prior arrest). 
Thus, both access to extremist opportunity structures and the alienating effect of negative 
interactions with government officials appeared to have been motivating factors among DFRs 
who chose to join a FR group. In contrast, non-group members tended to have been non-white 
loners. Non-group members were also less likely to have prior negative interactions with 
government officials, when compared to group members. As noted previously, this contradicted 
findings by Gruenewald, et al. (2013b). However, non-group members in this study included 
both lone wolves and non-extremist collaborators, which could have accounted for the 
contradictory results.  
GST did not successfully predict membership in extremist groups: no support was found 
for strain as a precursor to membership in far-right extremist groups. This contradicted several 
earlier studies on the FR (Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; Smith, 1994; Wooden & Blazak, 2001) 
but supported Aho’s (1990) work. Since this study used open source documents, establishing 
leadership status was difficult. It was possible that since both leaders and group members were 
assessed together, the different patterns of strain were lost. Leaders tended to have been more 
highly educated than followers in a movement (Ezekiel, 1995; Smith, 1990), which suggested 
that movement leaders could have been motivated by factors other than strain (Blee, 2002; 
Blazak, 2001). Ezekiel (1995) also noted that movement leaders tended to be intelligent, 
manipulative and cynical, which was supported by Blazak’s (2001) study. Blazak (2001) 
contrasted recruiters in the skinhead movement to his research with Wooden (2001) on skinhead 
members. Blazak (2001) noted that although strain was one of the variables that contributed to 




the cultural underdogs in a heroic, macho fashion” from Jewish capitalism, minority gangs and 
multiculturalism (p. 991). Although these recruiters did not perceive themselves as victims of 
strain conditions, Blazak (2001) found that they expressed an awareness of the effects of strain 
and how those experiences and feelings of victimization could have been manipulated to draw 
strained individuals into the movement. Thus, the exclusion of a variable assessing leadership 
status could have accounted for the non-significant effect of strain on group membership. 
While the study did not find support for GST as a predictor of group membership, 
support was found for DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Group membership was associated with 
having extremist friends and family and prior negative interactions with government officials. 
Thus, the key elements to group membership appeared to have been access to extremist 
opportunity structures via from extremist friends / family and prison gangs (see also Aho, 1990; 
Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blazak, 2009; Blee, 2002; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Simi & Futrell, 
2010; Strentz, 1990) and feelings of alienation caused by prior negative interactions with 
government officials (see also: Aho, 1990; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). These results were valid 
both for DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who were merely charged, as well as those who 
were convicted of a homicide or financial scheme.  
7.1.2. Differences between DFRs and non-extremist collaborators 
 DFRs were more likely than non-extremist collaborators to join an extremist group. The 
study was unable to determine whether the belief occurred first, or whether the individual joined 
an extremist group and was subsequently socialized into the extremist subculture. Nevertheless, 
this finding tentatively supported both DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) and movement / frees 
paces (Simi & Futrell, 2010). There was an association between membership in extremist groups 




and levels of commitment. As suggested by McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), members could 
have joined the extremist group for multiple reasons. However, they may have chosen to stay in 
the group because of loyalty to group members. One would therefore not have expected to find a 
relationship between levels of commitment and group membership. 
  There were no differences in strain experienced between DFRs and non-extremist 
collaborators. This was unexpected since DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) hypothesized that strain 
would have been the initial condition that propelled individuals into deviant subcultures. Instead, 
similar rates of stain were experienced by DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This supported 
GST (Agnew, 2005), which argued that the presence of strain and lack of legal coping 
mechanisms would increase the risk of criminal offending. Thus, strain contributed to criminal 
behavior, but not to DFR beliefs or membership in extremist groups. 
Also unexpected: there were no differences in prior negative interactions with 
government officials among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. In other words, similar rates 
of prior negative interactions with government officials were found among DFRs and non-
extremist collaborators. This finding suggested that negative interactions with government 
officials had a greater impact on future offending behavior (since the sample consisted of people 
charged with a homicide or financial scheme), than it did on DFR beliefs. The effect of negative 
interactions with government officials on offending behavior was explored later in this chapter. 
7.1.3. Discussion of factors associated with commitment to extremism 
None of the variables (strain, extremist friends / family, negative interactions with 
government officials or group membership) influenced levels of commitment to extremism. 
Rather, differences were found based on type of extremist beliefs, i.e., the factors used to create 




and being a white male increased the risk that a DFR would have general hate beliefs (Ezekiel, 
1995; Hamm, 1993). This suggested that feelings of powerlessness, identity and masculinity may 
have provided the impetus for DFRs to become Proud Supremacists (see Arena & Arrigo, 2000; 
Hamm, 1993).  
Thus, while GST had no influence on membership in extremist group, it did affect 
commitment to general hate beliefs. This supported Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) DOT. However, 
although both strain and extremist loved ones were associated with general hate beliefs (Ezekiel, 
1995; Hamm, 1993), there was no evidence of an amplification or interaction effect. This lack of 
an interaction effects contradicted DOT. Thus, in terms of commitment to general hate beliefs, 
support was found for GST and limited support was found for DOT. A possible reason for the 
lack of support for an interaction effect between strain and ties to extremist friends / family could 
have been due to the use of secondary data sources. It was possible that a type II error was made 
and supplemental data in the form of interviews or self-administered surveys would have 
unearthed a connection between the variables.  
Interestingly, those who believed in conspiracy theories were quite different from the 
individuals who held general hate beliefs. While strain, tied to extremist friends / family and 
being a white male increased the risk of being a Proud Supremacist, being non-white and not 
experiencing strain increased the risk of a DFR being a Conspiracy Theorist. Similar to Blee’s 
(2002) and Aho’s (1990) findings, DFRs in the current study had diverse backgrounds: some 
were unemployed or homeless, while others had graduate degrees or were extremely wealthy. 
Furthermore, when strain was absent, the influence of extremist friends / family on Conspiracy 
Theorists was amplified. Prior negative interactions with government officials also increased the 




friends / family. Therefore, DFRs who had a steady job or average (or higher) income and was 
charged / arrested / convicted with a civil or criminal offense, tended to ascribe to elaborate 
conspiracy theory – possibly to explain or justify their conviction status, similar to the Christian 
Patriots described by Aho (1990).  
Individuals who had an average or higher income and extremist friends / family had a 
higher risk of believing in conspiracy theories, even if they did not have any prior negative 
interactions with government officials. This was an interesting finding, as it suggested group 
identification increased commitment to extremism (Blee, 2002; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; 
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011), even in the absence of feelings of helplessness and loss 
of power (caused by inadequate access to wealth / resources and negative interactions with 
government officials). Thus, individuals appeared to have been socialized into extremist beliefs 
(Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 2007), specifically 
beliefs in elaborate conspiracy theories.  
Furthermore, informal and personal ties were more closely associated with group 
identification and commitment, when compared to formal group ties, i.e., Conspiracy Theorists 
tended to have extremist friends / family but did not belong to extremist groups. Thus, the 
socialization of subcultural gangs hypothesized by DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) was not 
supported. One possible explanation for the lack of support for group socialization into extremist 
beliefs may have been self-selection bias. If individuals with a propensity towards violence self-
selected into violent skinhead groups and people with anti-gun control beliefs self-selected into a 
militia group, the socialization due to group membership would not have been readily apparent 




In short, unemployed white males with prior negative interactions with government 
officials or extremist referent others were more likely to blame other people (become Proud 
Supremacists). In contrast, employed non-whites with no prior negative interactions with 
government officials and extremist friends / family were more likely to blame the government / 
IRS / NWO / ZOG (become Conspiracy Theorists). On their own, civil / criminal priors and 
extremist referent others reduced the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist, but when both 
were present the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist increased. It was possible that both 
Proud Supremacists and Conspiracy Theorists interpreted their negative interactions with 
government officials as a challenge to their sense of power and authority and the choice of whom 
to blame was influenced by personal characteristics (race and experience of strain) and 
friendship ties (Arena & Arrigo, 2000). Thus, the key elements that predicted whether an 
individual would become a Proud Supremacist or Conspiracy Theorist were race and strain, 
while the socializing element for both was in informal free or movement spaces (i.e., via 
extremist referent others, rather than formal group interactions).  
As noted in the previous section, GST was not associated with group membership. Nor 
was GST associated with individual’s level of commitment to extremism. Instead, GST was 
associated with type of extremism beliefs. The actual group a DFR joined was predicted by 
DOT: they joined groups they had access to, either via extremist referent others or prison 
(subsequent to negative interactions with law enforcement). Finally, the socialization into 
extremism culture was predicted by free or movement spaces by the presence of extremist 






7.1.4. Discussion of factors associated with crime committed 
 There were several differences among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged 
with financial crimes, compared to those charged with a homicide. Female DFRs and non-
extremist collaborators who engaged in criminal behavior were more likely to commit financial 
crimes. A possible explanation of this was that females were usually not considered members of 
violent hate groups. Rather, they were normally considered associates, based on a romantic 
connection to a male group member. The group may have been unwilling to involve someone 
who was not a member in a homicide, especially one that was motivated by a desire to protect 
the group’s interests. A more likely explanation was prosecutors’ legal strategy included 
attempts to flip female co-offenders, i.e., female co-offenders could have been offered deals to 
testify against the male group members, whom the prosecutors considered to have been the 
larger threat. 
 The experience of strain was also quite different between the two types of criminal 
offenders. DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with homicides were more likely to 
experience strain and had prior negative interactions with government officials, in comparison to 
those charged with financial crimes. Furthermore, homicide suspects were more likely to 
experience strain, when compared to financial suspects: (1) when all other factors were 
controlled; (2) there were no known extremist friends or family; and (3) there were no prior 
negative interactions with government officials. Thus, while GST did not explain membership in 
extremist groups, it did explain differences between the types of extremist beliefs held (i.e., 
Conspiracy Theorists vs Proud Supremacists) and risks of subsequently committing a homicide. 
Further evidence was obtained for the connection between GST and risk of violent 




According to Agnew, loss of legal avenues to cope (e.g., difficulty finding work due to a prior 
connection) should have increased the risk of criminal behavior when strain was present (e.g., 
financial debt, homelessness). Limited support was found for DOT. Having extremist friends had 
no effect on the behavior of DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who committed a homicide 
(contradicts DOT), but prior negative interactions with government officials increased the risk of 
a DFR or non-extremist collaborator committing a homicide (supports DOT). 
There was no evidence of GST among financial offenders. Further, there was little 
evidence of DOT as an impetus to financial offending behavior: having extremist friends had no 
effect on the behavior of DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who committed a financial 
crime. Rather, financial offending behavior among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators was 
influenced by gender (i.e., females were more likely to commit a financial crime and less likely 
to commit a homicide), overall commitment to extremism score (i.e., DFRs and non-extremist 
collaborators who committed financial crimes had significantly higher commitment to extremism 
scores), and the absence of prior negative interactions with government officials.  
Interestingly, while levels of commitment to extremism were higher among people 
charged with a financial crime, non-extremist collaborators were more likely to have been 
charged with a financial crime. In other words, financial schemes had more non-extremist 
collaborators, and homicides tended to have been committed by group members and affiliates. 
This was logical; since non-DFRs would not have been motivated to commit homicide for a 
cause they did not personally believe in. However, the penalties for financial crimes could have 
been minor and the rewards more tangible (i.e., wealth), which may have been the motivating 




A possible explanation for the finding that DFRs were more likely to commit a homicide 
but people who committed a financial crime had higher levels of commit to extremism was that 
DFRs who committed homicides were more committed to the group, while DFRs who 
committed financial crimes were more committed to the cause. Another possible explanation for 
this apparent relationship was the use of court documents in the study. Homicide suspects in this 
study tended to have been defended by attorneys, who would raise a legal defense (e.g., insanity, 
self-defense), while people accused of financial crimes, such as tax evasion, tended to have been 
pro se defendants. The suspects who chose to represent themselves in court did not generally 
follow legal defenses. Instead, they raised common tax protestor arguments – e.g., questioned the 
constitutionality of federal tax laws or the right of the federal government to asses taxes; 
suggested federal taxation was a ploy by the ZOG to achieve world domination; claimed that 
only non-resident aliens and people residing in the District of Columbia were subject to taxation 
– which increased their commitment to extremism score. Thus, based on the reliance of court and 
open source documents, the level of commitment among homicide suspects could not have been 
apparent with this type of research design. 
Another interesting finding was the absence of a significant relationship between group 
membership and criminal behavior of DFRs in the model comparing homicide and financial 
crime. In other words, there were similar rates of group membership among homicide suspects 
and financial suspects. Furthermore, group members were equally as likely to commit 
ideological or non-ideological violent and financial crimes. This suggested that not only were 
groups engaging in ideological financial schemes as an expression of their DFR beliefs or to 




However, although group members were not more likely to commit a homicide, DFRs 
were more likely than non-extremists to commit a homicide. In a study examining homicide 
incidents by far-rightists at the county level, Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich 
(2014) found that counties with hate groups were more likely to have ideologically motivated 
homicides. Taken together, these findings suggested an upsurge in leaderless resistance. Group 
messages of hate may have carried weight among the movement as a whole and may not have 
been as apparent among group members.  
7.1.5. Summary of evidence supporting GST, DOT and movement / free spaces 
This section discussed the findings of the current study. Group membership was not 
predicted by the presence of strain, i.e., there was no support for GST as a predictor of group 
membership. Instead, membership in far-right extremist groups was predicted by access and a 
possible predisposition or sympathy towards extremist beliefs: those with access to groups via 
extremist friends / family or access to prison gangs and held extremist beliefs were more likely to 
join an extremist group. Thus, DOT was a better predictor of group membership than GST. 
Neither GST, nor DOT predicted levels of commitment to extremism. Free or movement 
spaces theory was the best predictor of any commitment to extremism. When non-extremist 
collaborators and DFRs were analyzed as a binary variable, people who belonged to a group 
were more likely to have been committed to the cause.  However, non-extremist collaborators 
were more likely than DFRs to have been female and have extremist friends / family members. 
Interestingly, similar rates of strain and negative interactions with government officials were 
found among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This suggested that strain and negative 
interactions with government officials had a greater impact on overall criminal behavior, since 




None of the theories (GST, DOT, or movement spaces) explained levels of commitment. 
Instead, differences were found between two types of DFRs: Conspiracy Theorists and Proud 
Supremacists. The presence of extremist others and prior negative interactions with government 
officials, reduced the risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist, which contradicted DOT. A viable 
anti-crime program for Conspiracy Theorists could have been an increase in fines for criminal 
behavior. This was logical since prior negative interactions with government officials reduced 
the risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist and Conspiracy Theorist tended to commit financial 
crimes. 
Similarly, GST did not predict Conspiracy Theorists: an absence of strain was associated 
with a higher risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist. Similar rates of extremist friends / family 
members were found between Conspiracy Theorists and non-Conspiracy Theorists, i.e., all DFRs 
had similar rates of extremist friends / family members. However, the presence of extremist 
others and negative interactions with government officials were higher among Conspiracy 
Theorists. Therefore, someone who had extremist friends / family members and at least 1 
negative interaction with government officials had a significantly higher risk of becoming a 
Conspiracy Theorist.  
GST (i.e., the presence of strain) and DOT (i.e., presence of extremist others and prior 
negative interactions with government officials) were associated with a DFR becoming a Proud 
Supremacist. When other variables were controlled, negative interactions with government 
officials had no effect on Proud Supremacists. Interestingly, the effects of strain and negative 
interactions with government officials amplified when the other variable was absent. In other 
words, the effect of negative interactions with government officials on Proud Supremacist was 




protective factor (rather than a risk factor) among Proud Supremacists who have negative 
interactions with government officials. 
White males who experienced strain were also more likely to become Proud 
Supremacists. This indicted that concepts of gender, masculinity and power should have been 
explored among Proud Supremacists (Arena & Arrigo, 2000; Blee, 2002; Kimmel & Ferber, 
2000). Doing gender theory may also shed light on the behavior of Proud Supremacists. 
According to Miller (2002, p. 434), “men and women ‘do gender’ in response to situated 
normative beliefs about masculinity and femininity…the performance of gender is both an 
indication of and a reproduction of gendered (as well as raced, classed, generational, and sexed) 
social hierarchies.” Therefore, people do not merely respond to societal expectations based on 
one’s gender, race, class and sex. Instead, individuals make conscious decisions based on the 
prevailing social structures and social settings. Thus, agency was a key element of doing gender 
theory.  
Proud Supremacists tended to have been white males who experienced conditions of 
strain.  Proud Supremacists were also more likely to commit a homicide than a financial crime. 
These findings supported Gruenewald’s (2012) argument that young, white males without 
legitimate opportunities to accomplish masculinity (i.e., do gender) may resort to violence. 
Interestingly, the risk of becoming a Proud Supremacist was reduced when strained individuals 
did not have extremist friends / family members. This also supported doing gender theory: the 
performance of masculinity through violence would have been moot in the absence of positive 
feedback from extremist friends / family members (Gruenewald, 2012). 
GST (i.e., the presence of strain and possible inability to find employment to a prior 




found for DOT: violent offending behavior was associated with strain and negative interactions 
with government officials. Interestingly, violent behavior patterns were more closely tied to type 
of extremist belief, rather than levels of commitment to extremism. Proud Supremacists and 
Survivalists were more likely to commit a homicide than a financial crime. Furthermore, lower 
levels of commitment to extremism were associated with a higher risk of violent offending 
behavior. Therefore, doing gender theory, GST and DOT together provided the strongest 
theoretical framework for interpreting DFRs’ violent offending behavior.   
High levels of commitment to extremism, females, and people who did not experience 
strain (i.e., held a good job and did not have a prior criminal / civil record) were associated with 
an increased risk of financial offending behavior. Conspiracy Theorists and Socializers were also 
more likely to commit a financial crime, than a homicide. Individuals who did not experience 
strain and did not have prior negative interactions with government officials were also more 
likely to commit a financial crime than a homicide. Thus, financial perpetrators were not 
motivated by need. They did not become disillusioned from the experience of strain or negative 
interactions with government officials; they were motivated by their level of commitment to FR 
extremism and greed. However, there were some caveats and limitations of these findings, which 
were explored in the next section. Suggestions on how to address these limitations were also 
covered in the next section.  
 
7.2. Limitations of the Data and Suggestions for Future Research 
There were several possible limitations of this study. To create a reliable measure of 
strain, the variable was operationalized as objective strain only. Subjective strain and subjective 




type II error (not identifying significance). Thus, a certain degree of validity was sacrificed for 
reliability.   
Another limitation of the study was the use of secondary data sources, namely, open 
source documents, such as appellate court documents, news reports, accounts of personal 
statements made to the media or in court and accounts on blogs / articles by friends / 
acquaintances of the suspects included in the sample. Although this technique was relatively 
quick, inexpensive and resulted in a more representation sample compared to interviews or self-
report surveys, context and personal justifications for behavior were sacrificed.  
As noted in the methods chapter, consistent with the Weberian approach to 
conceptualizing motives and action (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998) and the FBI’s method for 
determining if a hate crime occurred, commitment to far-right extremism could have  been used 
under specific circumstances to ascertain motive for a crime (Flanagan & O’Brien, 2003; 
Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009). The intent was “to give a correct causal interpretation of a 
particular action …[by interpreting] the outward course of the action and its motive as 
appropriate and at the same time as related to each other in a way whose meaning can be 
understood” (Weber, 1998, p. 15). However, there was a risk of conflating the behavior of 
interest (ideological vs. non-ideologically motivated crime) with one of the risk factors, namely, 
commitment to far-right extremism. Nonetheless, to not attempt to deconstruct out these two 
concepts would have been to risk unmeasured errors, since DFRs’ criminal behavior could have 
also have been motivated by greed or revenge. 
 This study contained DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a homicide or 
financial crime. It would have been beneficial to explore the experience of strain, extremist 




collaborators. This would help shed light on which variables propel some extremists to offend, 
while others lead law-abiding lives. However, such a study was likely to have been difficult to 
implement, due to issues of access to extremist groups.  
Group members in the current study tended to have been a DFR. However, non-group 
members had higher commitment to extremism scores. This indicated that some of the non-group 
members were non-extremist collaborators, while most were lone wolves with high commitment 
to extremism scores. An interesting follow-up study would have been to compare the non-
extremist collaborators, lone wolves and group members. Differences may have been found in 
strain experienced, negative interactions with government officials and extremist friends / family 
members. Such a design would allow the research to determine whether the experience of strain 
was different among non-extremist collaborators and group members. One would also have been 
able to assess whether lone wolves and group members differed in their experiences with 
government officials.  
Another useful comparison group would have been a matching sample on non-DFR 
offenders, similar to Gruenewald’s (2011) study but with both violent and financial non-
extremist perpetrators. The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) would have been a valuable source of 
a matching group of violent and financial non-extremist perpetrators. Differences between the 
four types of perpetrators (violent extremist, financial extremist, violent non-extremist and 
financial non-extremist) would have been extremely useful in identifying differences between 
extremist and non-extremist offenders and designing evidence-based anti-crime polices specific 
to the offender type.  
 It would have been useful to apply the commitment to extremism scale to a wider sample. 




commitment to extremism), the next logical step was to assess (1) the relative weights of the six 
factors identified from the factor analysis and (2) the reliability of the scale. A larger sample of 
extremist would have been required to achieve these two goals. In addition, the data should have 
been analyzed using item response theory (IRT), which was also referred to as latent trait theory. 
The subsequent scale would have a high degree of reliability and more precise commitment to 
extremism scores could have been obtained. These scores could have then have been combined 
with other IVs to more accurately assess risks and patterns of criminal offending behavior among 
extremists. 
 The sample was limited to the American FR movements. Another possible avenue for 
research was extending this analysis to FR movements in other countries. This would allow the 
researcher to determine whether the American have FR was unique or share similar 
characteristics with other countries. South Africa, Australia, Scandinavian countries and 
European Union countries have FR movements. The models used in the current study may have 
been applicable to other countries, or historical and social factors in specific countries could 
provide more valid explanations of the criminal behavior patterns of far-rightists.    













This study assessed the influence of Agnew’s (2005) General Strain Theory, Cloward and 
Ohlin’s (1960) Differential Opportunity Theory and Simi and Futrell’s (2010) concept of free or 
movement spaces on membership in extremist groups, commitment to extremism and criminal 
offending behavior of DFRs. DOT was most successful at explaining membership in extremist 
groups, while GST was not associated with membership in extremist groups. Factors predicting 
levels of commitment were more complex: none of the variables in the study were associated 
with levels of commitment. However, strain increased the risk of an individual becoming a Proud 
Supremacist, but reduced the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist.  
Surprisingly, having extremist friends or family was not associated with levels of 
commitment to extremism or any of the sub-types identified via factor analysis. More 
surprisingly, non-extremist collaborators were more likely to have extremist friends or family 
members, when compared to DFRs. This suggested that many of the non-extremist collaborators 
sampled were sympathetic to FR extremist beliefs, i.e., Seekers. Conspiracy Theorists tended to 
have been loners; having extremist referent others reduced the risk of a DFR becoming a 
Conspiracy Theorist. Another interesting finding was that higher levels of commitment were not 
associated with an increased risk of criminal offending. Instead, the type of extremist belief was 
associated with risk of criminal offending: Proud Supremacists were more likely than non-Proud 
Supremacists to commit a homicide (ideological or non-ideological) and Conspiracy Theorists 





 GST was associated with a higher risk of an individual becoming a Proud Supremacist, 
and also with a Proud Supremacist committing a homicide. DOT also explained some of the risk 
of individuals becoming a Proud Supremacist: individuals who did not experience strain but had 
negative interactions with government officials had a higher risk of becoming a Proud 
Supremacist. This was perhaps because people serving a prison sentence who had never 
experienced individual level stressors may have been less able to protect themselves and needed 
to join a prison gang to survive life inside.  
 The study faced several limitations. Firstly, some degree of validity was sacrificed to 
obtain a reliable measure of strain. More intangible measures of strain, such as the effects of 
parental divorce or the effects of bulling in school on the younger offenders, were excluded. This 
increased the risk of making a type II error or failing to identify significant effects associated 
with the experience of strain. There was also some risk of conflating ideology of the offender 
with motive for the crime. Attempts were made to minimize this risk by using claims made by 
the suspect and defense or prosecuting attorneys to establish motive for the crime.   
The study’s research design was sound. The use of open-source documents, pay-per-view 
websites with arrest records and Multiple Imputation facilitated the creation of a large N dataset 
with sufficient statistical enough power to assess the independent variables in the study. In 
addition, because of the use of multiple open-source documents and MI, these results were 
generalizable to DFRs who have committed a homicide or financial scheme. Furthermore, the 
use of factor-analyses resulted in an empirically sound and valid measure of commitment to FR 











Appendix A: Interpreting Logistic Regression Models 
Output/statistic Purpose How interpreted 
Model Chi2 statistic 
 
Omnibus test; compared 2 
models of the same data - was 
the current research model 
significantly better than the 
previous model? 
Significant results indicated that 
the 2nd model was a significantly 
better fit of the data than the 1st 
model. Not a measure of effect 
size. 
Pseudo R2 (Cox and 
Snell, or Nagelkerke,) 
Measure of model effect size  Larger pseudo R-squares 




Omnibus test; to determine if the 
observed data were significantly 
different from the predicted 
values. Alternative to model Chi2 
Non-significant results indicated 
the model was doing a good job 
of predicting the data. 
Wald statistic (B/S.E.). 
B was the 
unstandardized 
coefficient.  
Were the IV significant 
predictors of DV? Which IV was 
the strongest predictor? 
Interpret Wald statistics that were 
significant (p≤ .05). IV with the 
largest significant Wald was the 
strongest predictor of the DV. 
Odds Ratios, also 
referred to as Exp(b) or 
standardized coefficient  
 
Effect of IV on DV; measure of 
effect size for individual IV, 
while holding other IVs constant. 
Only reported if Wald was 
significant. 
Interpreted in comparison to 
reference category, while holding 
all other factors at their reference 
category and covariates 
(continuous IVs) constant.  
Classification table Contingency table that identified 
counts and percentages of correct 
(and incorrect) predictions. 
Measure of effect size 
A higher percentage of correct 
predictions indicated a better-
fitted model. 
Classification plot Graph of observed groups and 
predicted probabilities. Used to 
identify the correct predictions 
made by the model and complete 
separation 
Observations should have 
clustered to the ends of the 
graph, i.e., had a U-shaped 
distribution. Observations in the 
middle represented incorrect 
predictions.  
Influence Statistics 
(Cook’s D, Leverage 
Values, & DfBeta 
To ensure no case had excessive 
influence on the coefficient, i.e., 
to determine which of the 
models, including IVs and 
interactions effects, were 
correctly specified. 
These were reviewed in the 
original tabular form in the SPSS 
data screen or graphed against 
predicted probabilities for easier 
interpretation. See footnotes 49-
52 for additional details. 






Appendix B: Logistic Regression Models – Assumptions summary table 
Assumptions Output/statistic How interpreted Remedy 
Independent error 
terms  
N/A N/A Independent sample or 
use a conditional logit 
model instead of a 
logistic model 
Low measurement 
error and no 
missing cases 
 Missing at random, 
didn’t require missing 
completely at random. 
Generally resulted in 
unbiased estimates, 
standard errors and 
statistics 
List wise deletion if 
there were nonrandom 
missing values in DV 
or IV. If too many 
individuals had been 
omitted from the 
analysis, multiple 
imputations (MI) were 
used instead. 
Linear relationship 
between log odds of 
DV and continuous 
IVs 
Box-Tidwell 
transformation test for 
continuous IVs; logic 
step test for ordinal or 
continuous IVs 
 For continuous IVs, 
recoded into 
categories; for ordinal 
IVs, collapsed into 











Tolerance > .1 and 




condition indexes need 
to be close in value. 
Should have had small 
variance proportions 
on small eigenvalues. 
Used factor analysis to 
merge the collinear 
variables; dropped one 
variable from the 
model  
No outliers Residuals (studentized 
residual, standardized 
residual, deviance 
statistic) and Case 
wise listing of 
residuals 
Residuals: 5% of the 
cases between ±1.96, 
1% between ±2.58; 
Case wise listing of 
residuals < 2SD 
Outliers could have 
been omitted from the 




N/A Number of cases in 
smaller binary 
outcome / number of 
predictors ≥ 20 
 
Sampling adequacy Crosstabulation 80% of cells should 
have had a count of at 
least 5, no cells should 
have had a zero count 
Biased goodness or fit 
measures 




Appendix C: Interpreting Regression Models 
Output/statistic Purpose How interpreted 
Change statistics Difference between each research 
block – did the new variables 
significantly improve the model? 
A significant F-statistic indicated 
that the new variables significantly 
improved the model  
F-Ratio Tested fit of the model: difference 
between the improvements in 
prediction from adding the 
variables to the model 
Significant results indicated that 
the IVs improved our ability to 
predict the DV. 
R2  Measure of model effect size; the 
proportion of the variance in the 
DV explained by the entire model 
Larger R-squares indicated 
stronger models 
T-statistic Were the IV significant predictors 
of DV, i.e., was the parameter 
significantly different from 0?  
Interpreted T-statistics that were 
significant (p≤ .05).  
Standardized Beta 
value 
Which IV was the strongest 
predictor? 
Higher absolute standardized beta 
values indicated that the IV was a 
stronger predictor of the DV, 
compared to the other IVs 





























Appendix D: Regression Models – Assumptions summary table 
Assumptions How tested in SPSS Consequence  Remedy 
1. Additivity and 
linearity 
The DV should have 
had a linear 
relationship with the 
predictors (IVs) 
Invalid Model - Transformed IV to 
make the relationship 
linear  
- Ran a robust 
Regression  
2. Independent errors 
or no autocorrelation 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic should have 
been between 1-3. 
Invalid Model - Ran a robust 
Regression 
 
3. Homoscedasticity Residuals should have 
been consistent at each 









Errors should have had 
a mean of 0. Created 
normal probability plot 




significance test in 
small samples only 
- Bootstrapped 
confidence intervals 
5. Continuous and 
unbound DV; binary 
or continuous IVs 
N/A N/A N/A 
6. No perfect 
collinearity  
VIF values from 
Coefficients table < 
10; average VIF 
values should not have 




- Ran a robust 
Regression 
 
7. Non-zero variance 
  
IVs must vary   
 
8. No outliers or 
influential cases 
Standardized 
Residuals: 5% of the 
cases between ±1.96, 
1% between ±2.58; 
Case wise listing of 
residuals < 3SD 
indicated a problem. 
Cook’s D >1 indicated 
a problem. 












Appendix E: Interpreting Multinomial Regression Models 
Output/statistic Purpose How interpreted 
Likelihood ratio test, 
also referred to as 
the log-likelihood 
test 
Omnibus test; compared 2 models 
of the same data, i.e., was the 
current research model 
significantly better than the 
previous model? Also used to test 
for interaction effects 
Significant results indicated that 
the 2nd model was a significantly 
better fit of the data than the 1st 
model. Not a measure of effect 
size. 
Pearson Chi2 & 
Deviance Chi2 
Goodness of fit statistics; 
compared researcher’s model to 
intercept-only model. Alternative 
to the likelihood ratio test 
Significant results indicated the 
researcher’s model was 
significantly better. Conflicting 
results indicated a weak model. 
Hosmer-Lemeshow’s 
Goodness of fit index 
 
Omnibus test; to determine if the 
observed data were significantly 
different from the predicted 
values. Alternative to model Chi2 
Non-significant results indicated 
the model was doing a good job of 
predicting the data. 
Pseudo R2 (Cox and 
Snell R2, Nagelkerke 
R2, and McFadden’s 
R2) 
Measure of model effect size, not a 
goodness-of-fit measure. 
Larger pseudo R-squares indicated 
stronger models; used with the 
classification table. 
Wald statistic   Were the IV significant predictors 
of DV? Which IV was the 
strongest predictor? 
Interpret Wald statistics that were 
significant (p≤ .05). IV with the 
largest significant Wald was the 
strongest predictor of the DV. 
Odds ratio Effect of IV on DV; measure of 
effect size for individual IV, while 
holding other IVs constant. Only 
reported if Wald was significant. 
Interpreted in comparison to 
reference category, while holding 
all other factors at their reference 
category and covariates 
(continuous IVs) constant.  
Classification table Contingency table of predicted and 
observed category probabilities.  
A higher percentage of correct 
predictions (hit rate) indicated a 
better-fitted model. 
AIC and BIC (only 
in multinomial 
logistic models) 
Used to determine which research 
model was the best fit of data for 
non-nested models. 
The model with the lower AIC and 
BIC values would have been the 
better-fitted model. 













Appendix F: Research questions and models 
Research question 1: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, and 
negative interactions with government officials have on membership in a rightwing extremist 
groups? Note: the ECDB uses group membership as an indicator of extremism, thus, people 
coded as DFR=0 could not have been members of an extremist group. However, not all DFRs 
belonged to extremist groups.  
Statistical test: logistic regression. This provided a measure of the strength of the model, and 
individual IV’s effect on membership in a far-right extremist group.  
 
 
To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise 
method:  
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family  
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials  





















(0=no; 1= at least 1)
Extremist significant 
others
(0=no; 1= at least 1)
Individual level 
stressors 




Research question 2: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, and 
negative interactions with government officials have on individual’s commitment to rightwing 
extremism?  
Statistical test: regression analysis. This provided a measure of the strength of the model, and the 




To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise 
method:  
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family  
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials  





























Research question 3: What effect, if any, did an individual’s commitment to far-right 
extremism, membership in an extremist group, individual level stressors, significant others, and 
negative interactions with government officials have on his/her criminal behavior?   
Statistical test: 1) Multinomial logistic regression model (when criminal behavior was measured 
as: 1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically motivated homicide; 3 = 
ideologically motivated financial scheme; 4 = non-ideologically motivated financial scheme);  




To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise 
method:  
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family  
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials  












(1= ideological homicide; 2 = 
non-ideological homicide; 3 
= ideological financial 
scheme; 4 = non-ideological 
financial scheme)











(0=no; 1= at least 1)
Individual level 
stressors




Appendix G: Interpreting MI Regression Models 
Output/statistic Purpose How interpreted 
Average relative 
variance (RVI) 
To assess the variance in the 
estimates across the coefficients 
due to missing data 
RVI close to 0 meant the missing 
data did not unduly influence the 
parameter estimates 
Largest FMI To determine if adequate datasets 
were imputed 
 The imputed datasets, M > 100 * 
FMI 
Model F-statistic To determine if the coefficients 
were significantly different from 0.  
Significant results indicated the 
model was doing a good job of 
predicting the data. 
T-statistic   Was the IV or interaction effect a 
significant predictor of the DV? 
If the p-value for the t-statistic < 
0.05, the variable had a significant 
effect on the DV 
mi test Were the IVs listed in the 
command significantly different 
from 0? 
Non-significant mi test results 
indicate the IV or interaction 
effect should have been dropped; 
significant results indicated the IV 
or interaction effect significantly 
improved the model. 
Monte Carlo Error Same as largest FMI: to assess 
whether adequate datasets were 
imputed based on the sample size 
and number of IVs 
The MCE of a coefficient was 
approximately 10% of its standard 
error; the MCE of a coefficient’s 
T-statistic was approximately 0.1; 
if the p-value was 0.05, the MCE 
of a coefficient’s p-value  should 
have been approximately 0.01; if 
the p-value was 0.01, the MCE of 
a coefficient’s p-value  should 
have been approximately 0.02 
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